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The A and B-theorists of time disagree over whether time passes in reality. The B-theorist denies 
it does, and so, despite its successes, stands at an intuitive disadvantage. The A-theorist on the 
other hand is able to argue that our experience of time provides evidence of its passage. This 
‘argument from experience’ expresses what I take to be the main motivation behind the A-theory. 
My aim is to provide the B-theorist with a response. The general thrust is that the argument from 
experience rests upon a mistaken view about the self – namely, Non-Reductionism. If we instead 
assume a Reductionist view, it should be rejected. 
Derek Parfit argues that, given Reductionism, it can be an empty question whether persons 
persists through change. After defining and justifying Reductionism, I argue for a stronger claim: 
it is always an empty question whether persons – and their experiences – persist. That is to say, 
what we naturally describe as a single persisting person (or experience) could just as accurately 
be described as a series of distinct momentary persons (or experiences).  
This claim is defended, then put to work against the argument from experience. Firstly, I argue it 
follows from this claim that we could not have veridical experiences of temporal passage. So, 
even if we do experience time as passing, we couldn’t take this as evidence that time really does 
pass.  
Finally, I propose a cognitive error account of temporal experience whereby although we believe 
we experience time as passing, this belief is false. I argue that the intuition to the contrary should 
be regarded as a side effect of a faulty, Non-Reductionist conceptual scheme. If we were to 
assimilate a Reductionist conceptual scheme instead, it would be impossible to conceptualise an 
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…I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, 
through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there 
was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel 
disappeared. I now live in the open air.  
Parfit, Reasons and Persons 
 

































Does time pass? To the uninitiated, the answer will seem obvious. But the question, in 
some form or another, is one that philosophers have been grappling with for millennia. In 
the early twentieth century, however, two papers were published that were to galvanise 
the debate: Albert Einstein’s ‘On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies’ (1905), and 
John McTaggart’s ‘The Unreality of Time’ (1908). McTaggart’s paper teased apart two 
different ways of thinking about time. Within the ‘A-series’, events are ordered according 
to their changing relations to the present (pastness and futurity); within the ‘B-series’, 
events are ordered in terms of their unchanging relations to one another (earlier-than and 
later-than). Debate ensued over which of these conceptions more fundamentally describes 
reality. The A-theorist holds the common sense view that the passage of time and a 
changing present are objective features of reality.1 The B-theorist on the other hand 
conceives of reality as a spatio-temporal ‘block’ in which ‘now’ is merely perspectival – 
analogous to ‘here’ in space – and from which the passage of time is absent. Einstein’s 
paper meanwhile gave birth to relativistic physics, which, with its unification of space 
and time, and omission of an objective present, is widely thought to describe a B-theoretic 
block universe.  
The B-theory is now the front runner, having accumulated a commanding array of 
supporting arguments. There does, however, remain a thorn in the B-theory’s side: 
experience. Simply, time seems to pass. I take this to be the main motivation behind the 
A-theory, and is illustrated by the following oft-cited quotes:  
We must regard the feeling of ‘becoming’ as (in some respects at least) a true 
mental insight into the physical condition which determines it … Surely 
‘becoming’ is a reality – or the nearest we can get to a description of reality. We 
are convinced that a dynamic character must be attributed to the external world. 
(Eddington 1928: 89, 94-95) 
                                                          




I find it impossible to relinquish the sensation of a flowing time and a moving 
present moment. It is something so basic to my experience that I am repelled by 
the claim that it is only an illusion or misperception. (Davies 1995: 275) 
[Experience] is a defeater-defeater that overwhelms any B-theoretic arguments 
against the reality of tense. (Craig 2000: 138) 
Temporal experience has in recent years become the focus of the debate between the A- 
and B-theorists. When A- and B-theorists disagree over whether time passes, what they 
are disagreeing about is the nature of change. For the B-theorist, change is mere temporal 
variation. For the A-theorist, an extra ingredient is need. A-theoretic change is essentially 
dynamic; it is the replacement of one state of affairs by a subsequent state of affairs.  
The A-theorist’s motivating intuition can be formulated as an inference to best 
explanation (see e.g. Baron et al 2015). Call this the argument from experience: 
(A1)  We have experiences as of A-theoretic change.2 
(A2)  The best explanation for (A1) is that A-theoretic change occurs in reality.  
(A3)  Therefore, A-theoretic change occurs in reality.  
My aim is to provide the B-theorist with a response to this argument. It is my contention 
that the ostensible plausibility of this argument results from an erroneous conception of 
the self and its identity over time.  
Few writers have been as influential in the field of personal identity as Derek Parfit. 
Parfit’s Reductionism is well known not only for being revisionist in its claims about the 
self, but also for its far-reaching implications regarding rational decision-making and 
ethics. I want to show that it can also weigh in on the debate between the A- and B-
theorists of time. The idea is that a properly Reductionist account of the self informs our 
understanding of temporal experience; and that this in turn undermines the A-theorist’s 
argument from experience.   
There are five chapters. Chapters 1 to 3 develop and defend what I am calling a ‘Neo-
Parfittian’ metaphysics of personal and experiential identity. Chapters 4 and 5 then put 
                                                          
2 ‘As of’ rather than ‘of’ so as not to presuppose the experience to be veridical.  
3 
 
this metaphysics to use against either premise of the A-theorist’s argument from 
experience.  
The purpose of Chapter 1 is to define Reductionism as propounded by Derek Parfit 
(1987), and demonstrate Non-Reductionism to be untenable. Reductionism is a family of 
claims about what personal identity consists in (for example, psychological continuity). 
However, despite its influence, a satisfactory definition of Reductionism remains elusive. 
This is no doubt due in large part to the fact that Parfit’s own offerings are somewhat 
lacking in precision. I begin by taxonomising the various possible positions. The 
shortcomings in Parfit’s definitions are then highlighted by comparing them to those of 
another closely-related family of views: Criterialism (and Anti-Criterialism).  
Parfit gives us two paradigm examples of Non-Reductionism: the Cartesian View and the 
Further Fact View. Arguments against these positions are considered, and, where needed, 
shored up. It is found that these arguments rule out all but one of the positions in the 
taxonomy: the view that personal identity consists in empirical relations holding between 
empirical entities. This is settled upon as our definition of Reductionism; all others 
positions in the taxonomy are Non-Reductionist.  
In Chapter 2 I argue that, given the truth of Reductionism, it is an empty question whether 
persons, and their experiences, persist. A question is empty when disagreements over how 
to answer it are merely verbal. Parfit employs his Combined Spectrum thought 
experiment to argue that a person’s diachronic identity can be indeterminate, and that 
when this is the case, it is because the question of that person’s identity is empty.3 This is 
an intriguing claim, since indeterminacy in thought experiments like the Combined 
Spectrum is generally held to arise as a result of vagueness; but vagueness is conspicuous 
in its absence from Parfit’s discussion.  
A way forward is found in Ted Sider’s (2011) treatment of verbal disputes, which allows 
us to accommodate vagueness in the Combined Spectrum while retaining the conclusion 
that identity questions can be empty. Having done so, I then argue that a stronger 
conclusion is warranted: it is always an empty question whether a person persists through 
change. I extend this claim further still, arguing that, on the assumption that experiences 
                                                          
3 An example of such a question of identity would be: ‘does person p1 persist (retain their identity) 




are individuated by the persons qua subjects who have them, the same can be said of 
experiences: although it is natural to describe a continuous experiential episode as a single 
unified experience, it would be just as metaphysically accurate to describe it as a series 
of distinct momentary experiences. A potential reply to this ‘Neo-Parfittian’ claim in the 
form of Barry Dainton’s (2008) phenomenal continuity account of personal identity is 
considered, but is found to be a version of Non-Reductionism and disregarded 
accordingly.  
Chapter 3 defends the Neo-Parfittian claim against the arguments of Matthew Soteriou 
(2013) and Ian Phillips (2011a). Both argue for a ‘holistic’ conception of experience 
according to which ‘whole’ extended experiences are metaphysically prior to their 
momentary parts. If true, it would mean that we can only make sense of momentary 
experiences as part of extended wholes, and the Neo-Parfittian claim would be false: we 
couldn’t just as well describe an extended experience as a series of distinct momentary 
experiences. Both writers argue that motion perception presents certain puzzles that can 
only be solved from within a holistic framework. I show that their arguments are 
unsuccessful, and that it is in fact the view they attack which is placed to make sense of 
the phenomena in question.  
I first examine Soteriou’s argument. I show that the puzzle Soteriou raises can only be a 
puzzle if we have already presupposed the ‘atomistic’ conception he opposes to be false. 
If instead we assume it to be true, there is no mystery whatsoever. Phillips’s argument is 
examined next, and found to fare no better. The ostensible paradox he raises is indeed 
troublesome. However, I show that his solution has unacceptable neurological 
consequences, and runs together two importantly distinct neural mechanisms. I present a 
much simpler solution to the paradox which avoids these problems, and does so without 
the need for the holistic conception of experience. We need be worried by neither puzzle.  
In Chapter 4, the Neo-Parfittian claim is put to use against (A2) of the A-theorist’s 
argument from experience, which claims that the best explanation for our experiences as 
of passage is that time passes in reality. I counter by arguing that, given the Neo-Parfittian 
claim, we would not be justified in believing that we have veridical experiences of 
passage; and so even if time did pass, we couldn’t take this to explain the experience 
claimed by (A1).   
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Before outlining the counter-argument, a word on terminology. My use of ‘event’ and 
‘state’ throughout the thesis will be somewhat idiosyncratic. Usually, when writers use 
the term ‘event’ they mean something that is processual, or something that changes over 
time; by ‘state’, writers usually mean something that is unchanging. Normally, then, states 
can be said to have temporal extension. For example, one could be said to be in a state of 
happiness over some period. When I say ‘event’, however, I merely mean something with 
temporal extension. So if I feel happy for some period, this would, according to my 
terminology, be a happiness event. When I say ‘state’ I will be talking about something 
without temporal extension. A state can then be thought of as, if one accepts such talk, a 
‘time-slice’ of an event (for this reason I may sometimes talk of states of events). So a 
happiness event will comprise happiness states that obtain during, or in the event (I accept 
both ways of talking). A state is always at a time, whereas an event is always over time.4  
Now for the counter-argument of Chapter 4. The outline is as follows. I argued in Chapter 
2 that it is an empty question whether experiences have temporal extension. If it is an 
empty question whether experiences have temporal extension, any theory that needs to 
posit extended experiences to account for our perception of extended events must be 
rejected. We must be able to account for our perceptual awareness of extended events 
within momentary experiential states. If our awareness of extended events must be 
accounted for within momentary experiential states, our awareness of extended events 
must be derived from our awareness of instantaneous states obtaining during events. 
Given that our perception of events is derivative in this way, A-theoretic change (A-
change) cannot be an object of experience; even if change has an A-theoretic structure, 
we could not experience it as such. So, even if we allow that A-change is represented in 
experience, we must accept that it is non-veridical. (A2) is refuted. 
Finally, I reply to (A1) in chapter 5. I propose a cognitive error account of temporal 
experience whereby although we believe we have experiences as of passage, this belief is 
false. I begin by softening intuitions against the idea that we could make mistakes about 
the content of our own experience. Some people think it is impossible to be mistaken in 
this way: when it comes to one’s own experience, what seems is what is. I begin by 
showing that this cannot be right as a general principle since there are times when we do 
make such mistakes. I then consider a version of this principle restricted to temporal 
                                                          
4 A persisting object could therefore be thought of as a spatio-temporal event; a photograph of 
that object would capture an image of a state.  
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experience. By framing it within the debate between conceptualists and 
nonconceptualists, however, I show that a proponent of this restricted principle would 
face a dilemma, finding enemies on both sides of the debate.  
The B-theorist may therefore reject the A-theorist’s motivating intuition that experience 
represents time passing. Provided, that it, they can explain how it is we come to make 
such a mistake. I propose that this mistake results from our Non-Reductionist conception 
of the self. We naturally suppose that our persistence is metaphysically significant; that 
questions of identity are not empty. This conception of the self is built into our conceptual 
scheme in the form of first person pronouns. Because Reductionism is true, however, a 
conceptual scheme which lacked the concept of diachronic personal identity would be  no 
less metaphysically accurate than ours. We could use ‘we’ to refer to our temporally 
extended selves rather than ‘I’. The intuition that I experience A-change necessarily 
presupposes that I am the same subject that experiences both states of affairs. Without the 
concept of personal identity (and experiential identity), it would make no sense to suppose 
that I could experience A-change. Such an experience would be impossible to 
conceptualise. And so it would be impossible to conceptualise an experience as of A-
change. We would be faced with a certain phenomenology, but we could not characterise 
this phenomenology as time passing. (A1) is refuted.  
My overall conclusion is that neither (A1) nor (A2) should be accepted, and, as such, that 
the A-theorist’s argument from experience fails. We must resist our A-theoretic 




Chapter 1: Personal Reductionism 
 
The aim of this chapter is to define Reductionism as propounded by Derek Parfit, and to 
show that Non-Reductionism should be rejected. Few writers have been as influential in 
the field of personal identity as Derek Parfit. Yet despite this, a satisfactory definition of 
Reductionism remains elusive. Parfit makes several claims that fall under the banner of 
Reductionism: that identity does not matter in survival; that identity can be indeterminate; 
and so on. I focus on his ontological claim: the claim about what personal identity consists 
in.1 
When considering the question of what personal identity consists in, there are many 
different ways one might respond. I begin by taxonomising the various positions, before 
showing why Parfit’s own definitions are unsatisfactory. I then critically evaluate the 
arguments populating the literature that would count against certain positions in the 
taxonomy. It is shown that not only does Parfit fail to offer a watertight case against Non-
Reductionism, but that there are other views that should count as Non-Reductionist that 
he fails to identify. A superior definition of Reductionism is settled upon, and the case 
against Non-Reductionism is shored up. It is concluded that Reductionism is the only 
tenable position. 
1.1 Taxonomising the positions 
Broadly speaking, we can divide the different responses to the question of what identity 
consists in into two sorts, which I shall call informativist and primitivist. An informativist 
thinks something informative (non-circular, non-trivial) can be said about what grounds 
personal identity. Their explanans (what identity consists in) contains concepts that aren’t 
included in, or equivalent to the concepts in, the explanandum (‘personal identity’).2 The 
primitivist denies this. For the primitivist, the explanans contains only those concepts that 
                                                          
1 Following Parfit (1999), I will refer to the ontological claim simply as ‘Reductionism’.  
2 Whenever I write ‘identity’ I am referring to the diachronic relation, unless otherwise stated.  
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are included in, or equivalent to, those in the explanandum. Their response is 
uninformative. 
There are two main ways an answer can be informative. One sort of answer tells us 
something informative about the entity that’s involved. For example, one might say that 
personal identity consists in the persistence of an empirical entity, such as a body.3 
Similarly, an informativist might say that identity consists in the persistence of something 
non-empirical, like a separately existing immaterial soul-like entity, or Cartesian Ego. 
When a position is informative about the entity involved, we can call it ‘entity 
informativism’, or ‘E-informativism’ for short. We can then differentiate between the 
empirical and non-empirical versions as ‘E-informativismE’ and ‘E-informativismNE’ 
respectively.  
The other sort of informativist answer says something informative about the relation 
itself. We may call this position ‘relation informativism’, or ‘R-informativism’ for short. 
Again there are empirical and non-empirical variants. The typical empirical variants are 
physical continuity and/or connectedness (C/C), and psychological C/C. It might help to 
say a little about these relations. Firstly, ‘continuity’ is transitive, whereas 
‘connectedness’ is not: even if person p1 at time t1 is not connected to p3 at t3, p1 at t1 
will be continuous with p3 at t3 provided that they are connected to p2 at t2, who is in 
turn connected to p3 at t3. I (now) can be physically (or psychologically) continuous with 
an earlier self even in the absence of any direct physical (or psychological) connections, 
provided there is a chain of physically (or psychologically) connected selves between us. 
In this way, continuity can be used to explain how, for example, I (now) can be considered 
the same person as four-year-old-Henry, despite the fact that my body is now made up of 
new cells, and my psychology is radically different.  
There still remains the question of what exactly physical and psychological C/C are. We 
should be careful not to impose too strict a definition here – after all, we are trying to 
chart the possible views on personal identity, and there may well be different views about 
what counts as a physical or psychological connection (and therefore what counts as an 
instance of continuity). Parfit’s writing (1987: 203-204) suggests that he thinks physical 
connectedness is simply a matter of being made up of the same physical stuff, such that I 
am physically connected to a past self in virtue of having the same cells etc. However, 
                                                          
3 I am here using ‘empirical’ in the sense of discoverable through experience.  
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this is to define physical connectedness in terms of identity. An account of personal 
identity along these lines therefore fails to tell us anything informative about the relation 
that grounds personal identity. It only tells us about the entities involved – that they are 
made up of physical stuff. It merely says that personal identity consists in bodily identity. 
This family of views – those that are informative about the entity but uninformative about 
the relation – will be addressed shortly.  
For an account based on physical C/C to be informative about the relation, it cannot 
define physical connectedness in terms of bodily persistence.4 It cannot employ the notion 
of quantitative, or numerical identity – that one and the same body (or body part) is 
existing at two different times. What it can do, however, is employ the notion qualitative 
sameness, or exact similarity. On this view, I am physically connected to a past self in 
virtue of having certain distinctive physical properties in common with that person 
(properties that don’t presuppose numerical identity). If we could give a complete 
physical description of my body at t1, much of this description would be rather generic 
(two arms, two legs etc.). But at a greater level of detail it would describe many features 
that were peculiar to me, even down to the arrangement of cells. If we were to give a 
second such description a few moments later, we would find there to be many similarities 
between the two.5 With many of the descriptive peculiarities, there would be an exact 
similarity. It would then be in virtue of these similarities that physical connectedness 
holds.6  
This notion of connectedness can then be transposed to psychological connectedness. The 
classic example of a psychological connection is memory: if p2 at t2 remembers the 
experiences of p1 at t1, then p1 and p2 are psychologically connected. But other 
psychological connections could be beliefs, hopes, desires, and so on. In short, we may 
                                                          
4 I assume that ‘persistence’, ‘continued existence’, and other such concepts presuppose identity.  
5 Connectedness holds as a matter of degrees: the more similarities, and the more distinctive those 
properties are, the higher the degree to which the two persons would be connected. 
6 Additional conditions could be added. For instance, one might want to say that p1 and p2 must 
be spatiotemporally contiguous in order to be physically connected. Such a view would then rule 
out true teleportation. Parfit seems to assume such a condition when he says ‘[t]hose who believe 
in the Physical Criterion would reject Teletransportation’ (1987: 204). Although this would be 
true on many plausible interpretations of the physical criterion, other interpretations need not be 
so strict. I will assume throughout however that these views include a non-branching clause: 
whatever relation is taken to ground identity, that relation cannot take a branching form, since a 
single person at t1 cannot be identical to two distinct persons at t2. 
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say that psychological connectedness holds between p1 and p2 when there are certain 
distinctive similarities between the psychologies of p1 and p2.  
So much for the empirical variants of R-informativism. The non-empirical variant claims 
that personal identity consists in immaterial C/C – that is, continuity and/or connectedness 
of the spooky stuff that (one might think) Cartesian Egos are made of. As Richard 
Swinburne writes: 
We may say that there is a stuff of another kind, immaterial stuff, and that persons 
are made of both normal bodily matter and of this immaterial stuff but that it is 
the continuity of the latter which provides that continuity of stuff which is 
necessary for the identity of persons over time. (Swinburne 1984: 27) 
We can now differentiate between the empirical and non-empirical versions of R-
informativism as ‘R-informativismE’ and ‘R-informativismNE’ respectively. These four 
different types of informativist position can be plotted onto a table, which can be 
populated with examples where applicable.  
 
Relation 






Physical C/C of bodies 





Psychological C/C of 
Cartesian Egos 
Immaterial C/C of Cartesian 
Egos 
Figure 1: taxonomy i 
It will be useful to make some clarifying remarks about the examples given in Figure 1. 
Take ‘physical C/C of bodies’ for starters. Physical C/C holds between physical states, 
and in this instance those physical states are the physical states of bodies. The example is 
empirically informative about both the relation and the entity. So the example fits 
straightforwardly in the E-informativeE/R-informativeE box (top left). But psychological 
C/C is not so straightforward. Psychological C/C holds between psychological states. But 
there is disagreement over what sort of entity psychological states are attributable to. A 
11 
 
substance dualist will think that psychological states are attributable to immaterial mental 
entities like Cartesian Egos, whereas a materialist will think that brains (or bodies, or 
organisms etc.) are the bearers of psychological states. So psychological C/C might be 
attributed to empirical or non-empirical entities. For this reason, psychological C/C 
features in both boxes in the left hand column (E-informativeE/R-informativeE and E-
informativeNE/R-informativeE). 
I have left the E-informativeE/R-informativeNE (top right) box as n/a; no view can be 
empirically informative about the entity but non-empirically informative about the 
relation. It might be objected that there is a type of view that belongs here. The view I 
have in mind might be called the ‘divine bundle theory’. According to this view, a person 
is just a bundle of physical and/or psychological states, and these states are unified over 
time as a matter of divine will, or suchlike. Bundles of empirical states are connected 
merely because God decided so. The thought goes that we would be saying something 
informative about the relation – viz. that it is a divine sort of connectedness – but we are 
also admitting that it is beyond our empirical grasp. However, although there is a sense 
in which this view says something informative about the relation, it is not informative in 
the right sort of way. It is informative only insofar as it says something about the cause 
of the relation: God causes the unification relation to hold. But it doesn’t tell us anything 
about the relation itself. After all, someone might hold that personal identity consists in 
physical continuity between bodies, but nevertheless hold that this physical continuity 
holds as a matter of divine will. Or someone might hold that persistence consists in the 
divinely willed immaterial continuity between Egos. These two views respectively say 
something empirically and non-empirically informative about the relation involved in 
persistence. Hence, knowing that the relation that grounds persistence holds as a matter 
of divine will is, in itself, insufficient to say whether or not a view is empirically or non-
empirically informative about that relation. We are now in a position to see why the divine 
unification theory fails to count as a R-informative view. It says something informative 
about why the relation holds, but not about what the relation itself actually is. 
There is a prima facie case for supposing that entity informativism and relation 
informativism go hand-in-hand. If you think persons persist by virtue of the persistence 
of their physical bodies (E-informativismE), then it is natural to also think that physical 
C/C is the grounding relation (R-informativismE). Or if you think that persons persist by 
virtue of the persistence of an immaterial substance (E-informativismNE), then it would 
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make sense to hold that immaterial C/C is the grounding relation (R-informativismNE). 
So it is plausible to suppose that someone who claims something informative about the 
entity will do the same regarding the relation. 
And indeed they might do. But there is nothing forcing them to. One might think that 
something informative can be said about the entity only. For example, someone might 
think that a person persists by virtue of the persistence of a Cartesian Ego, any yet contend 
that the persistence of Egos is brute. Similarly, someone might think that we persist by 
virtue of the persistence of our bodies, but hold that bodily persistence is brute. Such 
positions are uninformative about the grounding relation, but informative about the 
entities it holds between. We can therefore add a column to our table for those positions 
that say something informative about the entity but not the relation itself. Following suit, 
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Figure 2: taxonomy ii 
It does seem, on the other hand, that if we are to say something informative about the 
relation we must say something informative about the entity. This is because if we say 
something informative about the relation we will be attributing to the entity the states 
between which the stipulated relation holds. For example, if you think that persistence 
consists in physical continuity, you will have to accept that the grounding entity – the 
entity involved in whatever grounds identity – has physical states. And that is to say 
something informative about the entity. Admittedly, a more informative answer could be 
given. Knowing the sort of states the entity has doesn’t tell us everything there is to know 
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about the entity. But still, in saying something informative about the relation, something 
informative about the entity will follow.  
It might not seem obvious that this must be the case. Some relations, one might think, do 
not entail anything informative about the entity. For instance, it might seem plausible for 
someone to hold that causality is the grounding relation whilst having nothing informative 
to say about the entity. But although they might not think that they have anything 
informative to say about the entity, they must at least admit that, whatever the entity is, it 
has causal states (i.e. states that figure in causal relations). Now, if all candidate entities 
have causal states, this wouldn’t tell us anything informative about the entity. But there 
are surely potential candidate entities that don’t have causal states. Someone might, for 
example, claim that the spooky states of Cartesian Egos are causally unrelated. This 
would be an odd view, for sure. But if someone thinks that personal identity consists in 
brute Cartesian Ego persistence, they needn’t think that any relation holds between the 
states of Egos except identity. As such, if someone claims that the entity that grounds 
personal persistence has causal states, they will be claiming something informative about 
that entity.  
That leaves one last combination that hasn’t yet been discussed: the position whereby 
nothing informative can be said about either the entity or the relation. This amounts to a 
full-blooded primitivism, which Parfit calls the Further Fact View (1987: 210). According 
to the primitivist, the fact of a person’s persistence does not consist in any other facts at 
all. It is a ‘further fact’.7  
It should be noted that a primitivist might be able to claim that personal identity consists 
in the persistence of an ego. This might seem like an inconsistent position. Primitivists, 
after all, deny that identity consists in any other facts. But they could claim that identity 
consists in the persistence of an ego, provided they weren’t using ‘ego’ in the same way 
as the E-informativistNE. Rather than holding that egos are immaterial entities, they would 
have to be using ‘ego’ in such a way that made their claim only trivially true. They might 
for instance use ‘ego’ merely as a placeholder for ‘person’, or to mean something like 
                                                          
7 There is a sense in which the Cartesian Views posit a ‘further fact’. Once we have all the physical 
and psychological facts to hand, the Cartesian will still say that there is a ‘further’ fact to a 
person’s identity – i.e. a non-empirical fact about an immaterial entity. However, the Cartesian 
nevertheless claims that personal identity consists in this fact. And so it is not a further fact in the 
sense intended by Parfit. The primitivist denies that personal identity consists in any other facts. 
This is why the primitivist’s view is called the Further Fact View.  
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‘essence of a person’ – which is then defined circularly in terms of personal identity. We 























of Cartesian Egos 




Uninformative n/a n/a Primitivism 
Figure 3: taxonomy iii 
1.2 Reductionism and Criterialism  
Now that we can see the full range of positions, we can take a look at how Parfit defines 
Reductionism and Non-Reductionism. As we will see, Parfit’s writing sometimes 
suggests a way of defining the terms that would bring them in line with another family of 
views: Criterialism (and Non-Criterialism). However, when we do so we get the wrong 
results: positions Parfit explicitly characterises as Non-Reductionist are in fact Criterialist 
positions. This section will expose the flaws in Parfit’s definitions, and take some initial 
steps towards finding satisfactory replacements.    
Parfit (1987: 210) defines Reductionism as the view that: 
R1: ‘the fact of a person’s identity over time just consists in the holding 
of certain more particular facts.’8 
                                                          
8 Parfit adds an optional second condition for Reductionists: that the facts in which identity consist 
must be describable without presupposing the existence of persons. There are further problems 
with this second condition, and, since Parfit allows that Reductionists need not commit themselves 
to it, I shall ignore it. For discussion, see Hummel (2017). 
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A view is then defined as Non-Reductionist if it rejects R1 (ibid.).  
There has been much debate over whether Parfit’s use of the term ‘reductionism’ is 
warranted (e.g. Cassam 1989; Garrett 1991; McDowell 1997; Shoemaker 1997; 
Blackburn 1997; Parfit 1999; Behrendt 2003).9 It is now common to find philosophers 
using the terms ‘Criterialism’ and ‘Anti-Criterialism’ instead, which prima facie appear 
to be doing the same work as Parfit’s ‘Reductionism’ and ‘Non-Reductionism’ 
respectively. Duncan writes: 
Some philosophers think that personal identity through time consists in 
something, [and] that there are informative necessary and sufficient conditions – 
i.e. criteria – for personal identity through time. These philosophers are 
criterialists. (Duncan 2014: 283) 
Similarly, Olson writes:  
I propose that a proper criterion is one that completes this formula: 
Necessarily, if x is a human person at t and y exists at t*, x = y iff and because… 
where the word “because” expresses the logical or metaphysical dependence […] 
Criterialism, then, is the claim that some such criterion is true. (Olson 2012: 49) 
According to Criterialists, then, 
C1:   Personal identity consists in something (other than itself), and 
C2: There are non-trivial necessary and sufficient conditions for 
personal identity. 
I take C1 and R1 to be equivalent for our purposes. Although Parfit does not stipulate an 
equivalent of C2 in his definition, it would appear that he implicitly assumes it. We can 
see this assumption at work is his characterisation of a Reductionist psychological 
criterion: 
                                                          
9  Many writers think that ‘Reductionism’ is something of a misnomer. The aim of this chapter is 
not to defend the use of ‘Reductionism’ as a technical term. Rather, my aim is to find a satisfactory 




X today is one and the same person as Y at some past time if and only if (2) X is 
psychologically continuous with Y, (3) this continuity has the right kind of cause, 
and (4) it has not taken a ‘branching’ form. (5) Personal identity over time just 
consists in the holding of facts like (2) to (4). (Parfit 1987: 207, emphasis added) 
 
The ‘if and only if’ sets out the necessary and sufficient conditions as required by C2. At 
first blush, then, it seems that there is no real difference between Reductionism and 
Criterialism. The immediate problem with this diagnosis is that we know from Parfit’s 
examples of Non-Reductionism that some Non-Reductionists should be classified as 
Criterialists. Parfit tells us that there are two sorts of Non-Reductionist view: the Further 
Fact View and the Cartesian View. The Further Fact View says that a person’s identity 
consists in no other facts – i.e. that it is a primitive fact. This rejects R1, and so, as we 
should expect, counts as a version of Non-Reductionism. With the Cartesian View, 
however, we get the wrong result. Someone who holds the Cartesian View thinks that a 
person’s identity is tied to that of an Ego, and so will hold one of the entity informativistNE 
views. But none of these views reject R1; they all say that identity consists in ‘certain 
more particular facts’ – fact about Egos. Indeed, looking at Figure 3 we can see that every 
view except for E-uninformativism/R-uninformativism (i.e. the primitivist’s Further Fact 
View) claims that identity consists in other more particular facts. So by R1, the Cartesian 
View is classified as Reductionist. This is not what Parfit wants.  
Things get more muddled when we look at Parfit’s attempts at clarification. He later says 
that Reductionism is the view that: 
R2: ‘Our identity over time consists in physical and/or psychological 
continuity.’ (Parfit 1999: 217) 
Now that we have taxonomised the positions, we can see that it is possible to say 
something non-empirically informative about the entities, whilst saying something 
empirically informative about the relation that holds between them: it is possible for a 
Cartesian to hold that identity consists in psychological continuity. According to R2, this 
would mean they are a Reductionist. Again, we get the wrong result. What’s causing this 
problem is that R2 defines a view as Reductionist in terms of the relation it posits, 
whereas the Cartesian view is defined in terms of the entities it posits. It is clear now that 
satisfactory definitions of Reductionism and Non-Reductionism need to account for both. 
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If we assume that the two Non-Reductionist views Parfit discusses (viz. the Cartesian 
View and the Further Fact View) are exhaustive of Non-Reductionism, we end up with a 
definition of Non-Reductionism as the view that identity consists in facts involving Egos, 
or else in no other facts at all; and Reductionism as the view that identity consists in other 
facts not involving Egos (Pollock 2018). Having distinguished between facts about 
entities and facts about relations, we can see that this would classify two positions as 
Reductionist: the E-informativistE/R-informativistE view (top left box), and the E-
informativistE/R-uninformativist view (top right).  
The rest of this chapter will critically examine arguments in the literature that are effective 
against the various positions in our taxonomy. It will be shown that we should not take 
the Further Fact View and the Cartesian View to be exhaustive of the Non-Reductionist 
positions, as the considerations that count against the primitivist also count against the E-
informativistE/R-uninformativist. In other words, any view that says the fact of a person’s 
identity consists in the brute persistence of any kind of entity should be classed as Non-
Reductionist, and disregarded as such. A satisfactory definition of Reductionism and 
Non-Reductionism will finally be settled upon, with Reductionism being the only tenable 
position. We begin by looking at the objections against the Cartesian and Further Fact 
Views.  
1.3 Arguments against the Cartesian View 
We can begin with the tried-and-tested arguments against the Cartesian View. In general 
terms, the case against the Cartesian View is epistemological: we have no evidence for 
Cartesian Egos, so we shouldn’t believe they exist.  There are two versions of this 
argument, which apply to different versions of the Cartesian View.  
One version of the Cartesian View is what Parfit calls the ‘Featureless Cartesian View’. 
Proponents of the Featureless Cartesian View hold that Egos are devoid of empirical 
features. Someone who holds this view would either be R-uninformativist or R-
informativistNE.  That is to say, they would hold that personal identity consists in the brute 
persistence of Egos, or else that personal identity consists in the immaterial continuity of 
Egos. Parfit’s argument against these views follows the objections of Locke (1694). Since 
featureless Egos are devoid of empirical features (e.g. psychological states), it would be 
impossible to have any evidence of their existence or persistence. Although we are aware 
of psychological continuity, we cannot attribute this to an Ego if we are supposing that 
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Egos lack empirical features. Because of this, it would be impossible to know if identity 
ever held between two persons. Egos could swap between bodies and minds; or they could 
exist only momentarily, with one being replaced by another in a continual cycle. So what 
we intuitively reidentify as a single persisting person could actually be a series of distinct 
persons. An account of personal identity that makes it impossible to know whether or not 
identity ever holds between two persons should be rejected.  
Parfit does accept, however, that there could have been evidence in favour of the 
Cartesian View. Or rather a version of the Cartesian View: the R-informativistE version. 
According to the R-informativistE view, empirical relations – i.e. psychological C/C – 
hold between Egos, since Egos are the bearers of psychological states. Parfit imagines a 
Japanese woman who claims to remember being an ancient Celtic Warrior. Although we 
would be rightfully sceptical of her claim, Parfit imagines that she is able to make certain 
predictions though would otherwise have been impossible to make. For example, she is 
able to say where certain settlements were, and successfully direct archaeological digs to 
places where she remembers hiding particular artefacts that she can accurately describe, 
and so on. If we lived in a world where this was commonplace, it might be reasonable to 
conclude that the carrier of memory was not the brain but some spooky substance or entity 
that could pass from one brain to another over the generations. In such a world, there 
would be empirical support for the R-informativistE version of the Cartesian View. But 
we don’t live in a world like that. In our world there is no such evidence. And so, just as 
we have no reason to believe that, say, fairies exist, we have no reason to believe that 
Cartesian Egos exist. The R-informativistE version of the Cartesian View should therefore 
also be rejected.  
Between these two arguments, all versions of the Cartesian View are ruled out. These 
arguments are well discussed, and I will assume their efficacy. The E-informativistNE 
(middle row) positions in Figure 3 may therefore be discounted.  
1.4 Arguments against the Further Fact View 
1.4.1 The Shoemaker-Parfit argument 
David Shoemaker (2002) offers an objection against the primitivist’s Further Fact View 
which builds on Parfit’s Combined Spectrum thought experiment. Parfit asks us to 
imagine a range of operations in which the distinctive physical and psychological (viz. 
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empirical) properties of person p1 (who, in this case, is Derek Parfit) are replaced with 
those of p2 (Greta Garbo). The idea is to test our intuitions about how much change a 
person can go through before they can no longer be considered to be the same person. At 
the near end of the spectrum, some minutiae of p1’s empirical properties – say, a cell and 
a vague aspect of a distant memory – are replaced with those of p2. In the next case along, 
a trivially larger amount of p1’s empirical properties are replaced with those of p2. This 
continues until we reach the far end of the spectrum, where we have an operation in which 
all of p1’s distinctive empirical properties are replaced with those of p2. 
It is important to note that the spectrum we are imagining is not a series of operations. 
We are not to imagine a single experiment consisting of multiple operations conducted 
one after another, each changing some further trivial aspect of p1’s empirical properties. 
The spectrum does not represent a single experiment in which p1’s empirical properties 
are progressively replaced. Rather, the operations are, as it were, parallel experiments, in 
the sense that each case on the spectrum represents a distinct possible experiment in which 
only one operation is made. At the near end of the spectrum we are to imagine some trivial 
aspect of p1’s empirical properties are replaced in a single operation; at the far end we 
are to imagine all of p1’s distinctive properties are replaced in a single operation.  
The Combined Spectrum will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. For now, though, 
it will suffice to say that Parfit’s main target is the intuition that identity is always 
determinate. If Parfit’s argument is successful, it would show that there are conceivable 
cases where we can’t give a yes or no answer to the question of whether a person persists. 
Shoemaker takes this conclusion and uses it to construct an argument against the 
primitivist’s Further Fact View, which we may call the Shoemaker-Parfit argument.  
(SP1) If the Further Fact View is true, identity must always be 
determinate.  
(SP2) The Combined Spectrum thought experiment shows that identity 
can be indeterminate.  
(SP3)  Therefore, the Further Fact View cannot be true.  
The argument is unsuccessful, however. Neither premise of this argument need be 
accepted by the primitivist.  
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In support of (SP1), Shoemaker says of the primitivist’s ‘further fact’: 
[T]he further fact either obtains or it does not. That is, questions of identity 
always have determinate answers: either “I” exist of “I” do not. The reason for 
this entailment is that, according to these views, our identity involves one more 
thing that the more particular (numerous, perhaps) facts about brains, bodies, etc. 
viz. it involves a fact about the entity which is me, some one thing that is distinct 
from the mere agglomeration of my material constitution. So given this further 
fact is a fact, it either obtains or it doesn’t. (Shoemaker 2002: 152) 
Although the primitivist may accept this story, I see no reason why they should be forced 
to. Yes, the primitivist believes the fact of a person’s identity is a further fact. That is just 
to say they think that, when it is a fact that a person persists, this fact does not consist in 
other facts. Similarly, the primitivist thinks that, when a person does not persist, this fact 
consists in no other facts. Again, this fact would be a ‘further fact’ – a further fact about 
identity determinately not holding.  
Now, if this is what the primitivist can say about instances where identity either does or 
doesn’t hold, why can’t they tell the same sort of story about instances where identity 
neither does hold nor doesn’t hold? If they can say that there are further facts about 
determinate identity, why can’t they say there are further facts about indeterminate 
identity? There doesn’t seem to be anything preventing a primitivist from saying: there 
can be cases where it is neither true nor false that a person persists; that when this is the 
case it is a fact that identity neither does nor does not hold; and that this fact does not 
consist in other facts – that it is a ‘further fact’. Indeed, if someone were to hold such a 
view, what does Shoemaker think we should say their position is? The position is 
undeniably primitivist, since it say that the fact of indeterminate identity consists in no 
other facts. So presumably Shoemaker would have to say that it is the wrong sort of 
primitivism – that the primitivist we have been discussing only thinks that the further facts 
of identity are determinate facts. But that would be to impose an unwarranted restriction 
on the definition. The point is that someone who thinks facts about determinate identity 
consist in no other facts (i.e. the primitivist as defined by Shoemaker) can also contend 
that facts about indeterminate identity consist in no other facts. The truth of the Further 




The primitivist doesn’t need to accept that identity can be indeterminate in order to refute 
Shoemaker’s argument, though. They might instead focus their attention on (SP2) – that 
the Combined Spectrum shows that identity can be indeterminate. A primitivist who 
rejects indeterminate identity will contend that there is a sharp cutoff somewhere along 
the spectrum between identity and non-identity; that there is a borderline between a pair 
of adjacent cases where on one side we have a clear case in which the original person 
persists through the change, and in the next we have a clear case in which they are 
replaced by a distinct new person.  
Parfit objects that this position is indefensible. Only someone who believes in the 
existence of separately existing Cartesian Egos (i.e. a non-empirical informativist about 
the entities that ground personal identity) is entitled to believe that there is a sharp cutoff 
on the spectrum. As the primitivist doesn’t believe that such entities exist, they cannot 
hold that a sharp cutoff exists:  
There are some people who believe that our identity must be determinate, though 
they do not believe that we are separately existing entities distinct from our brains 
and bodies, and our experiences. This view I believe to be indefensible. What 
explains the alleged fact that personal identity is always determinate? […] if we 
are not separately existing entities, how could there be such a borderline? What 
could make it true that, in one case, the resulting person would be me, and in the 
next he would not be me? What would the difference consist in? (Parfit 1987: 
239) 
The thought is that if Cartesian Egos existed (and, presumably, weren’t ontically vague 
entities), there would be a fact of the matter as to when the original Cartesian Ego ceased 
to exist and a new one began.10 And this fact would make it true that, in one case on the 
spectrum we could have a clear case of identity, and in the next case a clear case of non-
identity. But for someone who doesn’t believe that persons are separately existing entities, 
nothing could make it true that there is a sharp cutoff. As Parfit asks, what could the 
difference between identity and non-identity consist in?  
                                                          
10 Proponents of ontic vagueness say that the world itself can be vague, and that vagueness is not 
(only) due to our use of language etc. If a Cartesian thought that Egos were ontically vague 
entities, they could hold that identity can be indeterminate (since they could allow that there might 
be cases where it is neither true nor false that an original Ego persisted). In order to hold that 
identity cannot be indeterminate, the Cartesian must therefore reject ontic vagueness of Egos.  
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What Parfit fails to recognise here is that someone might think that identity is always 
determinate whilst denying that we are separately existing entities precisely because they 
think that identity does not consist in anything else. The primitivist position we are 
presently considering rejects indeterminacy. Because of that, our primitivist believes that 
there is a sharp cutoff on the spectrum. But being a primitivist, they hold that facts about 
persistence do not consist in any other facts. So they deny that the difference between 
identity and non-identity is grounded by facts about Cartesian Egos. And so it is because 
of this that they don’t need to appeal to the existence of Cartesian Egos to explain the 
difference between identity and non-identity. Parfit’s objection to the view that there is a 
sharp cutoff in the absence of a Cartesian Ego is, in essence, that it can’t explain the 
difference between identity and non-identity. But his objection clearly assumes that the 
difference is explainable – which is just to beg the question against the primitivist. Parfit 
therefore fails to show that the primitivist who rejects (SP2) is in an indefensible position. 
There is another consideration that might appear to count against the primitivist who 
rejects (SP2): the problem of proportionality. Intuitively, it seems that something of great 
significance (a person’s survival) cannot turn on something of great trivialness (the 
difference of a subatomic particle or suchlike): 
We are inclined to believe that there is always a difference between some future 
person’s being me, and his being someone else. And we are inclined to believe 
that this is a deep difference. But between neighbouring cases in this Spectrum 
the differences are trivial. It is therefore hard to believe that, in one of these cases, 
the resulting person would quite straightforwardly be me, and that, in the next 
case, he would quite straightforwardly be someone else. (Parfit 1987: 239) 
It seems that the primitivist who believes in a sharp cutoff on the spectrum is committed 
to the view that a trivial empirical difference will, as Parfit (1987: 239) says, ‘make all 
the difference’ between identity and non-identity. Since the difference between identity 
and non-identity is a matter of great significance, the primitivist must be mistaken. 
This isn’t quite right, though. We need to get clear about what the primitivist believes. 
Strictly speaking, the primitivist does not believe that a trivial empirical difference will 
‘make all the difference’ between identity and non-identity. The primitivist doesn’t think 
that anything makes it the case that identity is preserved or lost. The facts of persistence 
and cessation, when they obtain, are brute. And so if we are to say that the primitivist 
holds that identity ‘turns on’ a trivial empirical difference, we must understand ‘turns on’ 
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not as ‘consists in’ but as ‘coincides with’. And when this is made explicit, the objection 
loses its force. Parfit’s claim is that a trivial difference cannot constitute a significant 
difference. We can see that, with regards to personal identity, the primitivist would in fact 
agree with Parfit here – they think that no difference whatsoever can constitute the 
significant difference between identity and non-identity. And so they are immune from 
Parfit’s objection.  
Perhaps a stronger, positive proportionality claim might be suggested. Not only must it 
not be the case that a significant difference be constituted by a trivial difference; it must 
be the case that whatever constitutes a significant difference is itself of proportional 
significance. This principle is also ineffective against the primitivist, however. For the 
primitivist, the difference between identity and non-identity consists in nothing other than 
itself. In other words, they think that the difference between persistence and cessation 
consists only in itself. So on their view the significant difference does consist in a 
significant difference – itself! If the principle is to be effective against the primitivist, it 
must be amended as: a significant difference must be constituted by something other than 
itself that is of proportional significance. But this is, again, to beg the question against the 
primitivist. The problem of proportionality is no problem for the primitivist. The 
primitivist is free to reject (SP2). The Shoemaker-Parfit argument is ineffective against 
the primitivist. So far, so good for the Further Fact View.  
1.4.2 Criterialist arguments against the Further Fact View 
If we are to find arguments against the primitivist’s Further Fact View, we would do 
better to look elsewhere. ‘Primitivism’ is not a term one finds being used in the literature 
on personal identity. As we saw, a primitivist fails to say anything informative whatsoever 
about what identity consists in, and so they reject R1 – and, likewise, C1. Since 
Criterialists are committed to C1 and C2, this means that the primitivist rejects 
Criterialism. If we are looking for arguments against the Further Fact View, it might be a 
good idea to take a look at the arguments advanced by Criterialists against Anti-
Criterialism.  
The standard objections against the Anti-Criterialist are epistemological ones, focusing 
on their denial of necessary and sufficient conditions for persistence. One unsuccessful 
line of objection focuses on the lack of necessary conditions. If there are no necessary 
conditions for persistence, the thought goes, there is nothing stopping personal identity 
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from swapping between entities that are discontinuous in every empirical (observable and 
experienceable) regard. The swap might be between distinct human beings, or even 
between a human being and, say, a rock. The fact that the entities are discontinuous in 
every empirical regard is irrelevant; no relation anyone could possibly observe or 
experience could rule the identity-swap possibility out. Sydney Shoemaker must have 
something like this in mind when he objects that the Anti-Criterialist ‘seems committed 
to holding that a series of property instances whose members are causally unrelated could 
nevertheless be the career of a persisting object’ (2012: 126). But the Anti-Criterialist is 
by no means committed to such a view. As Merricks points out (1998), Anti-Criterialism 
is perfectly consistent with the view that there are necessary conditions for persistence. 
So in response to Shoemaker, an Anti-Criterialist could just allow that causal continuity 
is necessary for persistence, but not sufficient for it. And by doing so, their view would 
guarantee that identity only ever holds between object-stages that are causally continuous 
– thus overcoming the sort of concern voiced by Shoemaker.   
Another line of objection focuses on the Anti-Criterialist’s lack of sufficient conditions 
(Duncan 2014; Shoemaker 2012; Olson 2012; Zimmerman 1998). Granted, in positing 
necessary conditions the Anti-Criterialist is able to guarantee that two persons cannot be 
identical unless they are empirically related in certain ways. But because none of those 
empirical relations are sufficient for personal identity, the Anti-Criterialist cannot ever 
guarantee that those two persons are in fact identical. Even if physical continuity is 
necessary for personal persistence, we could have diachronically physically connected 
and continuous persons who were nevertheless numerically distinct. Indeed, because 
physical continuity (or whatever empirical relation we are supposing to be a necessary 
condition for persistence) would not guarantee persistence, the Anti-Criterialist has to 
allow for the possibility that persons never persist. Nothing we could ever observe could 
count as evidence against that possibility.  
1.4.3 Refining the primitivist’s position 
Can we now conclude that Anti-Criterialism, and therefore the primitivist’s Further Fact 
View, is done for? Well, not quite. It depends on the relation between C1 and C2. Recall 
that the Criterialist holds that C1 (identity consists in other facts) and C2 (there are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for identity) are true. Taking that as our definition, an 
Anti-Criterialist will then be someone who thinks that at least one of those claims is false. 
The preceding line of argument counts against someone who thinks that C2 is false. But 
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this will only count against Anti-Criterialism per se if rejecting C1 commits one to 
rejecting C2. If it is possible to reject C1 but affirm C2, the Anti-Criterialist will be able 
to avoid the objections above.   
What is the relation between C1 and C2 then? There is, I think, something intuitive about 
the idea that C1 and C2 are biconditionally related.  The intuition might go something 
like this. If on the one hand you hold that the relation of identity does not consist in any 
other relation, then surely the most you can say is that identity is necessary and sufficient 
for persistence. You won’t be able to supply any non-trivial necessary and sufficient 
conditions – in which case not-C1 entails not-C2; and so C2 entails C1. This appears to 
be the sort of reasoning Sydney Shoemaker is employing when he says: 
The diachronic unity relation cannot be simple and unanalysable if its obtaining 
requires spatio-temporal continuity or connectedness. (Shoemaker 2012: 129) 
As I understand it, to say the diachronic unity relation is simple and unanalysable is to 
say that it does not consist in anything other than itself. If that’s right, then Shoemaker is 
saying that someone who thinks that spatio-temporal continuity is necessary for 
persistence must also think that persistence consists in something other than itself. So by 
Shoemaker’s lights, if there are necessary conditions for persistence, then persistence will 
consist in something other than itself. That is, Shoemaker thinks that C2 entails C1.  
If on the other hand you hold that the fact of a person’s persistence consists in other facts, 
then surely you will also hold that the obtaining of those other facts will be necessary and 
sufficient for that person’s persistence. For example, if you think that one’s persistence 
consists in the existence of a series of persons with whom one is physically continuous 
and/or connected, it might seem to follow that you will hold physical continuity to be 
necessary and sufficient for persistence. If that’s the case, C1 entails C2. Intuitively, then, 
there is a case for supposing that C1 and C2 are biconditionally related. I take it that this 
intuition, or something like it, is demonstrated by the tendency to lump C1 and C2 
together; and that it is further demonstrated by the Criterialists’ apparent assumption that 
refuting Anti-Criterialism can be achieved simply by showing why C2 is indispensable. 
This intuition should not be trusted, however. For starters, as Olson (2012) warns, 
‘[p]erhaps our identity over time could consist in something that is not expressible in 
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions’ (2012: 49). The suggestion here is that C1 
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could be true and yet C2 be false, casting doubt on the conditional C1→C2. I do not want 
to spend any time considering how this might work; the relation we are really interested 
in is not the biconditional itself; what we particularly want to know is whether the 
conditional C2→C1 is true. If this conditional is false, the Anti-Criterialist will be able to 
reject Criterialism by accepting C2 but rejecting C1; and, in accepting C2, will be immune 
to the Criterialist’s epistemological objections considered above.  
In saying that persistence does not consist in anything else, one is saying that, whenever 
it is a fact that a person persists, this fact is not made true by any other facts. That the 
person persists is a ‘brute’ or ‘primitive’ fact. Now, there does not appear to be any 
contradiction in the thought that, even though this fact is brute, it nevertheless always 
happens to be accompanied by certain other facts, such as the holding of particular 
empirical relations. This would amount to the view that personal persistence is brute but 
that it has necessary conditions attached. And further, there does not seem to be any 
contradiction in the thought that, in addition, there are no instances when these other facts 
obtain but the brute fact of persistence doesn’t. This would mean that these other facts are 
sufficient for persistence. Thus, someone who believed all these things would be a 
primitivist who believes there to be necessary and sufficient conditions for persistence. 
There is logical space for someone to reject C1 but accept C2. 
Indeed, the reason that Criterialists need to insist on C1 in addition to C2 is that 
philosophers are not simply interested in what evidence we use to judge that personal 
identity obtains; they want to know what makes it the case that personal identity obtains 
(Olson 2012). If we knew what the necessary and sufficient conditions for personal 
identity were, we would be in a position to make identity judgements. If we knew that, 
say, physical continuity was necessary and sufficient for persistence, we would know that 
whenever physical continuity doesn’t obtain neither does identity; and whenever physical 
continuity does obtain, so identity does too. So we would be able to say that the person 
we are observing now is the same person we were observing some time ago. But we 
wouldn’t merely in virtue of that be able to say why the person we are now observing is 
the same person we were observing before. This is because the biconditional contained 
in C2 is symmetrical: if physical continuity (for example) is necessary and sufficient for 
personal identity, then personal identity is also necessary and sufficient for physical 
continuity. Hence, C2 could be true and it nevertheless be the case that personal identity 
does not consist in physical continuity; it might instead be the case that physical 
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continuity consists in personal identity. Or perhaps personal identity and physical 
continuity aren’t related by a grounding relation at all. Hence, C2 does not entail C1. All 
C2 tells us is that there is a correlation. We need C1 to impose an explanational 
asymmetry on the correlation; we need C1 in order to say what grounds persistence. 
Since C2 does not entail C1, the epistemological objections we discussed earlier that were 
levelled against Anti-Criterialism are not effective against Anti-Criterialism per se, but 
rather against a specific variety of Anti-Criterialism – namely, that which rejects C2. 
Admittedly, this Anti-Criterialist view is the one we typically find populating the 
literature. But if we are to follow the definition of Anti-Criterialism stipulated by the 
authors at the beginning of this chapter, we must recognise there is space for an Anti-
Criterialist to accept C2 whilst rejecting C1; an Anti-Criterialist can be a primitivist who 
holds that brute facts can have necessary and sufficient conditions. This Anti-Criterialist 
is immune to the criticisms examined so far. That is not to say the view does not face 
other difficulties – we will get to those in the following sections. But it just means that 
the Criterialist’s objections considered so far are only half the story.  
From here on in, I will be assuming that the primitivist accepts the existence of necessary 
and sufficient conditions for persistence. For ease of exposition, then, I will use the term 
‘primitivist’ to refer to the Anti-Criterialist who denies C1 but accepts C2. There are two 
arguments I want to make against such a view. Firstly is a general concern about 
theoretical simplicity. Secondly is the question of why we should believe that identity has 
necessary and sufficient conditions if it consists in no other facts.  
1.4.4 Arguments against the refined primitivist position 
The general concern we should have about primitivism is that, all other things being 
equal, primitivism posits more unexplainable facts. This is a point Lewis and Sider make 
against modal primitivism: ‘primitive modality is bad news, and more kinds are worse 
than fewer’ (Lewis 1986: 242; see also Sider 2011: 267). The primitivist about persistence 
claims that the fact of a person’s persistence does not consist in facts about person-stages 
and their relations; the existence of a persisting person is a further fact. For the 
informativist on the other hand, the existence of a persisting person is not a further fact 
and as such theirs is the simpler theory. They are able to explain more, and with fewer 
brute facts. All other things being equal, then, we should prefer informativism as the 
simpler, more epistemically responsible theory. 
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It might be contended by the primitivist that theirs is in fact the simpler theory. After all, 
they say that persistence does not consist in anything but itself, whereas the informativist 
says that persistence consists in all these other facts. Indeed, primitivism about personal 
identity is sometimes referred to as ‘the simple view’.  
This response from the primitivist misses the point of the objection. The primitivist can 
accept that the persisting person is intra-related in certain ways. They do not deny that 
these facts are involved in the persistence of a person. And if they think there are necessary 
and sufficient conditions for persistence (as they will on our current definition of the term 
‘primitivist’), then these facts are necessarily involved. Thus, they will agree with the 
informativist that these finer-grained facts obtain. The difference is that the informativist 
thinks that there is nothing more to a person’s persistence than these finer-grained facts. 
And so, if the informativist were to write an inventory of all the facts involved in a 
person’s persistence, they would not need to include the fact of persistence itself. That 
fact would have already been included in the list of finer-grained facts. This is where the 
primitivist disagrees. The primitivist’s list would include the fact of persistence. So the 
primitivist is committed to all the facts the informativist is, but with the additional further 
fact of a person’s identity.  
That’s not all, though. Our primitivist thinks there are necessary and sufficient conditions 
for persistence. They think that persistence always coincides with some particular 
empirical relation. This, I suggest, should strike us as peculiar. There are, I think, two 
questions that we should ask, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Firstly, if 
persistence doesn’t consist in that relation (or relations), what could possibly make it the 
case that persistence always coincides with a particular empirical relation (or relations)? 
And secondly, why should we believe that persistence always coincides with that relation 
despite not consisting in it? 
With regards to the first question – why there is such a coincidence – the primitivist has 
no explanation as far as I can tell. There just is. Now, this in itself might be enough to 
convince some that primitivism is a hopeless case. But the primitivist can just say that 
this is another brute fact. They’ve already bitten the bullet with the brute fact of 
persistence; entertaining another brute fact might not seem like much to worry about. And 
we can’t object to primitivism simply for positing brute facts about personal persistence. 
What we can object to, however, is the relative complexity of their view. Although it 
might not seem like much, positing another brute fact adds to this complexity, making the 
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case against primitivism stronger. We can object to the epistemic irresponsibility of a 
theory that multiplies the number of brute facts about the world just to keep itself afloat.  
Now for the second question: why should we believe that identity has necessary and 
sufficient conditions, even though it does not consist in anything other than itself? An 
answer to this question has been suggested by Simon Langford (2017). His move is, in 
short, to say that primitivists should accept the existence of necessary and sufficient 
conditions in the actual world, even though they should deny the existence of necessary 
and sufficient conditions in every possible world. Whilst they should allow that it is 
possible for identity to float free from, say, physical continuity, they should accept that it 
always coincides with the relation whenever we observe it: 
[T]here are possible worlds where people bearing all the qualitative relations that 
ordinarily accompany our persistence are distinct. Nonetheless, it’s also possible 
on this view that at the actual world a contingent law holds which ensures people 
bearing those relations are in fact identical. (Langford 2017: 62) 
What the primitivist needs to posit, then, is a contingent ‘gluing law’ that just so happens 
to glue identity to (e.g.) physical continuity in the actual world. With such a law in place, 
it would be guaranteed that whenever we observe physical continuity (between persons) 
we have an instance of personal persistence. Langford’s contention is that the hypothesis 
– that the gluing law holds in the actual world – should be believed for non-empirical 
reasons. His thought is that once we weigh up all the non-empirical virtues of the 
hypothesis we will find it more compelling than not. I do not wish to go through the list 
of virtues one by one and assess whether they are indeed compelling. It is the very 
suggestion that we should find the hypothesis compelling for non-empirical reasons that 
should, I think, be setting off alarm bells.  
The position being assessed here allows that there are two possible worlds exactly similar 
in every respect, except that in one world the gluing law holds and in the other it doesn’t. 
But if it is reasonable to believe that the gluing law holds for non-empirical reasons, the 
inhabitants of one world will have just as much reason to believe that the law holds in 
their own world as the inhabitants of the other world will have to believe it holds in theirs. 
So whatever the non-empirical virtues of the hypothesis, we have to acknowledge that 
there would be no way of knowing whether the gluing law obtains. We have to 
acknowledge that we could well be inhabiting the world in which it doesn’t obtain. But 
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now we seem to have gone full circle: it’s not clear how this position can avoid the 
epistemological problems it set out to avoid. Recall the criticism we encountered earlier 
against Anti-Criterialists who deny there are sufficient conditions for persistence. The 
problem was that no observation could guarantee that the people we intuitively identify 
were in fact the same person. We would have to allow for the possibility that persons 
never persist. The same can be said of Langford’s proposal. We must, on Langford’s 
proposal, recognise that whatever the non-empirical virtues of believing that the gluing 
law holds, we might inhabit the world in which it doesn’t. We would have no way of 
knowing whether our observations of any particular empirical relation coincided with 
personal identity. And because of this we would have no way of knowing whether persons 
ever persist; I might not be the same person from moment to moment. It does not appear 
that Langford’s possible world approach is going to be particularly helpful getting the 
Anti-Criterialist over the epistemological hurdles they face. I conclude that primitivism 
about personal identity should be disregarded as epistemically bankrupt. The view that 
personal identity is a ‘further fact’ is indefensible. 
1.5 Primitivism and brute persistence views 
We began by considering Parfit’s argument against the existence of Cartesian Egos. That 
argument knocked out the NE-informativistE positions, which was the middle row in 
Figure 3. I have just argued that primitivism must also be rejected, which knocks out the 
bottom-right box. My claim is that the considerations that count against primitivism will 
also count against the E-informativeE/R-uninformative views (top right box). The views 
that fall into this camp are those claiming that personal identity consists in the brute 
persistence of empirical entities, such as brains, or bodies, or streams of consciousness.  
The reason for this classification is as follows. A primitivist thinks that the fact of a 
person’s persistence does not consist in any other facts. The E-informativistE/R-
uninformativist thinks that the fact of a person’s persistence does consist in another fact, 
and this fact is the fact of, say, a brain’s persistence. But they cannot think there is 
anything informative to be said about the relation that grounds brain persistence. If there 
was something informative to be said about the relation that grounds brain persistence, 
then, given that they think that brain persistence grounds personal persistence, they would 
have something informative to say about the relation that grounds personal persistence. 
But then they wouldn’t be an E-informativistE/R-uninformativist. So for the E-
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informativistE/R-uninformativist, brains just persist. There is no other relation that 
grounds their persistence.  
That is not to say they can’t say something informative about the entity that grounds brain 
persistence, though. They could say that a brain is a collection of particles arranged in a 
certain way, and it is the persistence of this arrangement of particles that grounds brain 
persistence. But, for the reason given above, they cannot say anything informative about 
the grounding relation.  
So then, our E-informativistE/R-uninformativist thinks that a person’s persistence is 
grounded by the persistence of a brain, and that the brain’s persistence is grounded by the 
persistence of a certain collection of particles. We may now ask: what does the persistence 
of that collection of particles consist in? Perhaps they will have an answer even for that 
question. But sooner or later the E-informativistE/R-uninformativist will run out of 
answers. And when they do, they will have nothing informative to say about either the 
entity or the relation that, ultimately, grounds personal persistence. That is, they will be 
primitivists about the persistence of entities of a certain sort. And, as such, they will be 
prone to the same criticisms as the primitivist about personal persistence.  
The same considerations that count against the primitivist also therefore count against the 
E-informativistE/uninformativistR. If the primitivist’s Further Fact View is indefensible, 
then so is E-informativismE/R-uninformativism. I therefore propose that E-
informativismE/R-uninformativism should be regarded as a version of Non-Reductionism 
even though Parfit fails to identify it as such. The only remaining position untouched by 
the arguments against Non-Reductionism is E-informativismE/R-informativismE. This, I 
submit, is what Reductionists hold. Thus, I propose we define Reductionism as the view 
that: 
R3: Facts about a person’s identity just consist in facts about empirical 
relations holding between empirical entities. 
A view is Non-Reductionist if it rejects R3. That is, Reductionist accounts are E-
informativeE/R-informativeE, whereas Non-Reductionist accounts are either E-
informativistNE (Cartesian Views) or R-uninformativist (which include the Further Fact 




The difference between Reductionism and Non-Reductionism does not turn merely on 
whether or not identity is taken to consist in other facts, as Parfit sometimes claims. It 
matters what these other facts are. Criterialists and Reductionists agree on C1; they both 
agree that personal identity consists in other facts. But whereas the Reductionist stipulates 
what sort of facts personal identity consists in (facts about empirical relations holding 
between empirical entities), the Criterialist makes no such stipulation. Since all Non-
Reductionists except for primitivists hold that identity consists in other facts, all Non-
Reductionists except for primitivists can be Anti-Criterialists (provided they think that 
the facts in which identity consists are necessary and sufficient for identity – satisfying 
C2).  
The arguments considered have shown that any view that is not E-informativistE/R-
informativistE should be rejected. We first considered Parfit’s arguments against 
Cartesian Egos, which were effective against the E-informativistNE positions. The 
prospects for the primitivist’s Further Fact View were then assessed. Shoemaker’s 
argument against the Further Fact View was found to be ineffective, even when bolstered 
by considerations against primitivism found in Parfit’s work. The efficacy of arguments 
made by Criterialists were then considered. To avoid the Criterialist’s standard criticisms 
against Anti-Criterialism – that we could never know if identity held between persons – 
the primitivist must hold that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for persistence. 
But doing so lands them in more hot water. Firstly, primitivism loses out to informativism 
in terms of simplicity and explanatory potency – a matter amplified by the primitivist’s 
reliance on necessary and sufficient conditions. Secondly, we would need to posit a 
‘gluing law’ as suggested by Langford that ‘glues’ identity to a chosen empirical relation 
(such as physical C/C). But we could never know whether such a law actually obtains. 
And so, again, we could never know if identity held. It was concluded that the 
primitivist’s Further Fact View is untenable. Finally, I argued that the considerations 
against primitivism also count against the brute persistence views: E-informativismE/R-
uninformativism. Throughout all this, one group of views is left untouched: those that say 
something empirically informative about both the entity and the relation. This, I propose, 





Chapter 2: Reductionism and Empty Questions 
 
The aim of this chapter is to establish that, given the truth of Reductionism, it is an empty 
question whether persons, and their experiences, persist through time. Parfit uses his 
Combined Spectrum thought experiment to argue that in some cases, questions of 
personal identity could be empty. I contend that this conclusion is not radical enough. 
After examining the Combined Spectrum, I argue that a stronger conclusion is warranted: 
questions of personal identity are always empty. I then go on to argue that because of this, 
questions of experiential identity are empty too. I begin by explaining what it is for a 
question to be ‘empty’.  
2.1  Empty questions 
A question is empty, according to Parfit’s terminology, when different answers to that 
question are merely different ways of describing the situation in question: 
Suppose a certain club exists for several years, holding regular meetings. The 
meetings then cease. Some years later, some of the members of this club form a 
club with the same name, and the same rules. We ask: ‘Have these people 
reconvened the very same club? Or have they merely started up another club, 
which is exactly similar? …. We would not be puzzled when we cannot answer 
the question, ‘Is this the very same club?’ We would not be puzzled because, 
even without answering this question, we can know everything about what 
happened. If this is true of some question, I call this question empty. When we 
ask an empty question, there is only one fact or outcome that we are considering. 
Different answers to our question are merely different descriptions of this fact or 
outcome. This is why, without answering this empty question, we can know 
everything that there is to know. (Parfit 1987: 213-4) 
When people disagree over how to answer an empty question, their disagreement can be 
regarded as merely verbal. They are not disagreeing about the state of the world, because 
they already ‘know everything there is to know’. Rather, the difference between their 
answers simply reflects the difference in the language they use to describe the world.  
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Parfit also claims that answers to empty questions have indeterminate truth values. He 
thinks that if we answer the above question by saying that the two clubs are indeed 
identical, this answer will be neither true nor false (1987: 213). It is not immediately clear 
why this should be the case. To illuminate matters, it will help to take a look at Ted Sider’s 
(2011) discussion of ‘merely verbal’ disputes.  Merely verbal disputes arise, says Sider, 
when we try to answer what he calls ‘nonsubstantive’ questions – for example, the 
question of whether Robinson Crusoe is a bachelor: 
[F]or one or more expressions E (e.g. ‘bachelor’) in a nonsubstantive question, 
the semantic candidates for E (unmarried-adult-male, unmarried-adult-male-
eligible-for-marriage, etc.) are such that i) each opposing view about the question 
comes out true on some candidate; and ii) no candidate carves at the joints [of 
nature] better than the others. If E uniquely means one of these candidates, this 
is not because that candidate is intrinsically privileged. It is only because our 
linguistic community happened to select that candidate rather than one of its 
mates as the meaning of E. (Sider 2011: 46) 
Applying this line of thought to Parfit’s club example, it is clear that the expression ‘same 
club’ has multiple semantic candidates.1 For one candidate, ‘same club’ might be satisfied 
so long as the same name is used and at least some original members remain. For another 
candidate, it might be necessary for all members to remain, such that a club cannot retain 
its identity if there is a change in any of its members. Neither of these candidates, it seems 
plausible to suppose, ‘carves nature at its joints’ better than the other. Whether or not 
linguistic convention favours one over the other, neither seems to be more metaphysically 
accurate. So even if we disagreed with someone over whether the club retained its 
identity, it would be a mistake to think that they were making a mistake about the way 
the world is. They would merely be employing a different semantic candidate in 
                                                          
1 There is the question of what qualifies as a semantic candidate. Sider allows that there will be a 
degree of ‘mismatch with usage’ (2011: 50), in that an alternative candidate might not match our 
usage of a term. But at the same time, the mismatch can’t be too jarring: ‘If a linguistic 
community, roughly in our circumstances, could have used E to mean m without seeming 
“semantically alien”—could have used E to reach “the same semantic goal” as we use E to reach, 
albeit perhaps by a different route—then m is a candidate for E.’ (ibid.). The conclusion I am 
ultimately arguing for is revisionist: we could describe persons as non-persisting entities. My 
contention is that many of our ‘semantic goals’ could be still be achieved if we were to describe 
the world in this way. But, as a B-theorist and a Reductionist, I hold that some of our semantic 
goals – those concerning the expression of A-theoretic ideas and certain self-directed attitudes – 
should be abandoned. I discuss this more in chapter 5, when I compare our conceptual scheme 
with a possible alternative based on this different way of speaking.  
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answering the question. The question is empty; the disagreement would not be 
substantive. 
Although Sider’s characterisation of a nonsubstantive question echoes that of Parfit’s 
empty question, there is a prima facie tension between the two: whereas Sider says that 
both answers will be true, Parfit says that neither answer can be true (or false). We needn’t 
understand these two views as contradictory, though. Sider says that both answers are 
true, but only relative to their respective semantic candidates. When an answer is true in 
this way, we can say that it is nonsubstantively true. 
Nonsubstantively true: true relative to the semantic candidate employed, where 
there is no privileged semantic candidate. 
In the same vein, we can see that there is a sense in which both answers will be 
nonsubstantively false: although both answers come out true relative to their respective 
semantic candidates, they will come out false relative to the opposing candidate.  
Nonsubstantively false: false relative to an opposing semantic candidate, where 
there is no privileged semantic candidate. 
We can therefore say that in the club example both answers will be nonsubstantively true 
and nonsubstantively false. Hence, neither answer will be substantively true or false. This, 
I take it, is why Parfit claims that answers to empty questions have indeterminate truth 
values. Neither answer can tell us anything about the world; they can only tell us about 
how the utterer describes the world. So if we want to know about the way the world is, 
and we want to assign truth values to claims on the basis of what they tell us about the 
world, we will have to remain silent. Neither answer is true or false in the substantive 
sense. 
We have all overheard – and no doubt regrettably participated in – the sort of tiresome 
verbal dispute that ensues when an empty question isn’t recognised for what it is. And it 
is easy to see that any disagreement over the question in Parfit’s club example would be 
one such instance. But it is not at all obvious that we should say the same about questions 
of personal identity.  
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Intuitively, my continued existence is very different from the continued existence of a 
club. I can remember waking up this morning, sitting at my desk, writing the start of this 
sentence, and so on. If I asked myself: ‘am I the same person who began writing this 
sentence?’ I would instinctively answer ‘yes’. And in doing so I would be expressing 
what seems to be a ‘deep’ truth – a truth about the way the world is. If someone were to 
disagree with me, I would think they were confused. If they were to claim in all 
seriousness that the person who started writing this sentence was a different person – not 
just qualitatively but numerically different – and that I – me, now – had just suddenly 
popped into existence, inhabiting what used to be their body and remembering their 
experiences – I would be worried for their mental health.2 The disagreement between us 
would seem to be of a very different sort from the disagreement in the club example; our 
disagreement seems substantive. And it is hard to imagine that this sort of disagreement 
could ever be nonsubstantive. According to common sense, 
We are inclined to believe that there is always a difference between some future 
person’s being me, and his being someone else. And we are inclined to believe 
that this is a deep difference. (Parfit 1987: 239) 
For any person at any time, the intuition goes, there will be a yes or no answer to the 
question of whether that person is me. Any disagreement over whether or not identity 
holds will be substantive. Unlike the identity of clubs, there is a best way to carve nature 
at its joints – and given this superior carving all answers to questions of personal identity 
will be either true of false. Or so it seems.     
Parfit argues that this is wrong: there are some conceivable cases in which there is no 
‘deep’ difference between my being identical to some other person or not, and that 
disagreements over this matter will be merely verbal. Questions of personal identity can 
be empty. We can now turn our attention to the Combined Spectrum argument. I will 
outline Parfit’s argument first, before identifying gaps in need of shoring up.  
                                                          
2 A matter of terminology: one might object that it would be impossible to remember someone 
else’s experiences, since strictly speaking one can only remember one’s own past experiences. 
This can be avoided easily by introducing the notion of a ‘quasi-memory’ or q-memory, which 
does not require personal identity.  
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2.2 Parfit’s Combined Spectrum Argument  
To recall, the Combined Spectrum is an imagined range of operations in which the 
empirical properties of person p1 (Derek Parfit) are replaced with those of person p2 
(Greta Garbo). At the near end of the spectrum, some minutiae of p1’s empirical 
properties are replaced with those of p2. In the next case along, a trivially larger amount 
of p1’s empirical properties are replaced with those of p2. This continues until we reach 
the far end of the spectrum, where we have an operation in which all of p1’s empirical 
properties are replaced with those of p2.3 
It is common sense that persons survive minor physical and psychological changes. If, 
while I am clipping my fingernails I forget where I put my keys, I do not cease to exist, 
replaced by an almost-exact replica. So common sense dictates that the first few 
operations on the spectrum should be regarded as ones in which p1 retains their identity. 
Thinking now about the far end of the spectrum, it is equally common sense that a person 
will die if their brain and body are destroyed, and their psychological traits eradicated. So 
at the far end of the spectrum, where we are to suppose that all of Derek Parfit’s distinctive 
physical and psychological features are replaced by those of Greta Garbo, we have a clear 
case of non-identity.  
If there is always a ‘deep’ difference between identity and non-identity, then, for any 
operation on the spectrum, there will be a yes or no answer to the question of whether p1 
retains their identity. Towards the near end of the spectrum the answer will be ‘yes’, and 
towards the far end the answer will be ‘no’; and somewhere on the spectrum there will be 
a sharp borderline separating the two regions. Parfit argues that such a view is 
indefensible (1987: 239).4  
Firstly, there can be no evidence of such a borderline. If there was a borderline it would 
lie between a specific pair of adjacent cases. But the difference between any pair of 
                                                          
3 Parfit’s Combined Spectrum thought experiment is an analogue of Chisholm’s (1967). Chisholm 
is interested in trans-world identity – that is, what makes person p1 in possible world W1 the same 
person as p2 in W2. The modified Parfittian argument I develop in this chapter might, with some 
alterations, be applied to the possible worlds question.  
4 The Combined Spectrum can be regarded as laying the groundwork for two related arguments. 
One is an argument purporting to show that we should reject Non-Reductionism, and the other is 
an argument that, assuming the truth of Reductionism, shows that identity can be determinate 
(and that there is not always a ‘deep difference’ between identity and non-identity). Having argued 




adjacent cases on the spectrum is just as trivial as any other pair. As such, there would be 
no empirical reason to favour one pair of cases over another as the borderline’s location. 
No observation could support the claim that in one particular operation p1 survives, whilst 
in the next they don’t. Call this the evidence problem. 
Secondly, we intuitively believe that there is always a deep difference between identity 
and non-identity. But positing a sharp borderline entails that this ‘deep’ difference will 
turn on some trivial physical and/or psychological change. If you believed there was a 
sharp borderline, you would have to think that a different cell (or molecule, or subatomic 
particle) and different vague memory (or a slightly stronger desire, or a slightly weaker 
conviction) would make the all the difference between life and death. But, Parfit asks, 
What could make it true that, in one case, the resulting person would be me, and 
in the next he would not be me? What would the difference consist in? (Parfit 
1987: 239) 
Call this the truthmaker problem. Parfit claims that only the Non-Reductionist is able to 
answer these concerns, and so we can only accept the existence of the sharp borderline if 
we also accept Non-Reductionism.5  
Either the Non-Reductionist will be a Cartesian, or they will be a primitivist (including 
the brute persistence views). If the former, they can hold that in some of the cases p1’s 
Ego remains throughout the operation, whereas in others it doesn’t; and that between 
these two cases is where the borderline lies.6 Given that Egos are unobservable, the 
Cartesian needn’t be worried by the lack of evidence. So the Cartesian Non-Reductionist 
is untroubled by the evidence objection. And although they couldn’t say where on the 
spectrum the borderline lies, they are nevertheless able to say why it is true that it lies 
between whichever cases it does – viz. because the original Ego remains in one case, and 
doesn’t in the next. This, for them, is what the difference between identity and non-
                                                          
5 Parfit actually only mentions that the Cartesian Non-Reductionist is able to claim there is a 
sharp borderline (1987: 293), but, as shown, the primitivist can also make this claim.  
6 That is not to say a Cartesian must hold that there is a sharp borderline. They will if they think 
that the existence of an ego is always all-or-nothing. But they might instead think that egos are 
ontically vague entities (more on that later). The point is that they at least have the option to say 
that the existence of egos is always determinate; and if all-or-nothing egos did exist, the sharp 
borderline would sit between two trivially different adjacent cases. 
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identity consists in. Thus, the Cartesian Non-Reductionist also has an answer for the 
truthmaker objection.  
The primitivist Non-Reductionist is also unruffled by the evidence and truthmaker 
problems. There is a fact of the matter about which operations p1 survives, and this fact 
does not consist in other facts.7 So given that the fact of a person’s identity is brute, a lack 
of evidence is precisely what we should expect. And so it would be missing the point to 
ask what could make it true that in one case p1 survives and in the next they don’t. For 
the primitivist nothing makes it true.  
The Reductionist, on the other hand, believes that the fact of a person’s identity consists 
in empirical facts. Given that these facts are empirical, they cannot, as the Non-
Reductionist does, accept the lack of evidence for p1’s identity and non-identity. Nor can 
they avoid the truthmaker problem. Unlike the primitivist, the Reductionist must hold that 
the difference between identity and non-identity consists in other facts; but unlike the 
Cartesian, they cannot hide behind any posited unobservable facts to explain the 
difference. The Reductionist has nothing they can point to that would make it true that 
the borderline lies between one pair of cases rather than another. And so, given that 
Reductionism is true, we must reject the idea of a sharp borderline. Our intuitions in that 
regard would only be justified if Non-Reductionism were true. And so, Parfit concludes, 
as Reductionists we must accept that there need not always be a ‘deep’ difference between 
identity and non-identity: 
The resulting person would be me in the first few cases. In the last case he would 
not be me. In many of the intervening cases, neither answer would be true. I can 
always ask, ‘Am I about to die? Will there be some person living who will be 
me?’ But, in the cases in the middle of this Spectrum, there is no answer to this 
question … This question is, here, empty. (Parfit 1987: 232-233) 
2.3 Objections and clarifications 
I think Parfit’s conclusion is going in the right direction. But it isn’t radical enough. 
Parfit’s halfway position is, I shall argue, unjustified. What his argument shows – once 
                                                          
7 The primitivist is not committed to the existence of a sharp borderline. As we saw in Chapter 1, 
they might hold that in some cases it is neither true nor false that p1 survives, and that this fact of 
indeterminacy is brute. Again, the point is that a primitivist could be justified in believing in a 
sharp borderline.   
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we have ironed out a few crinkles – is that all questions of personal identity along the 
spectrum are empty. Before I get on to explaining why, it will be helpful to address some 
potential objections and points that are in need of clarification. Doing so will clear the 
ground in preparation for my stronger claim.  
2.3.1  Proportionality 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Parfit thinks that a trivial difference in empirical facts cannot 
make a ‘deep’ difference between identity and non-identity. But this, Sorensen (1988) 
argues, is to assume a false principle of proportionality: 
Proportionality Principle: ‘the magnitude of a modification must be proportional to 
its effect’ (Sorensen 1988: 251). 
Sorensen argues that we should reject the Proportionality Principle, and with it Parfit’s 
conclusion from the Combined Spectrum. We should reject the Proportionality Principle 
because small changes can make all the difference. To lend plausibility to this claim, 
Sorensen considers a rocket launch. In order to overcome Earth’s gravity, the rocket must 
reach a certain speed. But this speed constitutes a sharp borderline; just below the 
borderline, and the rocket will come crashing back down to Earth. As such, a single drop 
of rain slowing the rocket down by an infinitesimal amount is enough to make the 
difference between a successful launch and catastrophe. The proportionality principle is 
wrong.  
In fact, though, the principle of proportionality that Parfit assumes isn’t the one attacked 
by Sorensen. We can see this by comparing the rocket launch example with the Combined 
Spectrum. In the case of the rocket launch we have the facts about the launch condition, 
which differ trivially in the two cases considered. But the outcome of the launch is a 
further fact over and above the facts about the launch conditions. In the Combined 
Spectrum, the fact of the person’s identity is not a further fact (whether that be a fact 
about an Ego or a primitive fact); given the truth of Reductionism, the fact of a person’s 
identity consists in the trivially different facts. The question in the rocket launch example 
is whether a trivial difference would cause a significantly different state of affairs. But 
the question in the Combined Spectrum is whether a trivial difference would constitute a 
significantly different state of affairs (Unger 1990; Alter & Rachels 2005). Sorensen’s 
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proportionality principle is about differences in causes and effects. This misses the point 
of the Combined Spectrum argument, and the role that Reductionism plays in it.  
2.3.2  Animalism 
Because it alters physical and psychological properties, the Combined Spectrum 
argument is effective for Reductionists who espouse either the physical or psychological 
criteria of personal identity. However, there is a criterion that doesn’t fit neatly into either 
category: animalism. According to animalists, ‘each of us is numerically identical with 
an animal’ (Olson 2003: 318).8 It is not out of the question that an animalist might hold a 
primitivist view: that a person’s identity consists in the brute persistence of a human 
animal (i.e. where that animal’s persistence consists in no other facts). They would then 
be a Non-Reductionist, and so would be justified if they were to maintain that the 
spectrum has a sharp borderline.  
However, the common animalist view is an empirically informative one.9 That is, the fact 
of a person’s existence consists in empirical facts that pertain to the continued existence 
of an animal – whatever those empirical facts might be (views differ). And so most 
animalists will be Reductionists. However, the persistence conditions of animals and 
those of persons are often held to be different. For example, it is common to regard an 
early foetus as an animal but not a person. Equally, some animalists think that animals 
persist as corpses (e.g. Carter 1999; Mackie 1999; Feldman 2000), but it would be a much 
stronger and more controversial claim to say that persons survive death. Nevertheless, for 
the informativist animalist the persistence conditions of persons will be stated in terms of 
empirical facts (whatever those facts may be). Accordingly, in regards to the Combined 
Spectrum the question we are interested in is: at what point should the animalist regard 
the animal qua person to lose its identity? And to answer this question the animalist need 
only consider the distinctness of animals. As Parfit puts it: 
We are asking whether, if some part of an animal’s body were destroyed and 
replaced, the resulting animal should be counted as one and the same. This is not 
a scientific question [but] a purely conceptual question. (Parfit 2008: 200) 
                                                          
8 The doctrine is difficult to define precisely (see for example Johansson 2007). For our purposes, 
however, this quick gloss will do.  




The animalist can therefore think of the Combined Spectrum as a question about 
transplants: in the first cases, it is intuitive to suppose that the original animal is receiving 
a transplant. In the last cases it seems intuitive to say that what is left of the original 
animal is being transplanted into a new, distinct animal. But at what point does the 
recipient organism become the donor part?  
Olson’s view is that only the brainstem is of vital importance, his reason being that it 
controls much of the functioning of the organism (1997; 2003). Any other organ, such as 
the liver, could be removed and replaced without changing the identity of the organism. 
The resulting animal would be the same animal, just with a transplanted liver. Even the 
cerebrum is expendable; all but the brainstem could be replaced, and we would still have 
the original (albeit drastically altered) organism. But as soon as a different brainstem is 
introduced, we are looking at a new animal.  
As Belshaw (2011) notes, when we look closely at Olson’s reasoning, he assumes that 
the replacement of a brainstem would result in a period of ‘metabolic anarchy’ (Olson 
2007: 140). And it is because of this gap in regulated functioning that he believes the 
original organism would cease to exist. But there is no need to posit such a gap. This is 
science fiction, after all. Belshaw imagines the body being hooked up to a ‘brainstem 
machine’ that regulates metabolic functioning throughout the operation. Equally, we 
might imagine the transplant happens one nerve at a time, or that it happens via 
instantaneous teleportation. The point is that we don’t need to suppose brainstem 
replacement is necessarily accompanied by a period of ‘metabolic anarchy’.  
The question about animal identity is not therefore about metabolic functioning; it is, in 
Olson’s case at least, a question of brainstem identity. And so Olson’s criterion of animal 
identity is just as susceptible to the Combined Spectrum as any physicalist criterion of 
personal identity: how much of the brainstem can be replaced before it becomes a 
different brainstem? More generally, whatever bodily parts the animalist thinks are of 
pivotal importance in the identity of animals, the lessons of the Combined Spectrum will 
apply. In holding an empirically informativist view they are prone to the same evidence 
and truthmaker objections that the Reductionist ran into above.  
2.3.3  Vagueness 
The Combined Spectrum is a version of the Sorites puzzle. In the classic Sorites, the 
puzzle concerns heaps. We start off with a heap of sand, and in a series of trivial changes 
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– the removal of a single grain – we get to the absurd conclusion that a pile of no grains 
is a heap. We get to this conclusion because at no point along the series is there a pair of 
adjacent cases where on one side we clearly have a heap, and on the other side we clearly 
don’t have a heap. At no point does it seem reasonable to posit a sharp borderline. 
Parfit argues that we should conclude from the Combined Spectrum that identity can be 
indeterminate. But he asserts that this indeterminacy is due to the emptiness of identity 
questions: 
I need not solve the Sorites Problem. It will be enough to make the following 
remarks. […] [W]hen the Sorites Argument is applied to heaps, we are happy to 
solve the problem with a stipulation: an arbitrary decision about how to use the 
word ‘heap’. […] We do not believe that any collection of sand must either be, 
or not be, a heap. We know there are borderline cases, where there is no obvious 
answer to be question ‘Is this still a heap?’ But we do not believe that, in these 
cases, there must be an answer, which must be either Yes or No. We believe that, 
in these cases, this is an empty question. Even without answering the question, 
we know everything. (Parfit 1987: 232-3) 
We should take this assertion with a pinch or two of salt. Indeterminacy is, in Sorites 
puzzles at least, widely associated with, or held to arise as a result of, vagueness – a topic 
which Parfit skirts around.10 And it is not at all clear that vagueness in the Combined 
Spectrum cases should entitle us to conclude that the identity questions are empty. 
Without an account of vagueness, Parfit’s reliance on the Combined Spectrum is 
susceptible to criticism (see e.g. Goodenough 1996). 
To get an idea of how vagueness might fit into Parfit’s argument, we can reintroduce the 
notions of substantive and nonsubstantive truths. To recall, Parfit’s target in the 
Combined Spectrum is the intuition that ‘there is always a difference between some future 
person’s being me, and his being someone else [and] that this is a deep difference’ (Parfit 
1987: 239). Let’s unpack this a second. For there to always be a difference between 
identity and non-identity, it must always be the case that we can answer questions of 
identity (does p1 retain their identity?) with a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’; questions of identity will 
always have determinate answers. For there to be a ‘deep’ difference between identity 
                                                          
10 Vagueness is also associated with higher-order indeterminacy, where there are borderline 
cases of borderline cases (see e.g. Fine 1975; Sainsbury 1991; Wright 1992; Williamson 1999a). 




and non-identity, disagreements cannot be merely verbal. There must be a correct (or at 
least, uniquely superior) way of carving nature at its joints which makes some answers 
substantively true and other answers substantively false. We can therefore regard Parfit’s 
target intuition as having two components: 
(a) All questions of personal identity are substantive. 
(b) All questions of personal identity have determinate answers. 
If (a) and (b) are both true, there will be a single sharp borderline on the spectrum 
representing the point at which it ceases to be substantively true that p1 survives and 
becomes substantively false that p1 survives. We can call this borderline a substantive 
borderline. Parfit’s argument, if successful, would show that there cannot be a substantive 
borderline on the spectrum. And so it would show that (a) and (b) cannot both be true. 
But that leaves open the following possibilities. 
(i) (a) is false and (b) is true 
(ii) (a) and (b) are false 
(iii) (a) is true and (b) is false 
(i) is the most straightforward (but also untenable, as will become clear in discussion of 
(ii)). If (a) is false, questions of identity will (at least in some cases) have nonsubstantively 
true answers. The answers will be true relative to the semantic candidates they employ, 
while none of the potential candidates pick out a metaphysically privileged entity. As 
such, disagreements will be merely verbal. Parfit’s conclusion – that questions of identity 
can be empty – would be secured.  
If (b) is true in addition to (a) being false, identity questions will have nonsubstantively 
true determinate answers. That is to say, the question of whether p1 survives will have 
either a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ answer, but these answers will only be nonsubstantively true. We 
can spell out what this would mean on the spectrum.  
Suppose it was nonsubstantively true that p1 determinately survives, say, a quarter of the 
operations, and determinately doesn’t survive the others. The semantic candidate for 
‘same person’ being employed when assessing the spectrum would be (determinately) 
satisfied in only a quarter of the cases, and (determinately) not satisfied in the rest. Now, 
in his discussion of the Combined Spectrum, Parfit rejects sharp borderlines. But we can 
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see now that if (a) is false and (b) is true there will be a sharp borderlines – but they won’t 
be substantive borderlines. In the present example, there would be a borderline a quarter 
of the way across the spectrum. And it is easy to see that there would be many other such 
borderlines at various locations on the spectrum, each according to a different but equally 
legitimate semantic candidate. These borderlines would not reflect ‘deep’ differences 
between identity and non-identity; they would be what we might call nonsubstantive 
borderlines.  
Let’s now think about what (ii) would look like. Again, we are supposing that (a) is false, 
and so there will be nonsubstantively true answers to identity questions. But we are also 
supposing that (b) is false, meaning that some of these answers will say that it is 
indeterminate whether p1 survives. This might sound a little odd at first, but it makes 
sense. With (a) being false, there will be cases where it is an empty question whether p1 
survives. In these cases, we already know everything there is to know. That being so, we 
could describe an operation as one in which identity (determinately) holds, or we could 
describe it as one in which identity (determinately) doesn’t hold. But if it really is an 
empty question, and we already know everything there is to know, then we could equally 
describe an operation as one in which identity neither does nor doesn’t hold. We could 
employ a semantic candidate for ‘same person’ that resulted in borderline cases of identity 
where no determinate answer could be given. We could, in other words, employ a vague 
semantic candidate. 
For this reason, it is a mistake to claim – as (i) does – that the answers to nonsubstantive 
questions cannot be indeterminate. Simply: if the question is nonsubstantive, it cannot be 
substantively false that identity is indeterminate. If we already know everything there is 
to know about an operation, then saying that identity is indeterminate is just another way 
of describing the underlying fact. Disagreements between proponents of these views 
would, again, be merely verbal; different answers will be true relative to the semantic 
candidate they employ – which could be either vague or non-vague.11 So if (a) is false, 
(b) is also false. We may now discount (i). 
                                                          
11 This answers a separate concern one might have about (ii). (ii) claims that (a) and (b) are false. 
The falsity of (a) and (b) means that some questions will be nonsubstantive, and some will have 
indeterminate answers. This leaves the logical possibility of mutual exclusivity – i.e. that all 
nonsubstantive questions will have determinate answers, and all indeterminate answers will be 
answers to substantive questions, and no nonsubstantive questions have indeterminate answers. I 
do not consider this possibility for the reasons above: if a question is nonsubstantive, it can have 
indeterminate answers.  
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There are broadly speaking three sorts of view about how vagueness arises: linguistic, 
epistemic, and ontic. There is a case to be made for any one of them being the source of 
a semantic candidate’s vagueness. I do not want to choose between them, but will outline 
what proponents of the different views could say.12  
According to the linguistic theory of vagueness, vagueness results from imprecisions in 
our language. It regards vagueness as ‘semantic indecision’ (Lewis 1986: 212): the reason 
there are borderline heaps is not because heaps are vague entities. Rather, there are many 
precise entities, but ‘heap’ isn’t precise in which of those it picks out. A term is vague 
because of the way we use it; we don’t have in mind the exact referents. We could, 
therefore, employ a semantic candidate for ‘same person’ that was imprecise in this way, 
and hold that this semantic candidate was no better or worse than any other.  
The epistemic theory also denies that there are vague objects. But it also denies that our 
words are imprecise. Details differ between accounts, but the general idea is that 
vagueness is the result of ignorance. Words like ‘heap’ have precise referents, it’s just 
that we don’t know what those precise referents are (e.g. Williamson 1992; Sorensen 
2001).13 We could therefore hold that one of the possible semantic candidates was vague 
in this way. Although there are many semantic candidates that we can specify the referents 
of, each of which enables us to give a determinate answer to the question of identity, there 
are some that we can’t specify. For these candidates, we simply don’t know which entities 
they pick out. And so we cannot give determinate answers to the question of identity.  
According to the ontic theory, vague terms refer to vague entities. It locates vagueness 
‘in the world’.14 Lewis’s example is the outback: proponents of ontic vagueness think that 
the reason we can’t say where the outback begins is because ‘there’s this thing, the 
outback, with imprecise borders’ (Lewis 1986: 212). Similarly, the reason we can’t say 
when a collection of sand grains becomes a heap is because heaps themselves are fuzzy 
things. So while we can employ semantic candidates for ‘same person’ which, through 
                                                          
12 The task of choosing between the different accounts would be a project in itself. Moreover, it 
is not even clear that we need to choose between the three types listed. The list might not be 
exhaustive for one thing, and the different types of vagueness might not be mutually exclusive 
(Williams 2008).  
13 The epistemicists are yet to provide an account of the connection between meaning and use. 
But, Williamson argues, ‘[s]ince no one knows what such an account would look like, the 
epistemic view of vagueness should not be singled out for its failure to provide one’ (1992: 157). 
14 Traditionally, ontic vagueness was largely disregarded, sometimes on the grounds of 
unintelligibility (see e.g. Dummett 1975; Lewis 1986; Russell 1923).  
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stipulation, have precise referents, we can also, if the question is empty, employ semantic 
candidates which don’t have precise referents. We could – if we were willing to entertain 
the notion of ontically vague entities – stipulate that some of the possible semantic 
candidates pick out ontically vague entities. And relative to these candidates, it would be 
nonsubstantively true that identity neither does nor doesn’t hold - provided, that is, none 
of the ontically vague entities to which the semantic candidates refer are in any way 
metaphysically privileged (because then the question would be substantive). 
According to (ii), it will be nonsubstantively true that cases on the spectrum involve 
indeterminate identity. Assuming that indeterminacy is the result of vagueness, the source 
of this vagueness might be semantic, epistemic, or ontic; there is, at least, a case to be 
made for each of them.  
We have discussed how, if questions of identity can be nonsubstantive, the spectrum 
would be populated with nonsubstantive sharp borderlines. Well, we can now see that the 
spectrum will also, given (ii), be populated with nonsubstantive borderline zones: regions 
spanning many cases on the spectrum for which it is indeterminate whether p1 survives. 
These borderline zones will reflect nonsubstantively true ‘neither yes nor no’ answers – 
answers which are true relative to the vague semantic candidate they employ.  
In rejecting (a), (ii) allows that questions of identity can be nonsubstantive, or, as Parfit 
calls them, empty. So far so good for Parfit. But what about (iii)? (iii) accepts (a), so 
denies that questions are nonsubstantive. This prima face looks like a problem for Parfit’s 
conclusion that identity questions can be empty. However, it also rejects (b), and so says 
that identity questions can have indeterminate answers. When we spell out what this 
means, it emerges that Parfit has already given reason to reject (iii), and so his conclusion 
is safe.  
If (a) is true and (b) is false, it will be substantively true that identity neither does nor does 
not hold for (at least) some cases on the spectrum. For this to be substantively true, there 
must be a semantic candidate that picks out a metaphysically privileged entity in the world 
for which identity neither does nor doesn’t hold in those cases. For the Reductionist, there 
is no such metaphysically privileged entity. Parfit made the same point about in his 
objection to a substantive borderline. He asked the Reductionist: what could make it true 
– substantively true – that in one case we had an instance of identity, and in the next an 
instance of non-identity? The Reductionist had no reply. Only the Non-Reductionist did.  
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The question is now: what could make it substantively true that in some cases we have an 
instance of indeterminate identity? The primitivist can dodge this version of the 
truthmaker problem in much the same way as before. But the Cartesian is free to hold that 
Egos are ontically vague entities. This would supply them with the privileged semantic 
candidate they need for indeterminate answers to be substantively true. But for the 
Reductionist, there is nothing in the world that could make it substantively true that 
identity is indeterminate. As such, (iii) is an option only for Non-Reductionists. But as 
we have already rejected Non-Reductionism, (iii) is out of the picture. For the 
Reductionist, the only live option is therefore (ii).  
We can now see that Parfit’s assessment of the Combined Spectrum was somewhat 
superficial, and potentially misleading as a result. Three of his claims are in need of 
clarification. Firstly: the claim that there can be no sharp borderline. There will be sharp 
borderlines – many of them – but they will be what we have been calling nonsubstantive 
borderlines. Parfit is correct, however, if we read him as claiming that there cannot be a 
sharp substantive borderline.  
Secondly: the claim that identity can be indeterminate. There are three ways in which 
indeterminacy has cropped up in our discussion of the Combined Spectrum. Firstly, we 
saw that it cannot be substantively true that identity is indeterminate, since that would 
require a semantic candidate to pick out some metaphysically privileged vague entity – 
which only the Non-Reductionist can posit. But there are two ways in which 
indeterminacy does feature on the spectrum, but which Parfit fails to distinguish between. 
Since there is no substantive borderline, there will be a region where there are only 
nonsubstantive truths about identity. And so, in this region, questions of identity will be 
indeterminate in the sense that it will be neither substantively true nor substantively false 
that identity holds. This, I take it, is why Parfit says that in some cases there is no ‘deep’ 
difference between identity and non-identity. Questions of identity will also be 
indeterminate in this region in the sense that it will be nonsubstantively true that identity 
neither does nor doesn’t hold – i.e. there will be nonsubstantive borderline zones 
corresponding to (equally legitimate) vague semantic candidates. Because it is an empty 
question whether identity holds, we can legitimately describe identity as neither holding 
nor not holding.  
Thirdly: the claim that when a question of identity has an indeterminate answer, that 
question is empty. This claim can be assessed with respect to the three types of 
49 
 
indeterminacy listed above. Firstly, if it were substantively true that identity is 
indeterminate, this would be because there is some metaphysically privileged vague entity 
of the Non-Reductionist sort. If this were the case, it would most certainly not be the case 
that the question was empty. There would be a ‘deep’, non-verbal truth – a truth about the 
fuzziness of a vague entity ‘in the world’. The ‘deep’ fact of the matter would be that it 
is neither true nor false that the entity’s identity holds. As such, you couldn’t describe the 
case either way; you have to describe it as one of indeterminate identity. The identity 
question is not therefore empty if it is substantively true that identity is indeterminate. 
Since we are rejecting Non-Reductionism, this needn’t worry us.  
Secondly, there will be cases in which it is neither substantively true nor false that identity 
holds. In this borderline zone, we saw, there will be only nonsubstantive truths. This is 
why Parfit claims there will be no deep difference between identity and non-identity. 
There are only nonsubstantive truths in this region – answers to identity questions that are 
true relative to the non-privileged semantic candidates they employ. This is what it is for 
the question to be empty. Different answers are just different ways of describing the 
underlying facts.  
Finally, within this region of nonsubstantive truths, there will be nonsubstantive 
borderlines – sharp borderlines corresponding to determinate semantic candidates – and 
there will be nonsubstantive borderline zones – regions corresponding to vague semantic 
candidates. In these nonsubstantive borderline zones it will be nonsubstantively true that 
identity is indeterminate. Given that it is nonsubstantively true that identity is 
indeterminate, the question will be empty. But it is not this indeterminacy per se that 
entitles us to conclude that the question is empty. We have already concluded that 
questions of identity within the region of nonsubstantive truths are empty. And it is 
because they are empty that we may describe them as involving indeterminate identity.  
2.4 Extending Parfit’s claim 
Now that we have a better understanding of how the Combined Spectrum argument 
works, we are in a position to see its shortcomings. In this section, I will argue that Parfit’s 
claim that questions of personal identity are empty in some cases on the spectrum is 
unjustified. Instead, we should conclude that all questions of personal identity are empty. 
As we have seen, Parfit advocates what Curzer (1991) calls the ‘three stage view’: 
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The resulting person would be me in the first few cases. In the last case he would 
not be me. In many of the intervening cases, neither answer would be true. (Parfit 
1987: 232-233) 
However, I have argued that Parfit may only conclude that questions of identity can be 
empty from the claim that identity can be indeterminate when we interpret that 
indeterminacy claim as: 
It is neither substantively true nor substantively false that identity holds 
We may therefore modify Parfit’s quote in such a way as to make this indeterminacy 
claim explicit. Thus, I propose we understand the three stage view as:  
The three stage view: In the first case, it would be substantively true that 
identity holds. 
In the last case, it would be substantively false that 
identity holds. 
In many intervening cases, it would be neither 
substantively true nor substantively false that 
identity holds.  
I will assume this clarified version of the three stage view in what follows. At the near 
end of the spectrum is a zone of substantive identity, at the far end is a zone of substantive 
non-identity, and between these is a borderline zone of nonsubstantivity.  
There are a few problems with the three-stage view. Firstly there is the difficulty of how 
to deal with the boundaries of the nonsubstantive zone. As Curzer (1991) sees it, there 
are two options. Either the central nonsubstantive zone has sharp borderlines, or it is 
fuzzy. If it has sharp borderlines then clearly it runs into the same trouble as the view 
Parfit is arguing against. The difference between p1 persisting and it being an empty 
question whether p1 persists would consist in some trivial difference, and, again, the 
borderline would be completely unobservable. I agree with Curzer that the nonsubstantive 
zone cannot therefore have sharp borderlines. However, according to Curzer, the fuzzy 
three-stage view is no better off: 
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Suppose the Empty Area [i.e. the nonsubstantive zone] has fuzzy borderlines. 
What does it mean to say that F is a point in a fuzzy area? F is not in the Empty 
area, so it is not true that […] it would convey no additional information to say 
that person A and person F are the same or different. In other words, it would 
convey additional information to say that person A and person F are the same or 
different. But this implies that F is in either the Same area or the Different area. 
Thus, there is no Fuzzy area. The empty area has sharp borderlines. (Curzer 1991: 
22-23) 
I do not think we should be persuaded by Curzer’s argument here. We are imagining a 
case on the spectrum that lies in the borderline (fuzzy) zone between the central 
nonsubstantive zone and one of the substantive zones at either end of the spectrum. Now, 
there are three different views about what attitude one should have towards such 
borderline cases. Consider the proposition: 
P: ‘the case in question lies within the nonsubstantive zone’ 
Some people would say that P is neither true nor false; some would say P is both true and 
false; and other would say that P is partially true. Following Williams (2016), we can call 
these theorists gappers, glutters, and scalars respectively. Gappers should fully reject P, 
glutters should fully accept P, and scalars should accept P to whatever degree they think 
it is true (ibid.). Curzer says that the case does not lie within the nonsubstantive zone (‘F 
is not in the Empty area’), and in doing so appears to be fully rejecting P. We should 
therefore take Curzer to be a gapper, and I assume that approach in what follows. 
To see where Curzer goes wrong, consider first what we should say if the spectrum case 
in question was in the central nonsubstantive area. If it was in the nonsubstantive area, it 
would be an empty question whether or not identity was preserved. Answers to empty 
questions do not tell us about the way the world is; they merely tell us about how the 
person who gives the answer describes the world – or, as Curzer puts it, answers to empty 
questions ‘convey no additional information’. If it is not true that F is in the 
nonsubstantive area, then it will not be true that the identity question is empty; and so it 
will not be true that answers to that question would convey no additional information. 
Curzer is therefore quite entitled to say: 
(iv) it is not true that answers to the identity question would convey no 
additional information  
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The problem, though, is that he thinks (iv) entails: 
(v) answers to the identity question would convey additional information 
For (v) to follow from (iv), however, it must be the case that: 
(vi) it is false that answers to the identity question would convey no additional 
information.  
But we cannot accept (vi), since we are supposing that it is neither true nor false that the 
case in question sits within the nonsubstantive zone – that it is neither true nor false that 
the question is empty. If it is neither true nor false that the question is empty, then: 
(vii)  it is neither true nor false that answers to the identity question would 
convey no additional information. 
(v) does not follow from (vii), and so Curzer’s objection fails. There is however another 
obvious stumbling block in the way of the three-stage view: the problem of infinite 
regress. To avoid sharp borderlines, we will need to say that the edge of each borderline 
zone is itself a borderline zone ad infinitum. A staunch defender of the three-area view 
might be willing to accept this regress. But the real problem is: how wide are these 
borderline zones? Well clearly they must decrease in size, by which I mean they must 
span a decreasing number of cases on the spectrum. Let’s suppose the central borderline 
zone (b1) that Parfit posits in the three-stage view spans n number of cases. A borderline 
zone of b1, b2 will then span some fraction of n, and b3 will span some fraction 
(presumably the same fraction, but this is not vital) of that. Also, we may imagine the 
spectrum to be dense, such that there are an infinite number of cases (it could be taken 
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Thus, the width of the borderline zone adjacent to either substantive zone will be 
approaching zero, but the cases either side of that borderline will be only trivially 
different. Hence, the fuzzy three-stage view will be prone to the same criticisms (or at 
least, very close relatives of the criticisms) facing the sharp three-stage view. Parfit 
acknowledge the difficulties of the three-stage view, if only to admit defeat: 
There is a problem here, that of how to handle the borderline cases of borderline 
cases. I do not know how to solve this problem. But I am sure that it cannot show 
that there are no borderline cases. It cannot show that, to all questions, in all 
conceivable cases, there must be determinate answers. (Parfit 1993: 31-2) 
I agree. Certainly, there is no need to concede that questions of identity are always non-
empty. But Parfit is ignoring another possibility here. He is ignoring the possibility that 
all questions of identity along the spectrum could be empty. This is what Curzer calls the 
‘one stage view’ (1991). It is curious that Parfit doesn’t argue for the one stage view, 
since it can be seen to follow from Reductionism (as noted by Curzer 1991).  
By Reductionism, there is nothing more to a person’s existence than the empirical facts. 
As such, if we knew those facts we would know everything there is to know about that 
person. Consider the question:  
If changes [x, y, z] are applied to p1’s empirical properties, does p1 persist? 
This question will always be empty. Because there is nothing more to a person’s existence 
than the empirical facts, answering the question will convey no additional information. 
As such, any case on the spectrum will be indeterminate in the empty-question sense. 
Parfit restricts this reasoning to the middle cases of the spectrum, but it applies equally to 
all cases along the spectrum. To employ Parfit’s arguments against him, his claim that the 
first cases are cases of determinate identity and the last are cases of determinate non-
identity is merely a reflection of how he describes those cases. 
Curzer objects that the one-stage view doesn’t correspond to ordinary language. This is a 
bit too quick. That all questions along the spectrum are empty doesn’t mean you can’t say 
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that persons persist through change. Ordinary language is perfectly admissible. It’s just 
that you could say they don’t persist. Neither answer reflects a ‘deep’ truth about personal 
persistence, because there aren’t any truths over and above the empirical facts. If the 
objection is rather that the one-stage view doesn’t reflect our intuitions about the 
metaphysical significance of personal persistence, then this is no objection at all. The 
whole point of the Combined Spectrum is to show that these intuitions are faulty. If one 
doesn’t want to accept the one-stage view, their only option is to embrace Non-
Reductionism. 
The conclusion is that, for any amount of change, whether or not a person persists is an 
empty question. We say that persons persist through change only as a matter of linguistic 
convention; any change could be instead described as involving distinct persons. It is fair 
to assume that, for any amount of time, a person’s empirical features will change in some 
way, no matter how trivial. Hence, it is merely linguistic convention that persons persist 
per se. What we naturally describe as a single persisting person could instead be described 
as a series of distinct momentary persons. We can say that persons persist, but this is only 
nonsubstantively true; it is only true relative to the semantic candidates we employ.  
At this point there may be concerns that what is true of persons is true also of any entity 
we can give an empirically informativist (Reductionist) account of. For example, the 
existence of a river just consists in lower-level empirical facts, and so is open to a 
spectrum-type argument. Accordingly, we should regard the diachronic identity of rivers 
as a merely verbal matter. The same holds with nations, and trees, and so on. I am not 
worried by this conclusion. As I see it, these are the easy cases. The ancient question of 
whether the same river can be stepped in twice is an empty question, and this is not 
something that normally troubles us. Of course, there are practical benefits that come with 
saying it is the same river. Similarly, there are benefits that come with reidentifying 
nations, and trees. But our conclusion – that the diachronic identity of such things is 
merely verbal – should surely be less troubling here than in the case of personal identity. 
Unlike with rivers, our intuition that there is a deep truth about personal persistence is 
given to us by our first-person perspective. And so if this intuition is shown to be 
mistaken, the hard work is done. 
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2.5  Experiential identity and empty questions 
Given the truth of Reductionism, it is an empty question whether persons persist. I now 
want to use this claim to argue that the same can be said of experiences. Our starting point 
will be the common sense idea that experiences are individuated by subjects, such that 
two distinct persons cannot be subjects of one and the same experience.15 The thought is 
put by William James as follows. 
Neither contemporaneity, nor proximity in space, nor similarity of quality and 
content are able to fuse thoughts together which are sundered by this barrier of 
belonging to different personal minds. The breaches between such thoughts are 
the most absolute breaches in nature. (James 1952: 147) 
Even if you and I are having an experience of the same thing – maybe we are both 
watching the same film at the same time etc. – we certainly wouldn’t want to say that 
there is only one experience occurring, but one that has two subjects. There would be two 
distinct experiential events, but which both had the same content. Pursuing this line of 
thought, Barry Dainton imagines a replica is made of you, complete with an exactly 
similar sequence of experiences:   
Consider the following sequences of phases: S1 = [m1-m2-m3 … -m20], S2 = 
[m1-m2-m3 … -m20], and S3 = [m1-m2-m3-m4-m5-m6-m7 … -m20]. The first 
two sequences consist (respectively) of a portion of your experience and a portion 
of your replica’s. The third sequence consists of an alternation of phases from 
both streams of consciousness, yours and your replica’s. Clearly, S3 is not a real 
stream of consciousness at all; it is a fictional amalgam of components from two 
real streams, S1 and S2. (Dainton 2006: 130, emphasis added) 
Intuitively, I persist through time, and my stream of consciousness accompanies me. It is 
entirely natural to suppose that my experiences are temporally extended in the same way 
that I am, and that this is a ‘deep’ truth – just as that of my persistence is. However, since 
the intuition about personal identity can be challenged, so can the intuition about 
experiential identity.  
What we usually describe as a single persisting person could equally be described as a 
series of distinct momentary persons. But if it is impossible for two distinct persons to be 
                                                          
15 For the purposes of this discussion, ‘person’ and ‘subject’ can be used interchangeably: the 
experiences of two distinct persons/subjects cannot be unified into a genuine whole. 
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subjects of one and the same experience, then, were we to adopt this alternative way of 
talking, we would have to deny that experiences are ever temporally extended. On the 
assumption that the experiences of distinct subjects can’t be unified, we would have to 
say that experiences are only ever momentary states – each of which belongs a distinct 
momentary subject.16 We would have to say that the extended experiences we normally 
talk about are merely ‘fictional amalgams’.  
So whilst we can describe persons as persisting, and as having temporally extended 
experiences, we could equally describe them as momentary, and as having momentary 
experiences. Since it is an empty question whether persons persist, it is an empty question 
whether experiences have temporal extension.  
2.6  Experiences without subjects 
Call the common sense idea that experiences are temporally extended in a ‘deep’ non-
verbal sense ‘extensionalism’.17 The extensionalist might be prepared to admit that, when 
we look too closely at the subjects of extended experiences, common sense starts to look 
rather odd. But they might argue that this is to start off on the wrong foot. Sure, when we 
think about how subjects fit into the picture, it seems we will be forced to admit that it is 
an empty question whether experiences are temporally extended. But the extensionalist 
might want to insist that it is only the concept of ‘subject’ (or ‘person’) that is to blame – 
that it is somehow defective, and that this defect is infecting the way we think about 
experience. They might want to insist that we should amputate the idea of the subject 
from the way we think about experience. They might want to do away with the concept 
of ‘subject’ altogether, and thus avoid the Parfittian problem. 
                                                          
16 A reminder: I am using the terms ‘experiential state’ and ‘experiential event’ idiosyncratically. 
When I use the term ‘experiential state’, I simply mean an experience that has no temporal 
extension. This is not a claim about its content. An experiential state, as I intend it, might represent 
a duration or an instant. An experiential event, as I use the term, is simply a temporally extended 
experience. So what Dainton calls a ‘stream of consciousness’ would be an experiential event in 
my books. 
17 The name ‘extensionalist’ is standardly used to refer to those who posit extended experiences 
in order to account for our perception of temporal phenomena (such as Dainton 2006; Phillips 
2011a). Used in this standard way, extensionalists will hold that experiences are temporally 
extended in a ‘deep’, non-verbal sense – and so would accept the title as I am using it. However, 
I am using the title here in such a way that remains silent on the debate about our perception of 
temporal phenomena. For now, I simply use ‘extensionalist’ to refer to those who hold the 
common sense view about the temporal extension of experiences.  
57 
 
This would be a reasonable response, I think. In arguing against the extensionalist, we 
adopted the Parfittian stance that persons (subjects) lack the sort of metaphysical status 
we intuitively attribute to them. But Parfit (1999) himself developed this line of thought 
further, going on to argue that a conceptual scheme that lacked the concept of ‘subject’ 
would be no worse off than ours, metaphysically speaking. Our concept of ‘experience’ 
demands the existence of subjects, insofar as experiences are the sorts of things that are 
had. Since experiences are had, there must be subjects having them. But whilst it is true 
that there are such things as subjects, this is true only because of the way we talk about 
experiences. We can, however, imagine an impersonal conceptual scheme. This 
impersonal conceptual scheme would feature an analogue of ‘experience’ – ‘experience*’ 
– that made no such demand. There would be such things as experiences*, but we 
wouldn’t think about ourselves as the subjects of those experiences. Statements like ‘I am 
happy’, would be replaced by statements like ‘this is an expression of an experience* of 
happiness’. The concept of ‘subject’ is, on this view, metaphysically superfluous.  
The extensionalist may therefore want to fully embrace this impersonal conceptual 
scheme in an attempt to overcome the problem facing their view. Indeed, if they were to 
agree, they would presumably want to claim that an impersonal conceptual scheme would 
be in some ways superior to ours. When it comes to thinking about temporal experience, 
the concept of ‘person’ just gets in the way. Like the appendix, it is obsolete and liable to 
cause problems; we would be better off with it removed. This would be good news for 
the extensionalist if it can be made to work. The extensionalist has found themselves 
cornered by an argument derived from a Parfittian line of thought. But it now looks like 
this Parfittian line of thought might also, when followed a bit further, provide the means 
of escape.  
The remainder of this chapter will examine the prospects for extensionalism when persons 
are taken out of the picture. I’m not going to talk in impersonal terms – it’s clunky and 
unnatural, and so makes things hard to follow. But what follows could be translated into 
an impersonal conceptual scheme.  
2.7 What experiential identity consists in 
The extensionalist is by no means out of the woods. Even if they want to champion the 
impersonal conceptual scheme, they will still owe us an account of what unites successive 
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momentary experiential states into a genuinely extended experiential event. Dainton 
(2006) calls the relation in virtue of which experiences are unified over time of ‘co-
consciousness’. In what, then, does the relation of co-consciousness consist?18 
It should, I hope, be clear that any sort of psychological and/or physical continuity 
account will be susceptible to the Combined Spectrum argument. For example, one might 
be tempted to suppose that the physical continuity of the brain is necessary and sufficient 
for experiential identity, such that, even if the content of two experiences was radically 
different, they would still be united in virtue of the fact that they were ‘generated’ 
(however you want to take that) by the same brain – where ‘same brain’ would 
presumably be unpacked in terms of physical continuity. Or, one might be tempted to 
suppose that co-consciousness consists in psychological continuity, such that, if a single 
brain suddenly suffered severe trauma and the memories etc. were lost, there would be a 
break in the stream of consciousness. We would be talking about two distinct extended 
experiential events. Each of these sorts of view has its intuitive appeal, I think. But clearly 
we could run the Combined Spectrum argument (I trust we don’t need to go through the 
reasoning again), replacing the question of personal identity with the question of 
experiential identity, and end up at the same place: questions of experiential identity are 
empty.  
There is, however, one view that might be thought to offer a means of avoiding the 
Combined Spectrum argument: the phenomenological account of co-consciousness. This 
is the account proposed by Barry Dainton (2006). We can introduce the idea by first 
considering Russell’s (1921) claim that we cannot, on the basis of present experience 
alone rule out the hypothesis that the world sprang into existence five minutes ago. So 
long as we have the appropriate memories, we would be none the wiser. We can modify 
this suggestion. Instead of five minutes ago, let’s make it a bit more extreme. Let’s say a 
moment ago. We perceive the world in its current state – state Q – and have the false 
memory of the world in the preceding state, P. The world never was in state P; 
                                                          
18 I assumed in the previous section that the experiences of two distinct subjects cannot be unified 
into a genuine whole. Now, there may be those that want to deny this assumption. There are 
theorists who think that distinct subjects’ consciousnesses can be combined, such as those who 
espouse a version of panpsychism (e.g. Luke Roelofs 2016) or cosmopsychism (e.g. Philip Goff 
2017). Even if we were to entertain the possibility that different subjects’ experiences could be 
unified, however, we would still need an explanation of how experiences combine in the particular 
way required here – i.e. between subjects diachronically related by the particular empirical 
relation(s) deemed necessary. Further, we would still need an account of what the relation of co-
consciousness consists in – the difficulties which are explored presently.  
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nevertheless, provided we have the appropriate (false) memories, we wouldn’t be able to 
tell.19 The world could have sprung into existence just now. 
Dainton disagrees. He thinks we would be able to tell if the world had suddenly come into 
existence. Or, at least, he thinks there would be phenomenological evidence of it (whether 
we would conclude from this evidence that the world had just now sprung into existence 
is another matter). There would be evidence because an essential phenomenological 
ingredient would be missing – an ingredient that isn’t found in memory (fake or 
otherwise). He tries to muster support for this idea by imagining what it would be like to 
not have any memories whatsoever.  
Suppose you have been given a drug which over the course of a day gradually 
and sequentially destroys your experiential memory, without impairing your 
mental functioning in any other way […] Although you are now stranded in the 
immediate sensory present, you hear sounds, you have bodily sensations, you see 
movement, you feel strangely bewildered. The phenomeno-temporal character of 
immediate sensory experience is much as it ever was. True, it is impossible to 
imagine with any clarity what it would be like to be in this condition; but it is 
easy to believe that one could continue to be conscious, and continue to be 
directly aware of change. (Dainton 2006: 124) 
Dainton holds the common sense view that experiences are temporally extended in a 
metaphysically substantive sense. He is therefore an ‘extensionalist’ in the weak sense 
that I have been employing. But he is also an extensionalist in the stronger sense – he 
holds that it is only in virtue of having extended experiences that we perceive change. In 
the passage above he is claiming that we could perceive change without memory. Since 
he holds that change is represented in extended experiential events, he holds that 
memories aren’t necessary for extended experiences; co-consciousness can hold in the 
absence of memory. Rather, he thinks that what the thought experiment shows is that a 
different type of continuity grounds co-consciousness: phenomenal continuity. 
Phenomenal continuity is not, Dainton insists, the same as psychological continuity. 
Psychological continuity is unpacked in terms of memories, beliefs, desires, and so on. 
                                                          
19 Dainton’s version of the thought experiment is one in which, instead of springing into existence 
a moment ago, the world emerges from a ‘thousand-year total freeze, a period during which all 
mental and physical processes were completely halted’ (2006: 131). His conclusion transposes to 
the example I imagine.  
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But phenomenal continuity ‘cannot be reductively analysed (at least in any remotely 
obvious way) in terms of beliefs and memories’ (Dainton & Bayne 2005: 554). 
Consider again Dainton’s examples of two genuine streams of consciousness, S1 and S2, 
and the ‘fictional amalgam’, S3. The reason S3 isn’t a genuinely extended experiential 
event – even though you and your replica have the same memories, beliefs and desires – 
is because the experiential states it comprises aren’t phenomenally continuous: 
If we know anything about consciousness, we know that there is a fact of the 
matter as to which experiences [i.e. momentary experiential states] belong to 
which streams [extended experiential events], and we know this in virtue of the 
purely phenomenal interconnections between co-streamal experiences. (Dainton 
2006: 130) 
The relation of phenomenal continuity is one that is felt. It is felt when an experience 
‘merges seamlessly with the next’ (Dainton & Bayne 2005: 553). The mistake we make 
in the Russell-type thought experiment, Dainton thinks, is to suppose that our experience 
of the world in state Q would have the same phenomenal properties whether or not that 
experience was preceded by a genuine experience of P. Because the previous experience 
would be absent, the relational property would not obtain. So if the world were to have 
suddenly popped into existence in state Q, our experience of Q would not seem to flow 
from our (falsely remembered) experience of P. Although you would seem to remember 
the preceding experience, your current experience would not seem to have ‘merged 
seamlessly’ from it.20 This phenomenal unfamiliarity would be a ‘tell-tale’ sign that the 
world had just popped into existence. This is, of course, speculation on Dainton’s behalf. 
But let’s give him the benefit of the doubt here, and see how far we can run with the idea.  
There are two related objections I want to raise. Firstly, that the phenomenal continuity 
account relies on some pretty dubious empirical assertions, and secondly, that the view 
amounts to a version of Non-Reductionism about experiential identity, and should be 
rejected as such.  
                                                          
20 I think we might be able to get a feel for what Dainton is suggesting here if we try to imagine 
a sort of inverse déjà vu. Where déjà vu is a sense of phenomenal familiarity (‘it somehow feels 
like I’ve had this experience before), you would have a sense of phenomenal unfamiliarity (‘this 
somehow doesn’t feel like the experience I was having before’). 
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2.8  Rejecting the phenomenal continuity account 
That the phenomenal continuity account of co-consciousness amounts to Non-
Reductionism about experiential identity can be brought out by another thought 
experiment: the ‘streamal diverter’ (Dainton & Bayne 2005). The streamal diverter is a 
piece of apparatus that that can ‘direct the flow of consciousness from one brain to another 
in an instant’ (Dainton & Bayne 2005: 554). Since phenomenological continuity is – we 
are assuming – distinct from physical and psychological continuity, we can imagine that 
the memories, beliefs and desires ‘housed’ in each brain remain in place, unaffected after 
the swap. In other words, we are imagining a case where phenomenological continuity 
cuts across physical and psychological continuity. Consider the two brains and the 
associated sequences of experiences: 
Brain 1, generating the sequence of experiences e1, e2, e3, e4 
Brain 2, generating the sequence of experiences e1*, e2*, e3*, e4* 
In everyday life, we imagine that each brain has its own stream of consciousness. The 
stream of consciousness associated with Brain 1 would, we suppose, comprise 
experiences e1 – e4, and the stream of consciousness associated with Brain 2 would 
comprise experiences e1* – e4*. We can imagine that Brain 1 is receiving sensory input 
from – and so is giving rise to experiences of – an opera hall in which the Marriage of 
Figaro is being performed; whereas Brain 2 is receiving sensory input from – and so is 
giving rise to experiences of – a painful root canal extraction.  
Suppose that a streamal diverter is used to swap the streams of consciousness between 
brains. There would then be two streams of consciousness that looked like: 
Stream 1: e1, e2, e3*, e4* 
Stream 2: e1*, e2*, e3, e4 
Dainton and Bayne think that personal identity goes with experiential identity, and for the 
purposes of discussing this thought experiment it will help to talk in these terms (although 
what is said could be equally described in impersonal terms).  
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The prospect that ‘streams of consciousness’ could be swapped like this should strike us 
as a peculiar suggestion. After all, we are supposing that psychological continuity would 
remain with the original brain, meaning that all memories of the experiences leading up 
to the streamal diversion would be lost. Suppose ‘your’ stream of consciousness is Stream 
1. After having your stream of consciousness diverted from the opera house to the 
dentist’s chair, it would seem that you had been at the dentist’s all along. You would 
remember sitting in the waiting room filled with dread; being called in by the nurse; lying 
back in the chair and so on. All memory traces of the opera would be gone.  
To accept this story we have to square two other of Dainton’s empirical assertions: 
Claim 1: Even without any memory of what happened in the preceding 
moments we would nevertheless still feel the ‘flow’ of phenomenal 
continuity (as in the thought experiment in which a drug destroys 
your memory) 
Claim 2: If we were to have false memories of what happened in the 
preceding moments we would feel the ‘jolt’ of phenomenal 
discontinuity (as in the Russell-type thought experiment).  
We have been told that the successive experiences within a stream of consciousness are 
unified by virtue of being phenomenally continuous – when one experience ‘merges 
seamlessly with the next’. But it is obscure to say the least how the streamal swap would 
feel in seamless in the required way.  
Since e3* would be accompanied by a memory impression of e2*, we would believe that 
the preceding experience was e2*. But, since e2* and e3* are not part of the same stream 
– they are not co-conscious – ex hypothesi, e3* would not seem to have merged 
seamlessly from e2*. Yet at the same time, because e3* is co-conscious with e2, there 
would be a sense of phenomenal flow – but, since we would have no recollection of e2, 
we wouldn’t be able to say what e3* seemed to flow from. So we would feel a strange 
sense of phenomenal ‘dislocation’. This is, of course, pure conjecture. These are empirical 
claims that lack any sort of supporting evidence, and so should be treated with scepticism. 
This in itself counts against the view. But let’s try to keep an open mind. It will come in 




Dainton and Bayne’s thought experiment involves two brains and two sequences of 
experiences. But let’s now imagine a streamal diverter is used on four brains and their 
respective sequences of experiences. Also let’s imagine that we don’t know in advance 
the destinations of each stream of consciousness. We would have a situation in which 
four people are reporting to feel a strange sense of phenomenal dislocation. They would 
report (if we are to believe Dainton and Bayne) that the experience immediately following 
the activation of the streamal diverter did not seem to ‘flow’ from the previous one; but 
that the experience immediately after the activation of the machine nevertheless did seem 
to flow from some unidentifiable source. If Dainton and Bayne are right, then there will 
be a fact of the matter about which brains inherited which ‘streams of consciousness’.  
But now what if we imagine a different machine is made. Instead of transferring streams 
of consciousness from one brain to another, this machine induces a feeling of phenomenal 
dislocation of the sort discussed. We again have four test subjects who provide the same 
phenomenological reports as in the previous experiment. We may ask the question: what 
is the difference between the two experiments? In both the experiments we know what 
the physical and psychological facts are. And if we are to count the phenomenological 
facts separately, we know what these are too. All these empirical facts are the same in 
both cases.  
Dainton would object to this last point. Dainton (2008: 70) regards the phenomenological 
properties in question as relational properties, in the sense that they bind successive 
experiences together. It is only in virtue of being the subject of successive experiences 
that we have this sense of flow. In order to feel the phenomenal flow from one particular 
experience to another, we must be the subject of both experiences. Phenomenal continuity 
cannot be experienced in a single momentary experiential state. Hence, the empirical facts 
won’t be the same in both cases.  
This seems like a reasonable enough claim, but becomes less so upon inspection. Consider 
two temporally adjacent experiences (or experience-parts), e1 ending at t1 and e2 starting 
a moment later at t2. If e1 and e2 are phenomenally continuous, we are to suppose that 
e1 will seem to merge seamlessly into e2. But how is this meant to work? At t1, e2 is yet 
to happen, and so it cannot seem that e1 merges into e2 before t2. The transition from e1 
to e2 can only seem smooth once e2 is being experienced – viz. at t2. So, speaking 
precisely, e1 cannot seem to merge into e2. It’s rather that e2 will seem to have merged 
from e1. The sense of phenomenal flow cannot therefore be relational in Dainton’s sense. 
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It must rather be what we might call a retroactive property. The merging of one 
experience into another can only seem smooth during the second experience, after the 
first experience is over.21 On the assumption that phenomenology at a time supervenes 
on neural state at a time – which Dainton (2008: 324) appears to accept – the sense of 
phenomenological dislocation could indeed be induced in a subject.22  
There will be, therefore, no empirical difference between the two cases. In terms of 
empirical facts –facts that are discoverable – we must describe the two cases in exactly 
the same way. Dainton and Bayne want to insist that there is a difference between the 
cases, though. They want to posit further facts: facts about which experiences belong to 
which streams (or, which momentary experiential states belong to which extended 
experiential events). These are facts for which there can be no evidence, however. In the 
same way that we have no evidence to believe in the existence of separately existing 
Cartesian Egos, we have no evidence to believe in the existence of separately existing 
streams of consciousness. And in the same way that we cannot be justified in holding that 
the fact of a person’s diachronic identity is a primitive fact, we cannot be justified in 
holding that the fact of an experience’s identity is a primitive fact. So their view is 
indefensible, and should be rejected along with Non-Reductionism about persons.  
2.9 Summary 
Parfit deployed his Combined Spectrum argument to show that it can be an empty 
question whether persons persist. Imprecisions in the argument were exposed – 
particularly regarding vagueness – but, after some shoring up, it was shown that the 
argument justified an even more radical conclusion than Parfit’s: it is always an empty 
question whether a person persists. And, likewise for experiences. Experiences have 
temporal extension, but only because of the way we talk. It would be no less 
metaphysically accurate to describe experiences as strictly momentary states. The move 
to abandon the concept of ‘subject’ provides no defence against this conclusion, since the 
Combined Spectrum is also effective against experiential, rather than personal, identity. 
                                                          
21 It will do no good appealing to intervening experiences to explain the sense of flow, since in 
Dainton and Bayne’s thought experiment the streamal diverter works instantaneously.  
22 This also provides an argument against Dainton’s claim that there would be phenomenological 
evidence of the world popping into existence a moment ago. Since the phenomenological flow of 
co-consciousness can’t be relational in the way he urges, then, given that we were in the 
appropriate neural state, there would be no phenomenological ‘jolt’.  
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Finally, the phenomenal continuity account of co-consciousness was considered as a 
potential means of escaping the Combined Spectrum, but was exposed as a Non-
Reductionist view of consciousness. Given the truth of Reductionism, we may conclude 











Chapter 3: Defending Experiential Atomism 
 
I argued in the previous chapter that given the truth of Reductionism it is an empty 
question whether persons persist through empirical change, and as such, that it is an empty 
question whether persons persist per se. I also argued that because of this, it is an empty 
question whether or not experiences can be said to have temporal extension. This claim 
will now be defended against a view that I shall call experiential holism. According to the 
holistic conception of experience, the most basic building blocks of consciousness are 
temporally extended. The idea is that we cannot attribute an experience to a subject at an 
instant other than as part of some interval over which we can attribute an experience. 
Against the holistic conception stands the atomistic conception, according to which the 
most basic building blocks of experience are instantaneous.1 A subject’s experience over 
an interval is always determined by, and so can be completely explained in terms of, that 
subject’s experiential states at each instant during that interval.2  
The difference between the two views is sometimes put in terms of metaphysical priority. 
The holist thinks that extended experiences are metaphysically prior to instantaneous 
experiences, whereas the atomist thinks that instantaneous experience are metaphysically 
prior to extended experiences.3 If extended experiences have metaphysical priority, then 
                                                          
1 I regard holism as a rejection of the atomistic conception that what a subject is conscious of over 
an interval is always determined by what they are conscious of at each instant. That is to say, a 
holist will think that there are cases where what a subject experiences over a duration determines 
what they experience at an instant. Whether a holist thinks this is always the case is another matter.  
2 I refer to any instantaneous mental item as a ‘state’; and a temporally extended mental item as 
an ‘event’. I attach nothing else of significance to the terms.  
3 Much debate in the philosophy of temporal experience is between what are sometimes called 
‘retentional’ (as propounded by Husserl 1950, for example), ‘extensional’ (e.g. Dainton 2013b; 
Phillips 2011a), and ‘cinematic’ or ‘snapshot’ models (e.g. Chuard 2011; see also Prosser 2017). 
See Kon and Miller (2015) for an overview. The lines of demarcation between these models 
become blurred on close inspection, however. One such blurring is between the extensional and 
cinematic models. Extensional models account for our perception of temporal phenomena by 
positing temporally extended experiences, whilst cinematic models posit a series of distinct 
momentary experiences which together form an awareness of temporal phenomena over time. 
The difference between them then appears to turn merely on whether or not we call a conjunction 
of momentary experiences a single unified experience (Hoerl 2017). The question of metaphysical 
priority can be seen to more decisively cut between the positions. 
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it won’t make sense to talk about any particular instantaneous experiential state as 
divorced from an extended experiential event:  
What does it mean to say that a duration of experience is metaphysically prior to 
its sub-parts? It is not to deny that there are facts about instants during our stream 
of consciousness. It is, however, to insist that such facts are derivative. The most 
basic facts about our experiential lives are, in the first instance, facts about 
extended periods of the stream of consciousness. What is true at an instant is true 
only in virtue of that instant being an instant during a certain period of 
experience. (Phillips 2011b: 398) 
If true, this would undermine the conclusion from Chapter 2. We would only be able to 
make sense of a subject having an experience at a time once we had already helped 
ourselves to the idea of that subject having an experience that extends through time. In 
picking out an experiential state we would already have implicitly picked out the 
experiential event to which it belongs. If on the other hand it is the instantaneous 
experiences that have metaphysical priority, we can pick out an experiential state in 
isolation. So, for the conclusion of Chapter 2 to stick, the atomist conception must be true.  
This can be brought more sharply into focus when we realise that the holistic conception 
of experience amounts to primitivism about experiential identity. Primitivism about 
personal identity, if you recall from Chapter 1, is the Non-Reductionist view that the fact 
of a person’s identity consists in no other facts. Similarly, primitivism about experiential 
identity is the view that the fact of an experience’s identity consists in no other facts. 
Consider first the atomist’s view. The atomist holds that instantaneous experiential states 
are metaphysically prior to extended experiential events. They think that instantaneous 
experiential states are the most fundamental building blocks of experience, and so they 
will hold that the fact of an extended experiential event’s diachronic identity just consists 
in facts about instantaneous states. They will think that an experiential event extends 
through time by virtue of comprising states that are related in some particular way(s). 
Someone who holds that experiential states are fundamental will therefore be an 
informativist about the diachronic identity of experiential events. They will think that 
something informative can be said about what experiential identity consists in. 
The holist, however, will have to deny that the diachronic identity of experiences consists 
in facts about states. That would be to treat the states as more fundamental than the events. 
But if the states that comprise the extended experiential event can’t be used in the 
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explanans, then no relation that holds between those states can be used in the explanans 
either. So in holding that extended events are fundamental, the holist will have to deny 
that the fact of an experience’s diachronic identity consists in facts about relations 
between its constituent states.  
It was argued in Chapter 1 that primitivism about personal identity (and Non-
Reductionism more generally) should be rejected for epistemological reasons. And only 
once we have rejected Non-Reductionism can we conclude that questions of personal – 
and experiential – identity are empty. If it turned out that primitivism about experiential 
identity was true – as it would if the holistic conception was true – then the conclusion 
from Chapter 2 would be unwarranted. We could not claim that questions of experiential 
identity were empty. 
The holistic conception has enjoyed the recent support of Ian Phillips (2011a) and 
Matthew Soteriou (2013). Both offer ingenious arguments that purport to show that the 
atomist in unable to make sense of motion perception; and that only by adopting the 
holistic conception are we able to avoid the puzzles they face. Their arguments would, if 
successful, provide a reason to accept primitivism about experiential identity, and to reject 
the claim that questions of experiential identity are empty. 
I will consider their arguments, showing that empirical evidence in cognitive science 
gives us good reason to reject their proffered solutions; and moreover, that it is in fact the 
atomist who is best placed to make sense of motion perception. Before I look at Soteriou’s 
and Phillips’s arguments, I will defend the holistic conception from a recent objection 
brought against it by Simon Prosser (2016). Doing so will also help clarify the holist’s 
position. 
3.1  An initial defence of the holistic conception 
To illustrate the metaphysical priority of extended wholes, holists sometimes appeal to 
activities such as walking (e.g. Soteriou 2007). Plausibly, it is impossible for a person to 
walk for only an instant. Nevertheless, provided a person is walking over some interval, 
it will be true that they are walking at an instant during that interval. And so we can say 
that the extended act of walking is metaphysically prior to the action-stages it comprises; 
the extended item, rather than its instantaneous parts, is fundamental. According to the 
holist, the same is true of experience.  
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One might wonder whether such analogies establish quite what the holists want them to, 
however. Simon Prosser (2016) thinks they don’t. All they show, he thinks, is that an 
instantaneous part cannot exist in isolation. An instantaneous walking-stage cannot be an 
instantaneous walking stage unless it is surrounded by other instantaneous walking-
stages. But this dependency fails to establish any metaphysical priority: 
Suppose that an A cannot be ф unless it is followed by a B. This does not show 
that the A and the B together form a whole, or that this whole is more 
fundamental than its proper parts. For example, no one can be the second person 
to set foot in Antarctica unless there was a first person to set foot in Antarctica, 
but this does not show that the first and second persons form a whole. (Prosser 
2016: 151) 
We may wonder, however, whether Prosser’s analogy is entirely fair. It would indeed be 
rather odd to suppose that the first and second persons together form a fundamental 
whole. But the dependency in the Antarctica example surely doesn’t concern persons per 
se; it concerns their ordering. The point would be that the position ‘second’ cannot be the 
position ‘second’ without being preceded by the position ‘first’. More generally, a 
position in an ordering cannot be a position in isolation from the other positions. It is 
essential to the existence of a position that there exists an ordering for it to be a position 
in. Clearly, the same cannot be said for the persons who occupy those positions; a person 
will exist whether or not they occupy a position within an ordering. So Prosser is quite 
right to say that the first and second persons are not together more fundamental than they 
are individually. But the holist would presumable want to reply that what his example 
shows is that the second person depends on the first person for their position in the 
ordering. So the dependency in Prosser’s example might indeed be thought to establish a 
metaphysical priority – just not the one he attacks. 
To reinforce the point, consider again the example of walking. A person-stage can only 
be said to be walking if it is temporally adjacent to other person-stages that can also be 
said to be walking. But it would be wrong to conclude from this alone that the person-
stages are together more fundamental than they are individually. It does not follow simply 
from the fact that walking is a necessarily temporally extended action that persons are 
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fundamentally temporally extended beings.4 And this is because the dependency in 
question does not concern person-stages; it concerns their actions (or action-stages).  
Perhaps one might still want to resist this claim. Perhaps there is a case to be made for 
denying that the dependencies in the walking and ordering examples establish any sort of 
metaphysical priority. Be that as it may, it is not at all obvious that they don’t – not in the 
way that Prosser’s example was intended to show. So in the absence of any other 
argument, we have as it stands no good reason to reject the idea that extended wholes can 
be metaphysically prior to their parts. It is of course another question whether this story 
can be told about experiences. We may now consider the case in favour of the holistic 
conception of experience: Phillips’s and Soteriou’s arguments. Soteriou’s argument can 
be dealt with more quickly, so that is where we shall start. 
3.2 Soteriou’s argument 
Soteriou argues that there are cases where a subject’s mental state at a time may be 
determined by their mental state over time (2013: 106).  When reading this claim it should 
be noted that Soteriou is using ‘state’ in a different way from the way in which I have 
been using it. I have been using ‘state’ idiosyncratically, to refer to things at a time, or 
‘time-slices’. Soteriou is using ‘state’ in a way that will be more familiar. According to 
Soteriou’s usage, a state can be temporally extended or unextended; but a key feature of 
states is that they are ‘non-dynamic situations’ (Rothstein 2004: 6) that ‘do not unfold 
over time’ (Soteriou 2013: 102). An example is happiness. A subject can be in a state of 
happiness at an instant and over time, but this happiness is not processual; it does not 
unfold over time but rather obtains throughout an interval. 
What Soteriou would describe as an extended state of happiness would therefore, 
according to my definition, be described as a happiness event. So when Soteriou claims 
that the mental state a subject is in at an instant can be determined by the state they are in 
over an interval, he appears to be expressing the holistic conception. He appears to be 
rejecting the atomistic conception that that a subject’s mental properties over an interval 
                                                          
4 The inference could be made, but only with additional – and highly controversial assumptions 
– about the identity of persons. For example, if you thought that the fact of a person’s diachronic 
identity just consisted in facts about actions, you could then claim that, because the act of walking 
is necessarily extended, the person who is walking is therefore necessarily extended.  
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of time are always determined by the mental properties we attribute to them at each instant 
during that interval.  
Soteriou presents the holistic conception as the solution to an apparent puzzle that can be 
brought out by our perception of motion. Soteriou’s puzzle is generated by the following 
two assumptions: 
Ass.1: A subject’s awareness of a temporally extended occurrence will 
have the same temporal extension as the occurrence (2013: 97).5 
Ass.2: ‘if a subject is in a given state over a given period of time, then this 
is determined by … the fact that she is in that perceptual state at 
each of the instants that make up that period’ (2013: 96). 
According to Soteriou, Ass.1 ‘might be motivated by the temporal transparency of 
experience’ (2013: 97). Experience is said to be ‘transparent’ in the sense that when we 
introspect, we cannot discover any features of our experience other than those the 
experience is of. Regarding the temporal features of experience, this amounts to the 
following: we are unable to identify any temporal location or duration of the experience 
other than what is presented by the experience. In other words, one’s experience seems to 
run concurrently with its object. So when I am aware of an object’s motion from location 
L1 at t1 to location L10 at t10, it seems that my awareness of this motion occupies that 
same interval – viz. t1 to t10. For example, when I observe the second hand of a clock 
sweeping from five past to ten past, it seems as though my experience occurs as the 
second hand makes its sweep; and it seems as though my experience lasts for the five 
seconds the sweep does.  
When a subject is aware of an occurrence that unfolds over some interval, Soteriou 
supposes, they are in a ‘perceptual state [that] continues to obtain throughout that interval 
                                                          
5 I am presenting an abridged version of the puzzle. When a subject observes an unchanging state 
of affairs, Soteriou posits the claim that ‘if you successfully perceive something enduring for an 
interval of time, t1 to tn, then you are aware of that thing for an interval of time, t1 to tn’ (2013: 
96). When the subject observes a changing occurrence, Soteriou posits the claim that ‘[i]f you 
successfully perceive an occurrence unfolding over some interval of time, t1 – tn, then there are 
sub-intervals of an interval of time, t1 – tn, over which you are aware of temporal parts of that 
unfolding occurrence’ (2013: 97). It nevertheless follows from this latter claim that ‘[a]n 
occurrence that unfolds over time is something that you can only be aware of, as such, over time’ 
(2013: 97). Either way, Soteriou thinks that a subject’s awareness has the same temporal extension 
as whatever they are aware of. 
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of time’ (2013: 94). So by Ass.1, my awareness of the object’s motion from L1 to L10 
spans some interval; and throughout this interval I am in a perceptual state of awareness 
of the object’s motion from L1 to L10.  
The problem is that this is in tension with Ass.2. According to Ass.2, the fact that I am in 
a state of awareness of the object’s motion from L1 to L10 is determined by my being in 
that state of awareness at each of the instants during the interval of my awareness. But if 
this is the case, it is impossible for my state of awareness to span the interval of the 
object’s movement: at, say, t2 I cannot be aware of the object’s motion from L1 to L10, 
because the object hasn’t moved to L10 until t10 (Soteriou 2013: 98). So my state of 
awareness of the object’s motion from L1 to L10 cannot span the interval t1 – t10. This 
appears to contradict Ass.1.  
Soteriou proposes that the way to resolve this puzzle is to adopt a relationalist view of 
perception; and once we do that we can reject Ass.2. For relationalists, ‘there are 
phenomenally conscious states whose obtaining requires the obtaining of a relation of 
perceptual acquaintance, but which cannot be specified independently of that relation’ 
(Soteriou 2013: 99). In the case we are currently considering, by Ass.1 I am aware of the 
object’s movement from L1 at t1 to L10 at t10; this is my phenomenally conscious state. 
This phenomenally conscious state requires the obtaining of a relation of perceptual 
acquaintance, so the relationalist will say that the object’s motion from L1 at t1 to L10 at 
t10 is an event I stand in that relation to. This relation will hold over the period during 
which the object moves – viz. from t1 to t10. And it is because this relation holds over 
this period that I can claim to be in a state of awareness of the object’s motion from L1 
to L10 at any moment during it. But we must then ‘understand the claim as asserting that 
there are instants of time that fall within an interval of time over which [I am] aware of 
the movement of the object from [L1 to L10]’ (2013: 106). In other words, although we 
can attribute these states of awareness, we can do so only in virtue of the fact that I am in 
a state of awareness over that period. As such, it is wrong to claim that my mental state 
over that interval of time is determined by my mental state at each moment during that 
interval. The atomistic conception has it the wrong way round. 
I do not want to question whether the relationalist is able to solve the puzzle by rejecting 
Ass.2. What I do want to argue is that the puzzle can be solved by the atomist; and, further, 
that atomism enables a superior solution to the one suggested by Soteriou.   
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3.3  Responding to Soteriou’s argument 
The first objection I want to raise concerns the motivation of Ass.1. Ass.1 is, Soteriou 
says, motivated by the temporal transparency of experience. The transparency claim says 
that we ‘see through’ the experience, such that we only discover the temporal features of 
what the experience presents us with, rather than those of the experience itself. This, 
Soteriou says, is what motivates the claim that our awareness of a temporally extended 
event must itself be temporally extended – viz. Ass.1. 
However, we need to be careful about making inferences from our temporal 
phenomenology to the temporal structure of experience. To paraphrase Moore (1903), I 
should not infer from the fact that I am having an experience of the colour blue that the 
experience itself is blue. Soteriou even acknowledges this point elsewhere, saying that 
one ‘might think Moore’s warning unnecessary, for there is little temptation to suppose 
that our mental episodes or states are actually blue in colour’ (2013: 12). It is notable, 
then, that he is tempted to suppose that the temporal structure of an experience can be 
‘read off’ from the phenomenology. 
Indeed, evidence from psychology shows us that the following two claims cannot both be 
true together: 
i) The temporal structure of a subject’s mental life can be ‘read off’ from the 
phenomenology. 
ii) A subject’s awareness of a temporally extended occurrence has the same 
temporal extension as the occurrence [as Ass.1 asserts]. 
Take the ‘oddball’ effect for instance. If a subject is shown a series of identical stimuli, 
the first in the sequence will often seem to be longer in duration than the others (Rose & 
Summers 1995). Similarly, a stimulus will seem to be longer in duration than other stimuli 
of the same duration if it is differs from them in some other salient way (Pariyadath and 
Eagleman 2007).  
Now, if the temporal structure of the experience matches that of the phenomenology – as 
(i) suggests – then, as the ‘oddball’ stimulus seems longer than the others, we will have 
to say that our awareness of the oddball stimulus does indeed span a greater interval than 
our awareness of each of the other stimuli. But this is inconsistent with (ii). The oddball 
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stimulus and the standard stimuli have the same duration. So if (ii) is true, my awareness 
of the oddball stimulus and the other stimuli will be equal in duration. As such, either (i), 
(ii), or both are false. So even if experience is temporally transparent – even if we can 
only ever discover the temporal features of whatever our experience presents us with, and 
can never discover the temporal features of the experience itself – this cannot justify the 
belief that one’s awareness of an occurrences will have the same temporal extension as 
the occurrence itself. That is not to say Ass.1 is false. It’s just to say that Ass.1 cannot be 
true for the reason Soteriou gives.  
Let’s assume for the sake of argument that Ass.1 is true, though; let’s assume a subject’s 
awareness of a temporally extended occurrence will have the same temporal extension as 
the occurrence. The second objection I want to raise concerns Soteriou’s claim that the 
subject’s awareness of the object’s movement is a state of awareness. Without this claim, 
Ass.1 and Ass.2 won’t generate the puzzle. Ass.2 is a claim about states, so the puzzle 
requires the subject’s awareness described in Ass.1 to be a state of awareness in order to 
gain any traction.  
Soteriou claims that when a subject is aware of an object’s movement as it moves from 
L1 at t1 to L10 at t10, the subject is, from t1 to t10, in a state of awareness of that motion 
(viz. the motion from L1 at t1 to L10 at t10). The point I want to make is that it is 
impossible for an atomist to find this puzzling in the way Soteriou thinks we should. If 
the atomist accepts that the proffered mental state obtains they will have to deny Ass.2; 
or, if they accept Ass.2, they will have to deny that the mental state obtains. Either way, 
there is no puzzle. As such, we should only find motion perception puzzling for the 
reasons Soteriou provides if we have implicitly rejected the atomistic conception. 
Soteriou’s argument cannot therefore give us reason to reject it.  
Let’s first suppose that the atomist is willing to say that the subject is in the proffered 
state from t1 to t10. They will hold that: 
iii) From t1 to t10 the subject is in a state of awareness of the object’s motion (viz. 
from L1 at t1 to L10 at t10). 
But as they are an atomist, they will provide a reductive account of (iii). They will say 
that what makes (iii) true is that at t1 the subject is aware of the object at location L1, at 
t2 the subject is aware of the object at subsequent location L2, at t3 the subject is aware 
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of the object at L3, and so on. Different atomists will flesh this account out in various 
ways. For example, an atomist might think that the object of the subject’s awareness is 
dynamic; or they might think that it is non-dynamic. Similarly, they might think that the 
subject is aware of a strictly instantaneous state of affairs; or they might think the subject 
is aware of some preceding interval.  
Whatever the details, though, the atomist who accepts (iii) will, in providing this sort of 
reductive account, be set against Ass.2. Recall that Ass.2 is the claim that: 
if a subject is in a given state over a given period of time, then this is determined 
by […] the fact that she is in that perceptual state at each of the instants that make 
up that period. (Soteriou 2013: 96) 
That is to say, if a subject is in a given state over a period of time, then they will be in 
that same state at each moment during that period. As we can see, this is what the atomist 
will deny in providing their reductive account of (iii). As such, if the atomist accepts the 
claim that the subject is in a state of awareness throughout the interval, they will not be 
able to accept Ass.2. The puzzle won’t gain traction.  
This position might encounter resistance. The objection would be that if a reductive 
account of (iii) is true then the awareness described in Ass.1 would no longer belong to 
the category of ‘state’. The idea here would be that what determines the ontological 
category of a mental item ‘is the way in which that item fills the relevant period of time 
– whether it persists through time, or occurs during the time, or obtains throughout the 
time etc.’ (Steward 1997: 73). If a period of time is filled by a mental item that can be 
given the sort of reductive account we have just seen, then than mental item cannot be 
said to obtain over time but rather to unfold over time. However, mental items that unfold 
don’t belong to the category of ‘state’. States are ‘non-dynamic’ (Rothstein 2004: 6); they 
obtain. So the mental item described in (iii) would therefore be a state by name only. 
The atomist might then instead reject (iii) and deny that the psychological property we 
attribute to the subject is a state. But if this is their position, Ass.2 becomes irrelevant. 
Ass.2 is a claim about states, and so it won’t be saying anything about the property we 
are attributing the subject with. Again, the puzzle fails to get off the ground. So whether 
or not the atomist wants to call the mental item a state, they won’t be troubled by 
Soteriou’s puzzle. Hence, the puzzle will only be a puzzle to someone who has already 
presupposed the falsity of the atomistic conception; and, as such, Soteriou gives us no 
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reason to reject it. Further, the atomist is not forced to adopt a relationalist view of 
perception. Although relationalism is undergoing something of a renaissance at the 
moment, representationalism remains the most popular view.6 As such, Soteriou’s 
solution, in forcing us to reject representationalism and accept relationalism, is not easy 
to swallow. It would be much better to go with the solution that doesn’t force our hand 
either way.  
The atomistic conception therefore offers a better response to Soteriou’s puzzle than 
holism. Indeed, by adopting the atomistic conception it is impossible to generate the 
puzzle in the first place, and further, we aren’t forced to reject representationalism.  
3.4  Phillips’s argument 
3.4.1 Fara’s paradox 
Now we can move on to Phillips’s argument. Phillips makes his case in response to an 
ostensible paradox raised by Fara (2001). Fara’s puzzle results from the two following 
observations: 
Fara1: We experience constant motion 
Fara2: Some positional changes are too small to be perceived 
Fara1 is clear enough. An experience of constant motion is one during which the 
perceived object never appears stationary. Examples abound, such as when we watch a 
second hand sweep across a clock face. Similarly, there’s no denying Fara2 – not without 
committing oneself to the incredible position that humans have infinite powers of visual 
discrimination. But by Fara2, there is a threshold positional difference below which we 
are unable to perceive change. Over small enough intervals, a constantly moving object 
will not achieve this threshold positional difference. Thus, over short enough intervals the 
second hand won’t be seen to move. So an extended experience of motion will comprise 
                                                          
6 According to representational theories of perceptual experience, perceptual experiences are 
intentional in that they are about, or represent, the world: ‘perceptual states represent to the subject 
how her environment and body are. The content of perceptual experiences is how the world is 
represented to be’ (Martin 1994: 464). There are many ways of unpacking this general idea, 
however, and little in the way of consensus as to the relation between the phenomenal qualities 




sub-intervals during which the perceived object appears stationary. But an experience of 
constant motion is one in which the perceived object never appears stationary. Fara2 
precludes Fara1.  
The solution Phillips proposes has two commitments: 
Commitment 1: Experience has a temporal field within the bounds of which 
we perceive change. 
Commitment 2: The content of the temporal field is purely determinable 
over short enough sub-intervals. 
The terms Phillips employs here will be discussed shortly. By combining these two 
claims, we get the conclusion that ‘[e]xperiential contents are fundamentally temporally 
extended: they are the contents of temporal fields’ (2011a: 823). Notice that this is a claim 
about the content of experience. It does not, by itself, establish the metaphysical priority 
of experiential events.  
Some atomists think that, although experiential states are unextended, they have extended 
contents. They hold that experience is capable of representing extended periods of time, 
but that these representations do not themselves extend through time. These atomists are 
sometimes called retentionalists. It would appear, then, that the atomist qua retentionalist 
would be able to accept Phillips’s solution to Fara’z puzzle. Phillips thinks so, at least:  
[T]he core components of the account below can be endorsed from a retentional 
perspective. From such a perspective the ideas below should be understood as 
focused on the contents of experience, as opposed to experience itself. The core 
of the account is that the dynamic content of our experience at short timescales 
is metaphysically dependent on the content of experience over longer timescales. 
(Phillips 2011a: 818) 
Once we spell out what this would commit the retentionalist to, however, it becomes 
clear that Phillips’s proposal is not an option for them. I explain why in the discussion 
of Commitment 1 below. 
Against the retentionalist stands the extensionalist. Extensionalists think not only that 
experience represents extended intervals, but that these representations themselves extend 
through time. That is to say, they think that temporally extended phenomena are 
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represented in extended experiential events. Phillips is an extensionalist, and employs his 
argument within this extensionalist framework to argue for the holistic conception of 
experience. The idea is that if (as Phillips argues) experiential contents are fundamentally 
extended, and if (as the extensionalist claims) those contents unfold over time within 
extended experiential events, then (as the holist claims) the experiential events themselves 
will be fundamentally extended. Though one may wish to challenge this reasoning, I will 
assume it is correct. My focus will instead be on whether Phillips’s two commitments 
provide a satisfactory solution to Fara’s puzzle. By considering his proposed 
commitments in turn, we can see how his solution is intended to work.  
3.4.2 Phillips’s solution: Commitment 1 
That experience has a temporal field is, Phillips claims, demonstrated by the fact that we 
are able to perceive the movement of some objects (or visual stimuli more generally) but 
not others. We can, for example, see the second hand sweep across the clock face, but the 
hour hand never appears to move. We only ever notice that it has moved. According to 
Phillips,  
What this shows is that there is an upper bound to the stretches of time over 
which we can directly apprehend complete events and processes. As a simple 
model, we can think of our experience as having a ‘temporal field’, and of there 
being limits to the extent of the field, say 300ms. (Phillips 2011a: 817) 
The thought is that we perceive the world through a small temporal window of about 
300ms. Since a positional change between indiscriminable positions appears as no change 
at all, the positions of a moving object must be discriminable within this 300ms window 
in order for the object to be seen to move. Only then is its positional change ‘genuinely 
an object of experience’ (2011a: 813). So either the positions are discriminable, in which 
case motion is represented as occurring over the 300ms duration, or else the positions are 
indiscriminable, in which case no motion is represented at all. This is the idea of the 
temporal field of experience.  
Before moving on to Commitment 2, I want to show why the atomist qua retentionalist 
cannot accept this notion of the temporal field. It might not be obvious why this is the 
case. After all, the retentionalist claims that experience has a temporal field in the sense 
that experience is capable of representing temporally extended phenomena. This is the 
notion of what is sometimes called the ‘specious present’.  
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As Phillips recognises, an atomist could be a retentionalist, meaning that they could hold 
that although the experiential state is momentary, its content is extended. And if its 
content is extended – if it is an experience of an extended event – then, assuming the 
experience is veridical, the object will be an extended event. So it seems that the atomist 
could accept Commitment 1, and hold that the object of experience is the 300ms change.  
There are problems with this view, though. Let’s say an observed object moves between 
two minimally discriminable positions just within the 300ms timeframe. If Phillips’s 
notion of the temporal field is correct, the positional change will be a ‘genuine’ object of 
experience. But it would be what we may call a borderline motion experience. The 
positions are minimally discriminable, so if it moved any less in that 300ms, its positions 
would be indiscriminable and so it would not be seen to move. The problem is that, when 
understood within a retentionalist framework, this will either require positing an 
unrealistic delay-to-consciousness, or else it will require backwards causality.  
For the retentionalist, experiential states are instantaneous, even though they can 
represent occurrences that take place over extended periods. So the retentionalist will 
posit an instantaneous experiential state (or a series of many such states) with the content 
of the object’s positional change over a 300ms timeframe. But we may ask: when exactly 
does the (first) experiential state with this content occur? It must occur either prior to or 
upon completion of the 300ms positional change. If it occurs prior to the completion of 
the 300ms positional change, then the object of that experience will be an event that has 
yet to complete. In other words, we would be having an experience of an event that is 
partly in the future.7  
To avoid this sort of backwards causality, the retentionalist is forced to hold that we 
experience the change upon its completion. This means that we would have been 
observing the moving object for (just under) 300ms before being able to see its motion. 
This is an unfeasibly long delay. Dennett (1991) considers a similar proposal in relation 
to the phi illusion. The phi illusion works by flashing two dots in different locations in 
quick succession. Subjects report seeing a single moving dot; the intervening motion is 
apparently ‘filled in’. This result is problematic. Ruling out precognition, there are two 
natural lines of explanation. One is to say that the subject has a false memory of seeing 
the intervening motion: they believe they saw the motion, but they are mistaken. The 
                                                          
7 Prosser (2016: 148) marshals similar considerations against the extensionalist view.  
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brain is merely telling the story that makes the most sense of what has just been 
experienced. This is what Dennett calls the ‘Orwellian’ hypothesis. The other is what he 
calls the ‘Stalinesque’ hypothesis. This time, instead of forming a false memory about 
what was experienced, there is a delay to consciousness. This allows time for both dots 
to be sub-personally registered and for the brain to then decide what to ‘fill in’.  
Over very short timescales, the Stalinesque hypothesis might seem fairly plausible. But, 
Dennett argues, all plausibility is lost when we consider Kohlers and von Grünau’s (1976) 
version of the phi experiment, where there is 200ms between the spots: 
Suppose we ask subjects to press a button “as soon as you experience a red spot.” 
[…] Could it be that there is always a delay of at least 200msec in consciousness? 
No. There is abundant evidence that responses under conscious control, while 
slower than such responses as reflex blinks, occur with close to minimum 
latencies (delays) that are physically possible. After subtracting the demonstrable 
travel times for incoming and outgoing pulse trains, and the response preparation 
time, there is not enough time left over in “central processing” in which to hide 
a 200msec delay. (Dennett 1991:121-2) 
If there’s no chance of finding a spare 200ms for the Stalinesque delay, there’s certainly 
no chance of finding a spare 300ms for the retentionalist trying to accommodate 
Commitment 1. Contrary to Phillips’s earlier comment, then, Commitment 1 is 
unworkable within a retentionalist framework.  
From here on, I will restrict my attention to considering the prospects of Phillips’s 
argument within an extensionalist framework. This is what we are really interested in 
anyway; this is what, if it were to succeed, would undermine the conclusion from Chapter 
2 (that questions of personal and experiential identity are empty).  
3.4.3 Phillips’s solution: Commitment 2 
For the sake of argument, let’s assume that Phillips is right about the temporal field. If a 
change is discriminable within the duration of the temporal field, we directly experience 
the object’s movement. This tells us about the content of the temporal field as a whole. 
But we are still don’t know how this can be possible given the fact that we have limited 
powers of perception. We don’t know what to say about the content over sub-intervals of 
the temporal field. This is where the idea of determinable content comes in – Phillips’s 
second commitment. To get an idea of what determinable content is, Phillips discusses an 
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analogous case (owed to Tye (2002)). If you look at a postage stamp with clear vision 
you will be able to make out the serrated edges; the content of your experience will be 
relatively determinate. But if your vision goes sufficiently out of focus, you will no longer 
see the serrations. Your experience will not represent the stamp’s determinate shape. 
Nevertheless, the stamp will appear ‘squarish’.  
‘Squarishness’ is a determinable property: the edges of a squarish object could be straight, 
or fuzzy, or serrated, and so on, but ‘squarish’ remains silent as to these finer-grained 
details. Thus, we can say that the content of our experience of the out-of-focus stamp is 
in this sense determinable, but not determinate. It represents the stamp’s determinable 
squarish shape, but does not represent the stamp’s more determinate, serrated form. 
Phillips claims that the same can be said of the content of the temporal field. We 
experience the clock hand’s motion over the 300ms duration. But, due to our perceptual 
limitations, we are unable to determine any finer-grained details of the motion. There 
might be a change in velocity, for example, but such details are not represented in 
experience. Thus, the content of the temporal field is determinable, but not determinate: 
It is only over the whole period [of the temporal field] δτ that one has an 
experience of the hand sweeping out the angle δθ. Moreover, it is not true that 
over any proper sub-period of δτ that one experiences, or is experiencing, the 
hand sweeping out some subinterval of δθ: such tiny changes are beyond our 
powers of discrimination […] The most basic characterization of our experience 
during a sub-period of δτ is that we are experiencing the second hand sweeping 
out an angle δθ. We do not experience this sweeping motion in any more 
determinate way [as] there is no more determinate truth about our experience at 
such timescales. (Phillips 2011a: 822-23) 
It is true that what we are experiencing at an instant (or sub-interval) of the temporal field 
is motion. But what we are experiencing at an instant is not the hand’s motion at that 
instant (or sub-interval). Instead, what we are experiencing at that instant is the hand’s 
movement over a longer period; we simply experience the hand’s motion ‘continuing to 
unfold’ (Phillips 2011a: 821).   
This shows us the way out of the paradox. It follows from Fara2 – that some changes are 
too small to be perceived – that it is impossible to perceive continuous motion. But it is 
important to distinguish between continuous and constant motion, at least as Phillips uses 
the terms. To perceive continuous motion it is necessary for the experiential content to be 
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determinate ‘all the way down’; we would have to perceive all the fine-grained details of 
the motion. To perceive constant motion it is sufficient that one experiences motion 
without any periods during which the object appears stationary. By Commitment 2, the 
fact that we cannot perceive continuous motion does not entail that we cannot perceive 
constant motion. Provided the content of the experience is purely determinable over short 
intervals, we will perceive the motion without all the fine-grained details. Hence, we can 
experience constant motion without perceiving continuous motion. Fara2 does not 
preclude Fara1.  
It is impossible, Phillips thinks, to make sense of this if we take instantaneous experiential 
atoms as the most fundamental units of experience. Because the content of experience is 
purely determinable over short periods, what we experience at an instant is the hand 
‘continuing on its motion through the larger interval’ (Phillips 2011a: 822). What this 
shows is that the content of experience is attributable at an instant only through reference 
to the content of experience over a longer period. Or, to put it another way, there is no 
truth about the content of experience at an instant that is not derived from what is true 
about the content over longer periods. In order to say anything about the content of 
experience at an instant, we have to first look to the extended experience during which 
that instant occurs. In short, we can only make sense of experience at an instant if we 
understand that instant as belonging to an extended experience. Thus, if content is purely 
determinable at short timescales, we have to accept that it is not instantaneous experiences 
but extended experiences that are fundamental. As this is the only way out of Fara’s 
paradox, we must reject the atomistic conception of experience.  
3.5  Responding to Phillips’s solution 
Before I start explaining where I think Phillips goes wrong, I want to quickly cover a 
possible objection I see being raised – but one that is, I think, unsuccessful. The objection 
is as follows. We are considering the question of whether extended experiential events 
are more fundamental than momentary experiential states. In his account, Phillips is 
discussing the content of experience. His account – if successful – would show that the 
content of a momentary experiential event depends on the content of the surrounding 
momentary experiential states. But, one might think, isn’t this just to make the same 
mistake we saw in the earlier Antarctica example? The mistake was to think that the 
dependency in question concerned the persons, rather than their positions in an ordering. 
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Of course the first and second persons don’t form a fundamental whole; it is the first and 
second positions that do! Similarly, one might think, it would be a mistake to conclude 
that the momentary experiential states form a fundamental whole; the point is about their 
contents.  
In Phillips’s defence, though, it could be argued that there is an important difference in 
the case of experience. It is not essential to the existence of a person that they occupy a 
position in an ordering; whereas it is essential to the existence of an experiential event 
that it has content. Simply: an experience cannot be an experience unless it has content. 
To have an experience without content is to experience nothing at all. And so if the 
content of an experiential event depends for its existence on the contents of the 
surrounding experiential events, we can say that the experiential event itself depends for 
its existence on the surrounding experiential events. The same cannot be said of persons 
and their positioning in an order.  
I am not sure how successful this response is. It depends on precisely what Phillips’s 
argument establishes. If Phillips’s argument establishes that a momentary (or very short) 
experiential state cannot have any content unless it is surrounded by other content-bearing 
experiential states, then the response is successful. But it is not at all clear that this should 
be the lesson to take from Phillips’s argument. Phillips presents his solution as a way to 
explain how it is possible that we experience motion. Thus, what Phillips’s argument 
actually establishes – if successful – is that a momentary experience of motion cannot be 
a momentary experience of motion unless it is surrounded my other momentary 
experiences of motion. And so if this demonstrates a metaphysical priority, the priority is 
that of extended experiences of motion over momentary ones. But not all the experiences 
we have are experiences of motion. It is not at all clear, therefore, that Phillips 
demonstrates the priority of extended experiences per se over momentary ones. That 
would require an extra step in the argument.  
Perhaps we can supply that next step. Certainly, not all of our experiences are experiences 
of motion. But the lesson we can take from Phillips transposes to other sense modalities. 
For example, we are able to detect the change in the pitch of a constantly rising note; and 
yet we are unable to detect sufficiently small changes in pitch. Thus, Fara’s paradox 
applies – and can be given the same sort of treatment by Phillips. We could do the same 
for taste, smell, temperature and so on. What I propose is that the content of experience 
is never totally static; and so long as it isn’t, Phillips’s conclusion will always apply. 
84 
 
I will now explain where I think Phillips goes wrong. His argument is, in short, that we 
can only escape the paradox by accepting his two commitments; and we cannot accept 
the two commitments unless we reject the atomistic conception of experience (that 
experience can be analysed in terms of fundamental momentary experiential states). My 
response will be as follows. Phillips’s notion of the temporal field in Commitment 1 is 
too strong, but does get something right. We can therefore reformulate the first 
commitment, and when we do we see that the paradox can be avoided very easily and 
without invoking Commitment 2. As it does not follow from the revised first commitment 
that experience is fundamentally extended, Phillips’s argument fails.   
I do not disagree entirely with Phillips’s first commitment. There is indeed a sense in 
which experience has a temporal field. The phenomenal difference between our 
experience of the hour hand and second hand does show us something important. But it 
does not establish quite as much as Phillips asserts it does. Phillips claimed that the 
difference between the two cases shows that ‘there is an upper bound to the stretches of 
time over which we can directly apprehend complete events and processes’ (2011a: 817). 
But this doesn’t quite stack up. What the phenomenological difference shows is that, if 
an object (or visual stimulus more generally) we are observing moves a sufficient distance 
within a sufficiently short timeframe, we will experience motion. That much we can be 
sure of. But it is another thing entirely to claim that we experience the object’s movement 
‘directly’ within this timeframe. Once we entertain the thought that we experience the 
object’s movement directly within the bounds of the temporal field – that the object’s 
positional change from 0ms to 300ms is the object of experience – we slide uncritically 
to the idea that we experience motion over the duration of that timeframe – i.e. from 0ms 
to 300ms.  
But this is too strong a claim. If a subject experiences motion over the duration of the 
temporal field, then even at, say, 1ms into that timeframe, it is true that they are 
experiencing motion. But how this could be true is unclear, to say the least. We are all 
agreed that our powers of perception are limited. Thus, it should be uncontroversial that, 
within, say, 1ms of observing a moving object, it is physiologically and neurologically 
impossible to perceive the object’s motion.8 Sure, Phillips can appeal to his second 
                                                          
8 We have a limited number of light-receptor cells in our eyes, and so a stimulus has a minimum 
distance to move in order to stimulate a different group of cells. And then once a new group of 
cells has been stimulated, we have to wait for the signal to work its way to the brain and then be 
processed. This all takes time. 
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commitment (viz. that the content is purely determinable at such timescales) in an attempt 
to explain how this might work. But this appeal just obscures the problem, not answer it.  
Firstly, such an explanation looks hopelessly circular. Phillips claims it is true that a 
subject is experiencing motion at 1ms. But because the content at such timescales is 
purely determinable, this is true only in virtue of the fact that the subject is experiencing 
motion over the whole of the temporal field. But wait a second (pun not intended). How 
can it be claimed that the subject experiences motion for the duration of the temporal 
field? That’s precisely the point we are challenging. Even if we allow, for the sake of 
argument, that experiences are fundamentally extended, we are still waiting for an 
explanation of how the extended experience can have the extension Phillips is claiming 
it to have: how can the experience of motion begin so soon after first looking at the 
moving object? No explanation for this is given, other than what is asserted in the first 
commitment: that the movement is directly perceptible within the bounds of the temporal 
field. So in order to lend plausibility to the first commitment, we look to the second 
commitment; but the second can’t save the first unless the first is assumed to be true.  
Ultimately, though, this is beside the point. Let’s suppose the two commitments can 
supply a non-circular explanation. Unless he wants to assert that it is neurologically 
possible to detect an object’s motion within such a short timescale, Phillips’s solution 
seems to have the consequence that we can truthfully say of a subject’s experience 
something that, neurologically speaking, cannot be true of it. 
In Phillips’s defence, one might argue that when we first look at a moving object there 
does not seem to be an initial period of stasis. When we are about to cross the road and 
look up at a moving car, the car does not appear stationary for a brief time, before 
suddenly jolting into motion. This is quite true. But it does not follow that during the 
initial period we must be experiencing it as moving. The car will only appear stationary 
if it is represented in experience as stationary. It does not appear as stationary, so clearly 
it is not represented as stationary. But it does not follow that during that period it must 
therefore be represented as moving. The details of the car’s motion could simply be 
omitted from the representation. And, if it is neurologically impossible to detect the 
motion during that initial period, we must assume this is the case. So, during the initial 
period, although we do not experience the car as moving, we don’t experience it as not 
moving either. To use Phillips’s own idea, we can say that our experience of the car will 
be determinable but not determinate. Unlike the car’s motion, it is, I assume, 
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neurologically possible to perceive its general size and colour almost immediately. But 
because we cannot yet perceive its motion, the representation of the car will have many 
potential determinates. The car might be stationary, or it might be moving; and if it is 
moving, there are many potential speeds it could be moving at. Our experience of the car 
will be detailed to a degree, but indeterminate with regards to such details. By that I mean 
to say that it will be indeterminate as to what is represented; not that the representation 
will be a representation of indeterminacy. 
An opponent might argue that this explanation is inadequate. I have explained why the 
car does not appear stationary. But not only does the car not appear stationary when we 
first look at it, it does appear to be moving. And if it appears to be moving, then it must 
be represented as moving.  
I think this response is wrong; I think it cannot be the case that the car appears to be 
moving. The only way this could be true is if we posit a delay-to-consciousness, which 
would allow time for the brain to work out that the car is in fact moving. But, as Dennett’s 
response to the Stalinesque hypothesis we looked at earlier shows, it doesn’t look like this 
move will stick. The only option left is to deny that movement is represented when we 
first look at the car. If you think it seems like movement is represented the moment we 
look at the car, then you must accept that this is a conclusion the brain has come to once 
the motion is detected. After all, if you claim to have perceived something that it was 
neurologically impossible to have perceived at the time you are claiming to have 
perceived it, it is, I submit, safe to say you’re mistaken.  
Perhaps Phillips would be willing to accept that motion is not experienced right away: 
when the subject first directs their attention to a moving object, there is an initial period 
of perceptual stasis. Only once it is neurologically possible does the extended experience 
of motion begin. This would be a step in the right direction, I think. But it does make a 
nonsense of the first commitment. The first commitment states that we perceive an 
object’s movement within the bounds of the temporal field. But if there is a sub-interval 
of the temporal field during which we do not perceive motion, this can’t be the case. It 
can’t be the case that an object doesn’t appear to move when we are directly perceiving 
its movement. Commitment 1 should, I conclude, be rejected. Experience does not have 
a temporal field through which we directly perceive movement.  
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Nothing in what has been said demonstrates the second commitment to be problematic, 
however. From what has been said, it could well be the case that the experience of motion 
– once it actually gets going – is purely determinable at short timescales. With a slight 
adjustment, Phillips’s model might be salvageable.  
Phillips thinks that experiential content is determinable at short timescales below the 
duration of the temporal field: we can only state what is represented during any sub-
interval of that duration in terms of what is represented over the whole duration. Well, 
now we are saying that the experience of motion doesn’t unfold over the whole duration 
of the temporal field. That would be neurologically impossible. But, presumably, it will 
unfold over a sub-interval (B) of the period we are referring to as the ‘temporal field’, 
following an initial period of perceptual stasis (A): 
 
Figure 4: the temporal field 
As such, Phillips could just say that the most determinate fact about what is represented 
in experience is a fact about what is represented over the duration of B. In other words, 
he could just argue that the starting point for the experience is later than we have been so 
far supposing. He could still maintain that at sub-intervals of B, content is purely 
determinable. And if the content is purely determinable, we have a strong case for 
regarding extended experiential events as fundamental (just slightly less extended than 
Phillips first claimed). 
The question now is: do we have reason to believe that the content of the sub-intervals of 
B is purely determinable? I don’t think so. My thinking is this: Phillips’s argument was 
that we have to accept his two commitments in order to escape Fara’s paradox. But, as I 
will show in the next section, now that the first commitment is out the window, a much 
simpler solution is available. It might be the case that content is purely determinable over 
very short intervals, but we can escape the paradox without supposing so. As such, 
Phillips’s second commitment is unmotivated, obsolete and superfluous.  
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3.6  A better solution to Fara’s paradox: the Simple Model 
As argued, we should reject Phillips’s first commitment. We do not directly experience 
movement over the duration of the temporal field. We should allow for an initial phase 
of perceptual inactivity. The motion phenomenology then ‘kicks in’ when a sufficiently 
great positional difference is observed in a sufficiently short timeframe. This borrows 
some of Phillips’s idea of a temporal field but leaves the rest. It takes the idea that we 
experience of motion as the result of a observing a change that occurs within a certain 
timeframe. But it leaves out his idea that the object’s movement is perceived ‘directly’ 
within that period. As we saw, this latter component gets us into trouble. The idea we are 
left with is: 
Revised first commitment:  A subject enjoys (non-illusory) motion phenomenology 
when and only when an observed object is in a sufficiently 
different position from a sufficiently recent position it was 
observed in. 
The revised first commitment does not say that the positions must be consciously 
discriminable, nor does it state what the timeframe is. These details will be fleshed out 
soon.  
Once we equip ourselves with the revised first commitment, a straightforward solution to 
the paradox presents itself. To illustrate, let’s say that we begin observing a constantly 
moving object at t0, which achieves the minimum sufficient difference for motion 
phenomenology at t10. Also assume that this is within the timeframe necessary for motion 
perception. At t10, we would experience motion: 
 
Figure 5: the simple model i 
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At t11, the position of the object will be indiscriminable from its position at t10. This, 
according to the paradox, means that we will not perceive motion. This is wrong, though. 
It is wrong because although at t11 the position observed is insufficiently different from 
the position observed at t10, it is sufficiently different from its observed position at t1: 
 
Figure 6: the simple model ii 
And so, we can see how from t10 onwards we will experience motion phenomenology. 
And it is clear that no appeal to determinability or extended experiences is needed. All 
we need is the revised first commitment. Call this the simple model. 
It might be objected here that the timings I am suggesting are unrealistic. Phillips claimed 
that we experience motion when a positional change is discriminable within 300ms. So 
doesn’t my model say that we will be looking at the object for 300ms before we start to 
experience motion? This, one might introspect, is too long. This is not a problem for the 
simple model. 300ms is not my figure. Consider again what I have called a ‘borderline 
motion experience’. This is an experience of motion that we are only just able to perceive. 
We can imagine an hour hand of a clock so large that we are able to detect movement at 
its tip. If the hand was any shorter, and the movement would be imperceptible. If it is the 
case that the motion phenomenology kicks in before 300ms, then that is the timeframe 
we are looking for: that is the timeframe within which the positions of a moving object 
must be sufficiently different to generate motion phenomenology.  
At this point Phillips would object. We experience motion some time before 300ms, yes, 
but the positions occupied by the object would only be discriminable at 300ms. So 
anything less than 300ms and the positions would be indiscriminable. But if the positions 
are indiscriminable over that sub-interval, we cannot perceive the positional change over 
that sub-interval; and if we can’t perceive the positional change over that sub-interval, 
then we cannot have an experience of motion over that sub-interval. The experience of 
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motion, therefore, must happen over the longer period where the positions are 
discriminable. 
I do not accept this. I don’t think the positions need to be consciously discriminable in 
order to perceive motion. Admittedly, it will usually be the case that, when we perceive 
the movement of an object, its positions will be consciously discriminable. But it is a 
mistake to consider conscious discrimination a necessary condition for motion 
phenomenology. 
As I see it, Phillips is running together two importantly distinct neural mechanisms here. 
One mechanism computes (or gives rise to) motion per se, the other computes (or gives 
rise to) positional discrimination.9 There are several examples of these mechanisms 
coming apart. In the ‘waterfall illusion’, for example, a scene looks to be moving despite 
there being no apparent changes in the position of any of its visual features. More striking 
is akinetopsia, a condition that renders the subject unable to detect motion, despite an 
awareness of positional change. Subjects report seeing the world as a succession of stills 
(see e.g. Zeki 1991). Similarly, the ‘fine grain motion illusion’ suggests that we can have 
an experience (as) of motion between two points too close to consciously discriminate 
(Thorson, Lange, and Biederman-Thorson 1969).10 More on that soon.  
If we can truly say of our experience that we are experiencing motion before the positional 
discrimination (as Phillips says we can), then surely the natural conclusion to make is that 
the mechanisms for motion experience is more sensitive than the mechanism for 
positional discrimination: we are able to consciously detect the motion of an object over 
smaller distances than we are able to consciously discriminate positional change.  
                                                          
9 The strange thing is, Phillips acknowledges as much when he says that ‘empirical work on 
motion perception suggests that our visual systems can respond to motion per se, as opposed to 
simply detecting the change of position of features over time […] we may see motion without any 
awareness of position […] I abstract from these empirical issues here, and provide the broad 
structural outlines of an account of constant motion perception’ (Phillips 2011a: 820-1). I don’t 
see how he can abstract from these issues as he does.  
10 A caveat: although motion is being computed in this experiment – that it, the subjects have an 
experience as of motion – it is nevertheless an illusion. They are being presented with two 
stationary dots separated by a brief interval, rather than a single, continuously moving dot. What 
I really want to establish is that motion is veridically computed over smaller distances than can 
be discriminated. The required experiment would very similar, but instead of flashing two dots 
50ms apart, a single dot would be displayed that takes 50ms to travel between the two positions. 
I am assuming that the result would be the same – that motion would be perceived in the absence 
of discriminable positional change. I haven’t managed to find such an experiment.  
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The fine-grain motion illusion lends some support to this idea. In this experiment, two 
dots are flashed on a screen in quick succession. These dots are so close together that 
when the time between flashes is short enough, the two dots appear as a single unmoving 
dot. Subjects are unable to discriminate between the two positions. Similarly, when the 
time between flashes is long enough to notice, the second dot appears to be in the same 
place as the first. The positions, it is natural to conclude, are, at the conscious level, 
indiscriminable. But when the time between flashes is around 50ms – between the two 
extremes – the subjects report seeing a single moving dot. This experiment arguably 
shows that motion can be perceived between points too close to consciously discriminate 
between. 
Whether the fine-grain motion illusion establishes motion perception to be more sensitive 
than positional discrimination could be contended. It could be argued that when the time 
between flashes is 50ms the positions become consciously discriminable, whereas when 
the timing is different they are indiscriminable. This move would ensure that we cannot 
perceive motion without positional discrimination: whenever we perceive motion we are 
able to discriminate positions. I do not want to get too stuck into this potential reply. But 
it should be noted that it contradicts the established orthodoxy. And besides, given that 
we are talking about two distinct neural mechanisms here, it seems odd to insist that they 
would both be equally as sensitive. It is far more plausible to allow that, of any two neural 
mechanisms that process sensory information, one will be more sensitive (quicker to 
respond etc.) than the other. And if it is allowed that one will be the more sensitive, and 
it is also intuited that we are able to perceive motion before we are able to discriminate 
positions, then it is going to take some arguing to convince us that it is not the motion 
mechanism that is the more sensitive of the two.  
Ultimately, though, the simple model is flexible enough to work with whatever the 
neurological facts are. If the delay to motion perception is less than the delay to positional 
discrimination, no problem. All we need to explain this fact is the revised first 
commitment. If they are the same, no problem. Again, all we need to explain this fact is 
the revised first commitment. But if they are the same, a proponent of the simple model 
would reject reports that motion is experienced before positional discrimination. If a 
subject’s reports conflict with the neurological facts, the subject must be mistaken. But 
either way, whatever the neurological facts are, there is no need to appeal to the two 
commitments Phillips does. All we need to escape Fara’s paradox is the revised first 
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commitment, and no mention of determinability. The paradox therefore gives us no reason 
to reject the notion that experience can be analysed in terms of momentary (or very short-
lived) ‘atoms’. I conclude that Phillips does not succeed in establishing that experiences 
are fundamentally extended. 
3.7 The Cartesian Theatre objection to the Simple Model 
I will now consider what I anticipate will be the main objection to the simple model. The 
objection would be that the simple model assumes what Dennett calls ‘Cartesian 
materialism’, which regards experience as akin to a sort of internal motion picture, with 
us – the subjects – as the audience: 
Cartesian materialism is the view that there is a crucial finish line or boundary 
somewhere in the brain, marking a place where […] what happens there is what 
you are conscious of. (Dennett 1991: 107) 
Our sense-organs collect data which is encoded in the brain before making its way to the 
‘finish line’ whereupon it is transduced into consciousness. The ‘finish line’ need not be 
taken too literally. Although a naïve Cartesian materialist might think there is a specific 
location for the neural-phenomenal transduction, the finish line could instead be thought 
of by the Cartesian materialist as the culmination of neural processing of a special sort. 
The relevant point to our discussion is that on the Cartesian materialist view, there is a 
determinate matter of fact about what information has been transduced and is therefore 
experienced by the subject at any particular moment. By assuming Cartesian materialism 
we imagine that we could, if you like, stop the film reel, and inspect the frame being 
shown at that moment. We can always ask ‘at what moment did that particular content 
become conscious?’. But this question, the argument goes, betrays a misunderstanding:  
[…] being an item in consciousness is not at all like being on television; it is, 
rather, a species of mental fame. Almost literally. Consciousness is cerebral 
celebrity – nothing more and nothing less. Those contents are conscious that 
persevere, that monopolize resources long enough to achieve certain typical and 
"symptomatic" effects – on memory, on the control of behavior and so forth. 
(Dennett 1993: 929) 
There are two related criticisms that can be brought out here. Firstly, just as it makes no 
sense to ask at which moment a celebrity acquires fame, it makes no sense to ask at which 
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moment a particular content becomes conscious. And yet, in saying that that motion is 
experienced after precisely x ms (at t10), the simple model provides an answer to this 
question. As such, the simple model should be rejected for assuming Cartesian 
materialism; there can be no precise time at which the experience of motion begins.   
The simple model could also be accused of implicitly assuming Cartesian materialism in 
that it assumes there is a definitive fact of the matter about what is experienced at an 
instant. When we reflect on our experience, we imagine there is some canonical version 
of the phenomenal events to which we have just been subject. And by constructing this 
narrative it seems plausible that there is a fact of the matter about what was being 
experienced at any particular instant. But, the objection goes, this narrative – and 
therefore the narrative-at-an-instant – is a fiction; there is no canonical version of the 
phenomenal events. There are at any one time many different versions, all competing for 
influence (fame) throughout the brain.  
I will now respond to these objections. I do not think that the first objection is too much 
trouble for us. Recall that Figure 6 shows the subject’s experience of motion 
determinately beginning at t10. The objection here would be that the contents of 
consciousness aren’t the sorts of things that we can say have determinate start points. 
Neural influence isn’t an on/off affair: it spreads, and is a matter of degrees. Thus, there 
can be no moment when the experience of motion becomes determinately conscious. This 
might be true. But if it is true, we can build it into our model. Instead of the model positing 
an on/off experience of motion, it can chart the increase of neural influence with time. 
Where our current model shows the determinate beginning of the motion experience, we 
can take this as the point at which the neural influence is sufficient to prompt a verbal 
report. There would, I assume, be a short duration between retinal excitation and 
subsequent impulse-processing by the relevant motion-detection module in the brain. And 
so, if motion detection is what we are modelling, our model would still show an initial 




Figure 7: the simple model iii 
With respect to the first criticism, then, the Simple Model does not need to assume a 
Cartesian materialist conception of consciousness. And, I think, if we take the simple 
model as modelling neural propagation (which is, according to Dennett and others, all 
there is to consciousness) rather than the broadcastings of the Cartesian Theatre, we have 
a way to respond to the second objection. The second objection was that the idea of a 
canonical narrative-at-an-instant is a fiction, because there are many different competing 
versions at any one time. Well, if we are now modelling the propagation of information 
from specific modules, there will be a ‘canonical version’ at an instant. Not of the stream 
of consciousness per se – because there is no such thing as a ‘canonical version’ (or so 
we are assuming for the sake of this objection). But there will be a single, determinate 
matter of fact about what sort of effects the activities of a particular module of the brain 
will be having on other parts of the brain; about how far the information has spread and 
its efficacy in terms of verbal reports, behaviour and so forth. And, moreover, there will 
be a fact of the matter about these effects at an instant. We don’t need to assume that 
there is a Cartesian Theatre to accept this. If we truly embrace the idea that there is nothing 
more to consciousness than neural propagation, then we can model consciousness – or at 
least aspects of consciousness – with the simple model.  
Of course, it may well be the case that there is more to consciousness than neural 
propagation. There may be a processual ‘finishing line’. Whether or not there is, the 
Simple Model is flexible enough for us not to worry. The simple model shows us a way 
to escape Fara’s paradox without appealing to the notion of determinable content. 
Phillips’s argument for the holistic conception of experience is therefore unsuccessful. 
The atomistic conception of experience is vindicated. 
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3.8  Summary 
Neither Soteriou nor Phillips have presented compelling arguments in favour of the 
holistic conception of experience. On the contrary, their own holistic solutions to the so-
called puzzle cases they raise run into deep problems, and the puzzles themselves can be 
dealt with far more effectively by the atomist. We saw that Soteriou’s solution, in relying 
on the temporal transparency of experience, falls foul of empirical evidence; and, further, 
that the puzzle he attempts to solve can only be a puzzle for the holist. Phillips’s solution 
to Fara’s puzzle fared no better. It was shown that his notion of a temporal field central 
to his account, although ostensibly plausible, not only had unacceptable neurological 
consequences but also ran together two importantly distinct neural mechanisms. Once the 
appropriate corrections are made, a straightforward atomist solution to the paradox 
becomes available. The Neo-Parfittian claim that it is an empty question whether 
experiences have temporal extension is safe. We can put this claim to use against the A-











Chapter 4: The Counter-Argument from Experience 
 
I have argued in the previous chapters that there is no metaphysically non-trivial way of 
unifying the different momentary experiential states that we uncritically suppose 
comprise a subject’s stream of consciousness. While we can describe two experiential 
states as belonging to a single experiential event, it would be just as metaphysically 
accurate to describe them as not. What I now want to do is deploy that conclusion against 
the A-theorist’s argument from experience. Recall that this is that argument that:  
(A1)  We have experiences as of A-theoretic change. 
(A2)  The best explanation for (A1) is that A-theoretic change occurs in reality. 
(A3)  Therefore, A-theoretic change occurs in reality.  
In this chapter I respond to (A2), assuming for the sake of argument that (A1) is true. 
The thought behind (A2), I take it, is that it makes more sense to suppose that our 
experiences as of A-change are veridical than it does to suppose that they are non-
veridical. After all, the traditional B-theoretic response to temporal experience is to 
dismiss it as illusory; a move the A-theorist wants to block. If we can show that our 
experiences as of A-change are non-veridical, then, we will have sufficient reason to 
reject (A2) from the argument from experience.  
I will now argue that even if A-change was an objective feature of reality, it couldn’t be 
an object of perception. The argument in broad strokes is that we are not justified in 
believing that A-change is an object of perception given that it is an empty question 
whether experiences have temporal extension. The argument – call it the counter-





(B1)  The A-theory can be evidenced by experience only if A-
change is an object of experience. 
(B2) A-change cannot be an object of experience if our 
perceptual awareness of extended events is derivative. 
(B3) Our perceptual awareness of events is derivative if it must 
be accounted for in terms of momentary experiential states. 
(B4) Our perceptual awareness of events must be accounted for 
in terms of momentary experiential states. 
(B3), (B4)       (B5)  Our perceptual awareness of extended events is derivative 
(B2), (B5) (B6)  A-change cannot be an object of experience. 
(B1), (B6) (B7)  The A-theory cannot be evidenced by experience. 
The argument is valid, but some of the premises will take some explaining. This is due in 
part to the terminology, which will be made explicit as I go.  
4.1  Justifying (B1) 
(B1) is reasonably straightforward. Changes – the sort we are interested in – are 
temporally extended events involving, minimally, two distinct  (or incompatible) states 
of affairs, P and Q.1 Because the B-theorist denies the existence of a moving present, they 
understand the change from P to Q merely as tenseless ‘at-at’ change: P obtains at t1 and 
Q obtains at t2 (Russell 1903). The A-theorist demands more from the notion of change. 
Because for the A-theorist what is present is constantly changing, not only does P obtain 
at t1 and Q obtain at t2; P is replaced by Q as the presently existing state. We can thus 
say that A-theoretic change, or A-change, is understood as Q replacing P.  
If experience provides evidence of the A-theory as the A-theorist’s argument from 
experience claims, it must be the case that we have veridical experiences of Q replacing 
P. If we don’t have veridical experiences of Q replacing P, either we will have non-
                                                          
1 The sort of change we are interested in is diachronic change, so I ignore the sort of change (if 
one can even call it that) involved in spatial variation – e.g. the change between the hot and cold 
ends of a poker. 
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veridical (illusory or hallucinatory) experiences as of Q replacing P, or else we will have 
no experiences as of Q replacing P whatsoever.2 Either way, experience could not be 
taken as evidence for the A-theory. 
Now, in order to have a veridical experience of A-change, it must be the case that A-
change is an object of experience. One cannot have a veridical experience of something 
that is not the object of experience. To see why this is the case I must first explain what I 
mean by ‘object of experience’. This term might initially lead to some confusion. One 
finds terms like ‘direct object of experience’ and ‘direct object of perception’ populating 
the literature. As a loose definition: 
[P]erceiver P directly perceives an object O if P perceives O without perceiving 
any intermediary I. P would be perceiving an intermediary I if, as things are, it is 
only in virtue of perceiving I that P perceives O. (Dancy 1985: 144, emphasis 
added)  
Different theories will take different stances on what these direct objects are. For instance, 
a sense-datum theorist will hold that the direct objects of perception are sense-data; 
whereas a naïve realist (or relational theorist, or object theorist) will hold that they are the 
mind-independent objects ‘out there in the world’ that experience presents us with. When 
I speak of ‘objects of experience’, I too am referring to mind-independent objects. But I 
am not using ‘object’ in the sense outlined by Dancy. I am not committing myself to any 
view about what the direct objects of perception are. There may be perceptual 
intermediaries (sense data, etc.), or there may not be. The most I mean to commit myself 
to is a loosely realist view of mind-independent reality: mind-independent objects exist, 
and play a causal role in our perceptions of them.  
That is not to say that I am assuming the causal theory of perception to be true. Although 
the causal theory of perception is controversial, it is generally agreed even by those that 
oppose it that Grice (1961) did succeed in at least stating a necessary condition for 
perceptual experience: for subject S to perceive object O, O must causally influence S. 
There is a causal chain starting at a mind-independent object that leads to the subject’s 
sense organs and which ultimately results in some particular kind of mental activity. This 
much is uncontroversial, and I assume so much to be true in my argument. What is 
                                                          
2 When I talk of ‘veridical experiences of Q replacing P’ I mean veridical with respect to Q 
replacing P.  
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controversial is whether or not this is the object with which we are in direct conscious 
contact with. A direct realist/ relationalist will think that it is, whereas a sense datum 
theorist will think we are in direct conscious contact with some mental item. Similarly, a 
sense datum theorist will identify the perceptual experience with the mental activity at 
the ‘end’ of the causal chain, whereas a relationalist will hold that the perceptual 
experience is the relation between that mental activity and the mind independent object. 
These disagreements are irrelevant to my aims. When I use the term ‘object of 
experience’, I am merely referring to the mind-independent object that the perception is 
of; the thing in the world that, under some appropriate description, directly explains the 
qualitative character of the experience (in veridical conditions). Thus, it will suffice for 
our purposes to say that an object of experience is (a) mind-independent, (b) what the 
experience is of, and (c) causally responsible for the experience of itself.3 The existence 
of these sorts of objects is agreed upon by anyone who holds a realist view of mind-
independent reality. Whether or not this is the ‘direct’ object of experience (or a 
constituent of the perceptual experience) is not relevant to the current argument. Hence, 
if we veridically experience A-change, A-change must be the object of experience.4 It 
then follows that the A-theory can be evidenced by experience only if A-change is an 
object of experience. 
4.2 Justifying (B2) 
(B2) claims that A-change cannot be an object of experience if our perceptual awareness 
of extended events is derivative. This can be unpacked as the following two claims. 
Firstly, A-change cannot be an object of experience if we cannot be perceptually aware 
of extended events. And secondly, A-change cannot be an object of experience if that 
awareness is derivative. I will discuss these in turn.  
The object of experience was defined above as the object that lies at the beginning of the 
causal chain that results in, or is constitutive of, the perception of that object. So the object 
of awareness is by definition that which we are perceptually aware of. If we aren’t 
                                                          
3 The difference between a hallucination and an illusion then turns on whether the representation 
of an object has an object of experience, in the defined sense. An illusion has, whereas a 
hallucination lacks, any corresponding causally responsible mind-independent object. The 
difference between a veridical perception and an illusion then turns on the accuracy of the 
representation.  
4 I assume throughout that to perceive X is to veridically experience X. 
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perceptually aware of something, that something can’t be the object of experience. Hence, 
if we can’t be perceptually aware of temporally extended events, then the objects of 
experience can’t be temporally extended; the only objects of experience we would be 
capable of detecting would be durationless. A-change (if it occurs) is a temporally 
extended event. It then follows that A-change can be an object of experience only if we 
can be perceptually aware of temporally extended events. This secures the first claim. 
It might be objected at this point that the objects of experience can be extended even if 
our perceptual awareness is only ever of states. After all, everyday objects persist – that 
is to say, they have temporal extension – and it might be held that we are capable of 
detecting these objects insofar as we are capable of detecting instantaneous states of these 
objects. So it seems that the objects of our experience can have temporal extension, even 
if we can only ever be perceptually aware of durationless instants.  
It may be true that our awareness of persisting objects does indeed come from our 
perceptual awareness of the states they are comprised of. But if our perceptual awareness 
of objects is restricted to their states, then what awareness we can have of these persisting 
objects is built up – derived – from such perceptions. We would be aware of persisting 
objects in virtue of perceiving their states.  
This leads us to the second claim – that A-change cannot be an object of experience if our 
perceptual awareness of events is derivative. ‘Derivative’ and ‘non-derivative’ first need 
to be defined. As I am using the terms, we are derivatively aware of an event if our 
awareness of that event is derived from an awareness of states of (or during) that event.5 
We are non-derivatively aware of an event if our awareness is not derived from states of 
that event; if our awareness is of the event per se.   
Let’s assume for the sake of argument that change is A-theoretic. A-change events have 
the metaphysical structure of Q replacing P. P and Q, we may suppose, obtain within 
adjacent intervals. We may suppose this to be true whether the change is continuous or 
discrete. If it is discrete, the change will be a ‘jump’ from one state of affairs to another 
between adjacent intervals. With continuous change, one might object, the same cannot 
be said. The thought goes that what makes a continuous change continuous is the fact that 
                                                          
5 Again, my use of ‘event’ and ‘state’ is idiosyncratic. When I say ‘event’, I merely mean 
something with temporal extension. When I say ‘state’ I am talking about something without 
temporal extension.  
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it does not jump from one state to another between adjacent intervals. The change from P 
to Q will be continuous precisely because there is an intermediate interval between fully-
P and fully-Q during which the state of affairs phases from one to the other. This is not 
the full story, though. If there is a continuous change from P to Q there will be an interval 
during which fully-P is true, followed by an adjacent interval during which fully-P is no 
longer true. Not-fully-P is a distinct state of affairs from fully-P; we could call fully-P ‘R’ 
and not-fully-P ‘S’. And so we would have a change from R to S between temporally 
adjacent intervals.6 Thus, change is always between distinct states of affairs in adjacent 
intervals whether the change is discrete or continuous. We can therefore think of A-
change as necessarily involving the replacement of one state with another.7  
If our awareness of events was merely derivative we would be aware of the event ‘Q 
replacing P’ in virtue of being aware of its states. We would be aware of P, and of Q, and 
of the ordering of those states. But this does not amount to an awareness of A-change. It 
amounts to an awareness of change as described by the B-theorist. For the B-theorist, 
change is simply an ordering of states of affairs. There is no replacement of states. And 
it is precisely this process of replacement that would be beyond our perceptual grasp, 
were our perceptual awareness of events merely derivative. Anything that is beyond our 
perceptual grasp cannot be an object of experience. Hence, A-change cannot be an object 
of experience if our perceptual awareness of events is merely derivative.8 
                                                          
6 The same reasoning can be applied for any intervening state between R and S. 
7 One might worry here this account of change has the consequence that proper continuity is 
impossible. I think this worry would be misplaced. Yes, all change involves change from one state 
of affairs to a distinct state of affairs. And so it might be said that in this sense even continuous 
change is discrete. However, there a crucial difference between discrete and continuous change. 
With a continuous change, between any two states of affairs there will be a further, intermediary 
state of affairs. This is what ‘true’ continuous change is. Change is discrete when it is between 
two states of affairs with no intermediary state. 
8 I do not know how to show that A-change could be an object of experience if our awareness of 
events was non-derivative. But it seems plausible to allow that it would be possible. Q replacing 
P is an extended event, and so it seems reasonable to assume that, if we could be non-derivatively 
aware of that event, we would be aware of the replacement. This does not matter for the argument. 
All I need to show is that A-change cannot be an object of experience if our awareness of events 




4.3 Justifying (B3) 
(B3) claims that any perceptual awareness of extended events must be derivative if 
experiential states are momentary. If the A-theorist rejects (B3), they will hold that we 
can be non-derivatively aware of extended events even if experiential states are 
momentary. They will hold that our awareness is not derived from the perception of states 
during that event; they will hold that our perceptual awareness is of the event per se.  
We are assuming the broadly realist view that mind-independent objects of perception 
exist and that they play a causal role in our perceptions of them; when we are perceptually 
aware of an object, we are causally connected to it. The object of perception in question 
is an event. To be non-derivatively aware of an event – that is, to be perceptually aware 
of the event per se – our experience must be causally connected to that event per se and 
not merely to the states during that event. The causal connection between our experience 
and the event must be non-derivative. If it wasn’t, the objects of experience would be 
states, and our awareness of the event would be derived from those states. Our awareness 
of the event would be merely derivative. Someone who rejects (B3) therefore holds that 
experiential states can be non-derivatively causally connected to events.  
What I want to first establish is that, if the A-theorist is to hold that experiential states can 
be non-derivatively causally connected to events, they will be committed against the 
principle of temporal locality. Once this is done I will go on to show why this commitment 
spells disaster for the A-theorist.  
Temporal locality can be expressed in slogan form as ‘no unmediated action at a temporal 
distance’. The idea is that a cause and its effect cannot be separated by a temporal distance 
without there being some causal intermediary, or chain of intermediaries, linking the two. 
Someone who rejects (B3) is committed against temporal locality; they must accept that 
causal relations can hold over temporal distances in the absence of any intermediaries. In 
other words, they must accept temporal nonlocality. The reason for this is as follows.  
Let’s say that event A (A-change) occurs from t1 to t3, at which time (t3) experiential 
state B obtains. As discussed above, rejecting (B3) means the A-theorist must hold that 
the causal connection B has with A is non-derivative. So B must be causally connected to 
A per se; that is, B must be connected to all of A. That being so, there will be a causal 
connection terminating at t3 (where B occurs) and stretching back to t1 (where A begins). 
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But of course, B doesn’t exist at t1. So it seems that we have an instance of action at a 
temporal distance – viz. between t1 and t3 (and also between any intermediate time and 
t3 – see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: nonlocal causal connections 
The lesson is generalizable: because a state cannot be concurrent with an event per se, it 
is impossible for that state to be non-derivatively connected to the event – connected to 
all of the event – without causal connections holding over some temporal distance. It 
seems, then, that it is impossible to hold that a state can be non-derivatively causally 
connected to an event without violating temporal locality. 
It might not be obvious why this is the case. Yes, we are assuming that B is non-
derivatively connected to A. But this does not preclude there being causal intermediaries. 
And so surely we can avoid temporal nonlocality by positing a chain of causal 
intermediaries that spans the gap between t1 and t3.  
However, the problem emerges when we take a look at what these intermediaries might 
be. There are two options. Either they are states or they are events. Let’s assume the 
former for now. On this view, there is a chain of causal intermediary states linking state 
B at t3 with A at t1. Now, if B is directly connected to A, it cannot be connected to A 
merely in virtue of being connected to A’s states. So the chain of intermediary states 
cannot connect B to a state of A. The chain must be connected to A per se. That is, it must 
be connected to an event. But then we face the same problem we started out with. We 
have an event connected to a state. And as we have seen, this violates temporal locality.  
What if we assume that the causal intermediaries are events, though? We avoid the 
problem of temporal locality being violated at the connection with A. But we have the 
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same problem at the other end – at the connection with B.9 We have to make sense of a 
chain of events leading to, and being causally connected to a state – viz. B. But again, an 
event cannot be causally connected to a state without violating temporal locality. 
Similarly, we cannot say that the chain of intermediaries comprises some combination of 
both events and states without running into the same issue. 
Rejecting (B3) therefore forces the A-theorist to accept temporal nonlocality. I will now 
argue that this is problematic for the A-theorist on three counts. Firstly, it puts them at a 
severe dialectical disadvantage against the B-theorist. Secondly, there is no clear way for 
any version of the A-theory to account for the sort of causal relation they need. Thirdly, 
the nonlocal causal connections the A-theorist needs to posit in order to resist (B3) would 
commit them to an untenable model of the mechanisms involved in perception. I address 
these points in turn. 
4.3.1 Nonlocality and dialectical considerations 
In rejecting (B3), the A-theorist is committed to temporal nonlocality. This will be a bitter 
pill to swallow, as temporal nonlocality runs counter to what has traditionally been the 
philosophical and scientific orthodoxy. Indeed, temporal locality is ‘almost ubiquitous in 
the way that scientists think about science and about what constitutes a reasonable 
scientific hypothesis’ (Adlam 2018: 41).  
Temporal locality, and spatiotemporal locality more generally, certainly has a long line 
of supporters. Take Hume, for instance, who famously claimed that ‘nothing can operate 
in a time or place which is ever so little remov’d from those of its existence’ (1740 [1992]: 
75). Or Newton, who displays a more scathing attitude towards nonlocality: 
That one body may act upon another at a Distance thro’ a Vacuum, without the 
Mediation of anything else, by and through which their Action and Force may be 
conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity, that I believe no 
Man who has in philosophical Matters a competent Faculty of thinking can ever 
fall into it. (Newton [in Cohen 1978: 302-3]) 
Certainly, nonlocality – both temporal and spatiotemporal – is highly unintuitive. In their 
discussion of velocity, Bigelow and Pargetter (1989) offer something of a justification. 
                                                          




For context: they are arguing in favour of the ‘flux doctrine’ (that velocity is a property 
intrinsic to instantaneous states of objects) as opposed to the ‘Ockhamist view’ (that 
velocity is attributable to an object merely in virtue of the positions it occupies at different 
times). 
Consider for instance a meteor striking Mars, and consider the problem of 
explaining why it creates a crater of precisely the size it does. At the precise 
moment of impact, the meteor exerts a specific force on the surface of Mars. Why 
does it exert precisely that force? Because it is moving at a particular velocity. 
On the Ockhamist view, what this amounts to is that it exerts the force it does 
because it has occupied such-and-such positions at such-and-such times. In other 
words, the Ockhamist appeals to the positions the meteor has occupied in the 
past. But why should a body’s past positions exert any force now? This requires 
the meteor to have some kind of ‘memory’ – what it does on Mars depends not 
only on its current properties, but also where it has been […] This cannot be ruled 
out as absurd, without further argument. Nevertheless, it is an advantage of the 
flux doctrine that it does not require any pseudo-memory in objects, or any time-
lag in causation. (Bigelow & Pargetter 1989: 296) 
Their point is that we should reject the Ockhamist view because it entails the occurrence 
of temporally nonlocal interactions, which in turn seems to require the operation of some 
sort of spooky mechanism (‘pseudo-memory in objects’ or suchlike). Here, then, is an 
argument against temporal nonlocality: All things being equal, we should avoid spooky 
mechanisms. 
Unfortunately for the B-theorist it is far from definitive. The A-theorist can simply reply 
that in the current context all things aren’t equal. Positing such ‘spooky’ mechanisms, 
unintuitive as doing so may be, is less unintuitive than what the counter-argument from 
experience is trying to establish – viz. that we don’t veridically experience A-change. And 
so they could use the unintuitiveness of the B-theory to motivate their rejection of 
temporal locality. Perhaps spooky mechanisms are a small price to pay if doing so means 
we can preserve something so fundamental to experience as the passing of time. It seems, 
then, that we will have to do better than simply appealing to intuitions if (B3) is to gain 
any traction. 
Spatiotemporal locality might instead be defended on pragmatic grounds. The idea is that 
if we assumed that a state of affairs has as its immediate cause some spatiotemporally 
distant state of affairs, it would be impossible to isolate which aspects of which states of 
affairs were causally relevant to any other state of affairs. The worry is that this would 
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undermine the whole scientific approach, as we would have no reason to suppose that the 
variables changed during an experiment were responsible for its outcome. By assuming 
spatiotemporal locality, we restrict our attention to the variables changed during the 
experiment, and so are able to determine the effects of those variables. As Einstein writes 
in a letter to Born, without the assumption of spatiotemporal locality, ‘physical thinking 
in the familiar sense would not be possible’, and it would be ‘hard to see any way of 
formulating and testing the laws of physics’ (Born 1971: 172). Indeed, given that we do 
find regularities between spatiotemporally local states of affairs, rejecting locality would 
seem to leave it ‘completely mysterious why the effects of a cause occur at the time and 
place that they do’ (Le Poidevin 2007a:21). 
We might wonder whether these worries aren’t somewhat overstated, however. Certainly, 
it’s hard to imagine how we could even begin to go about developing a physics in a world 
that was properly described by laws which eschewed spatiotemporally local interactions. 
Of course, in such a world we would have to accept nonlocality. But we could accept 
nonlocality under less extreme circumstances. All nonlocality requires is that nonlocal 
causal interactions are possible; nonlocality could be true and it nevertheless be the case 
that interactions are for the most part local. All we would need is a theoretical framework 
that was able to predict under what circumstances interactions would be local and those 
circumstances under which interactions would be nonlocal. If we had such a framework, 
there would be nothing mysterious about why some interactions were local and others 
not. What’s more, we have such a framework – at least, we have one that apparently 
predicts spatially nonlocal interactions: quantum mechanics. 
In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) proposed a thought experiment designed 
to show that quantum theory was, as it stood, incomplete. A simplified version of the 
experiment is owed to Bohm (1951), the broad strokes of which are as follows. Two 
entangled particles are emitted from a source in opposite directions towards spin 
detectors. The measurements are synchronous (or near synchronous) so as to preclude 
any slower-than-light signal from one measurement influencing the other, and yet there 
is a correlation (or rather, anti-correlation) between them: when the detectors are set to 
measure spin along the same axis, they will always measure opposite spins.  
According to orthodox quantum mechanics, the particles’ spins become determinate only 
once the particles interact with the detectors. But this implies that by becoming 
determinate, one particle’s spin somehow instantaneously (or near-instantaneously) 
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influences the other particle’s spin. Assuming that this is impossible (i.e. that spatial 
locality is true), EPR argued that orthodox quantum mechanics must be incomplete. The 
particles must be emitted with spin values; it’s just that we can’t discover what those are 
using the calculations currently at our disposal. So in their argument, EPR assume locality 
and derive the conclusion that quantum mechanics is incomplete.   
However, John Bell (1964) showed that locality is in fact inconsistent with orthodox 
quantum mechanics. He devised an EPR-type test in which either detector could measure 
spin along a variety of axes. For each pair of particles emitted, the axis that either detector 
is set to measure along is randomly selected, and done so independently of the other. 
Given that the axes are randomly selected in this way, the results won’t be perfectly anti-
correlated. Sometimes both detectors will measure the same spin, sometimes opposite 
spins. If we assume locality, and that the particles therefore must have pre-defined spin 
values as ERP argued, we can calculate the probability of these results. However, as Bell 
established, these probabilities contradict those calculated using quantum mechanics. 
Simply, quantum mechanics predicts different results; it predicts results that aren’t 
possible without nonlocality. 
Experiments have since been conducted that confirm the predictions made by quantum 
mechanics (e.g. Aspect et. al. 1981; Shalm et al. 2015; Hensen et al. 2015), and it is now 
widely accepted that quantum mechanics demonstrates that interactions between particles 
in ERP-type cases are nonlocal. So it is indeed possible to formulate and test theories in 
physics without the assumption of locality – spatial locality, at least. But as it is possible 
with regards to spatial locality, there’s no obvious reason why it shouldn’t be possible 
with temporal locality (Adlam 2018). 
Let’s allow the A-theorist the point, as far as it can take them: temporal nonlocality is not 
ruled out. But that of course doesn’t mean it’s true. If the A-theorist is to reject (B3), they 
will first have to establish that temporal nonlocality is true. This presents a considerable 
– if not insurmountable – barrier.  
The A-theorist might at this point object that the B-theorist is in the same boat. Neither 
temporal locality nor nonlocality have been established to be true. Temporal locality 
might be current scientific orthodoxy, but we have seen that it is lacking in justification. 
So before the B-theorist can claim (B3), they need to come up with a convincing reason 
for accepting temporal locality.  
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This is wrong, though. (B3) doesn’t require the truth of temporal locality. This is because 
temporal locality is sufficient for the truth of (B3), but not necessary for it. (B3) claims 
that any perceptual awareness of extended events must be derivative if experiential states 
are momentary: when we are perceptually aware of an event, our experiential states must 
be causally connected to states of that event, rather than to the event per se. The truth of 
this claim would be guaranteed by the truth of what we might call the causal connection 
principle: 
CCP: a state can’t be directly causally connected to an event; it can only be 
connected to a state (or states) of an event. 
CCP says, in effect, that states and events can only ever be derivatively connected. In 
order to resist (B3), the A-theorist must therefore reject CCP. The truth of CCP would, in 
turn, be guaranteed by the truth of temporal locality.  
However, CCP does not require the truth of temporal locality. All CCP requires is that 
states are only ever non-derivatively connected to other states. Nothing about this 
precludes the possibility of these state-state connections holding across temporal 
distances in the absence of intermediaries. In other words, CCP does not rule out the 
possibility of nonlocal state-state connections. So CCP is consistent with temporal 
nonlocality. Temporal locality is therefore sufficient but not necessary for CCP. As such, 
even if – and it’s a big ‘if’ – the A-theorist could establish that temporally nonlocal causal 
connections are possible, they still wouldn’t have shown that CCP is false.  
Moreover, even if the A-theorist could somehow show that CCP is false, they still 
wouldn’t have shown that (B3) is false. This is because CCP is sufficient but not 
necessary for (B3). CCP says that states and events can only be derivatively connected. 
If states can only ever be non-derivatively connected to states (i.e. if CCP is true), then 
our awareness of events must be derivative if experiences are momentary (i.e. (B3) is 
true).  So (B3) follows from CCP. But even if (B3) is true, and no experiential state can 
ever be non-derivatively connected to any event qua object of perception, it doesn’t 
follow that no state can ever be non-derivatively connected to any event. Hence, (B3) is 
consistent with the falsity of CCP. So even if the A-theorist can somehow show that CCP 
is false, they still wouldn’t have shown that (B3) is false.  
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In resisting (B3), the A-theorist is committed against both temporal locality and CCP. 
However, although the truth of temporal locality and CCP would guarantee the truth of 
(B3), the B-theorist is committed to neither. Dialectically speaking, the A-theorist has all 
their work ahead of them just to break even with the B-theorist.  
4.3.2 The A-theories and temporally nonlocal causal relations 
Even if the truth of temporal nonlocality could somehow be established, it is not at all 
clear that the A-theorist could even accommodate it within their theoretic framework. I 
begin by examining the difficulties facing those A-theorists who subscribe to presentism. 
This comes in two parts: firstly, I consider the general problems posed by trans-temporal 
causal relations, and then the problems posed specifically by nonlocal causal relations as 
demanded by the rejection of (B3). I conclude that even if the presentist can answer the 
general challenge, their solution doesn’t carry over to the nonlocal case. 
 I then take a look at the difficulties encountered by those who advocate the other main 
versions of the A-theory, namely the Growing Block and Moving Spotlight theories. I 
conclude that they face a dilemma. Either these theorists opt for a full-blooded or a 
‘ghostly’ construal of non-present events. If the former, the causal relations in question 
can be accommodated; but doing so has unacceptable sceptical consequences. If the latter, 
these sceptical consequences are avoided, but then the A-theorist is lumbered with the 
same (or closely analogous) problems encountered by the presentist.  
We begin with presentists. According to presentists, states (and events) in the past and 
future do not exist; all that exists exists now. The general challenge the presentists face is 
as follows.10 Causal relations hold over time.11 The recent stubbing of my toe is the cause 
of my present pain. For a relation to exist, the relata it holds between must exist; without 
relata there can be no relation. So for a causal relation to hold between the stubbing of 
my toe (X at t1) and the pain I now feel (Y at t2), both X and Y must exist. But the 
presentist must deny this: only the present relatum can exist – viz. Y. X is in the past, and 
so doesn’t exist. As such, there can be no causal relation between X and Y. Presentists, it 
seems, must reject trans-temporal causal relations. 
                                                          
10 My exposition of the challenge is a variation of McDaniel’s (2009) formulation. 
11 It can be left open whether or not all causal relations hold over time. 
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A presentist might respond to this difficulty by providing an account of causality that does 
not require relations that hold between events (or states).12 Following Baron (2012), I will 
call the sort of causality that has events as the relata biff causation. There are two ways a 
presentist might try to circumvent biff causation. Firstly, they might posit other sorts of 
causal relata. Secondly, they might construe causation in such a way as does not require 
the existence of relata at all.  
De Clercq (2006) makes a suggestion along the former lines. The idea is that the causal 
relata are not taken to be events, but facts.13 The fact that I stubbed my toe explains the 
fact that I am now in pain. Although one fact is a fact about a past event, they are both 
currently true; they are facts that obtain in the present. The presentist can therefore 
contend that these are the relata between which the causal relation holds, and in doing so 
avoid the problem of missing relata. 
The latter approach – denying that causation requires relata – is a move available for those 
who espouse a counterfactual theory of causation (such as Crisp 2005; Bourne 2006; 
McDaniel 2009). The causal relation between the toe-stubbing and my pain would then 
be analysed in terms of the truth of the statement: 
 If I had not stubbed my toe, I would not be in pain.  
The standard Lewisian (1973) approach to counterfactuals determines the truth of this 
statement as follows. There are possible worlds in which my counterpart did not stub his 
toe. One of these possible worlds will be more similar to the actual world than any other. 
If, in that world, my counterpart is not in pain, the statement is true. No mention of causal 
relations whatsoever is needed. And if no mention of relations is needed, no mention of 
relata will be needed. It seems, then, that the presentist has here another way of avoiding 
the problem of missing relata.  
Sam Baron (2012) is convinced by neither strategy. Citing the arguments of David Lewis 
(2004: 287), he urges that biff causation should be regarded as the most basic kind of 
                                                          
12 Unless otherwise stated, I will assume that accounts that construe causation as a relation 
between events can also construe causation as a relation between states. (In fact, construing the 
causal relata as states rather than events avoids the problems associated with temporal nonlocality, 
as discussed herein.)  
13 See also Mellor (1995) Bigelow (1996) and Zimmerman (1997) who suggest we construe causal 
relata as belonging to a different category from events and states (as I define them). The 
considerations that count against DeClercq also count against these suggestions.  
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causation: it is what the truth of all causal statements (e.g. counterfactual statements etc.) 
supervene on. And so these presentist strategies avoid the problem of trans-temporal 
causation by ignoring the central issue.  
Whether or not one finds Lewis’s supervenience claim convincing for all conceivable 
causal statements, it certainly seems plausible when thinking about the processes involved 
in perception. If we are to do justice to the role played by our sense organs, we must 
recognise that perception is largely a mechanistic process. In the case of vision, photons 
with a certain wavelength collide with the light-receptor cells in the retina and, via certain 
electro-chemical reactions, send electrical signals up the optical nerve to the brain, and 
so on. This story is about biff causation. Any account that denies or ignores the 
interactions involved in perception will remain unsatisfactory. 
How, then, might the presentist be able to account for biff causation? One suggestion 
would be to say that two events can be causally related so long as they have overlapping 
temporal parts. Or, to avoid a four-dimensionalist terminology: so long as there is a time 
at which the two events are present. If event X begins at t1 and ends at t3, and event Y 
begins at t3 and ends at t5, then the two events could be causally related at t3 (see e.g. 
Sider 1997: 337 fn.). This explains how causal relations hold at a time, but leaves it 
mysterious how causal relations could hold over time.14 Further, it only explains how 
events could be derivatively related. This is because, assuming that the present is 
temporally unextended, the temporal parts of the events that could exist in the present 
moment would be instantaneous. Thus, the relata would be states, not events. And so the 
events would be biff-related merely in virtue of their states being biff-related. There 
would be no causal connection between events per se. The solution would therefore be of 
no help to those presentists trying to resist (B3).  
It looks like the only recourse would be to drop the assumption that the present is 
temporally unextended. Baron (2012) considers a model of causation along these lines as 
a way for the presentist to account for trans-temporal causal relations. It requires the 
presentist accept ‘thick’ presentism, according to which the present is not instantaneous 
but has some small extension. Once they allow this, it becomes possible for them to 
                                                          
14 Huemer & Kovitz (2003) argue that causal relata must be simultaneous if time is continuous. 
If this is right, no causal relations hold over time and so there can be no problem of trans-temporal 
causal relations. Far from saving the A-theorist, this would rule out the possibility of nonlocal 
causal relations and thus quash the A-theorist’s response to (B3).  
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maintain that two subsequent events – or extended temporal parts of those events (which 
would by my definition of ‘event’ themselves be events) – can both exist in the present. 
Imagine event X exists from t1 to t3, and event Y exists from t4 to t6. If the present 
extends from t3 to t4, then there will be a part of X at t3 and a part of Y at t4 that the 
presentist can say both exist and between which a causal relation can therefore hold.   
Although this model allows for trans-temporal causal relations, it comes at a heavy cost 
to the presentist. The idea that the present has temporal extension is highly controversial, 
and one that many presentists are not prepared to accept. Indeed, thick presentism is prima 
facie refuted by the following Augustinian-style line of reasoning.15 For any temporal 
extension, there must be earlier and later parts. This means that, in relation to the earlier 
parts, the later parts are in the future; and in relation to the later parts, the earlier parts are 
in the past. So if any part of an interval is present, some other part of it will be in the past 
or in the future. Hence, if all parts of the interval are present then all parts must also be 
either in the past or in the future. But what is past or future cannot be present. Hence, the 
present cannot have temporal extension. It must instead be thought of as the durationless 
temporal boundary between the past and the future.  
The ‘thick’ presentist might be tempted here to defer to quantum theory. Some quantum 
theorists propose that time is not continuous but granular, consisting of fundamental, 
indivisible units or atoms.16 If this is true, it might support the thick presentist’s claim that 
that the present has some small extension. Further, if these ‘atoms’ are indivisible in the 
sense that they are mereologically simple – lacking proper parts – the thick presentist will 
have a response to the Augustinian argument above. If the present has no temporal parts, 
no part can be in the past or the future in relation to another part. A present, extended 
chronon would be wholly present.  
It is a matter of debate whether the idea of an extended simple makes sense, and I do not 
wish to venture into that arena (see e.g. Markosian 1998; Braddon-Mitchell & Miller 
2006; McDaniel 2007; Sider 2007). But even if the idea of extended simples makes sense, 
and if time is granular, the presentist is still in a tight spot. Yes, if temporal atoms are 
extended simples then the presentist might be able to answer the Augustinian challenge. 
                                                          
15 From Augustine’s Confessions (397 – 400 AD, reprinted 1961).  
16 It is a matter of ongoing debate in quantum theory whether time is granular, and, if it is, what 
the size of the grains might be. Proposals range from 10-44 seconds (the duration of Planck time, 
as espoused by e.g. Rovelli 2016) to 10-24 seconds (the duration of a ‘chronon’ proposed by 
Caldirola (1980). The term ‘chronon’ was dubbed by Lévi (1927)).  
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But for the same reason, the thick presentist’s account of trans-temporal causal relations 
no longer works. If the present has no temporal parts, then two events that occur at 
different times can no longer occupy different parts of the present. Only events that occur 
at the same time could be biff related. Biff relations holding over time would appear to 
be ruled out.  
4.3.3 Presentism and the challenge posed by nonlocality  
Perhaps the thick presentist would be able to argue their way out of this tight spot. Perhaps 
the notion of an extended present – even if lacking proper parts – would give them 
sufficient resources to tell a story about biff relations holding over time within the present. 
But, even if such a case could be made, there is yet a further problem for the thick 
presentist in trying to respond to (B3).   
(B3) claims that any perceptual awareness of extended events must be derivative if 
experiential states are momentary. Rejecting (B3) means that the presentist must hold that 
the event – the object of perception – is non-derivatively causally connected to the 
experiential state. Assuming there is no backwards causality in operation here, the 
experiential state will obtain at, or some short time after, the end of the event. We may 
say that the object of experience, event A, occurs from t1 to t3 – at which point 
experiential state B obtains. As discussed above, there must be a nonlocal causal relation 
that holds between A at t1 and B at t3. The presentist’s solution to trans-temporal biff 
relations considered above was to posit an extended present within which the relations 
can hold. To apply the same model here would means positing an extended present from 
t1 to t3. Why this is unacceptable becomes clear when we consider how long this interval 
must be. 
The A-theorist’s argument from experience says, in effect, that because we have 
experiences as of A-change, we should conclude that A-change occurs in reality. The B-
theorist’s counter-argument says that even if A-change events occur, we could only be 
derivatively aware of them – and these sorts of experiences cannot constitute veridical 
experiences as of A-change. The A-theorist says that we can be non-derivatively aware 
of events – specifically, A-change events. These are those putative A-theoretic events 
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such as movement.17 So in rejecting (B3), the A-theorist thinks we can be non-
derivatively aware of movement. Let’s spell out what this entails for the thick presentist.  
In chapter 3, if you recall, the idea of a ‘borderline motion experience’ was introduced. 
We have a borderline motion experience when we observe an object moving so slowly 
we are only just able to detect its movement. If the object was to move any slower we 
would not see it move. We imagined an hour hand so long that we could just about see 
its tip move. Let’s take this to be the event the presentist claims us to be non-derivatively 
aware of.  
Over short enough timescales, the positions of the hour hand are indiscriminable; there is 
a minimum duration we would need to watch it for before we could perceive any change. 
Following Ian Phillips (2011a), a working estimate for this duration was put at 300ms. If 
we were to watch the hour hand for less than 300ms, we wouldn’t perceive a change. So 
the change we perceive occurs over 300ms or so. This, then, is the change event of which 
we are perceptually aware. Alarm bells should now be ringing for the presentist. We now 
have a timescale over which the nonlocal biff relations between the event and the mental 
state must hold. Event A, the change event in question, begins at t1 and ends at t3, which 
we are supposing to be 300ms later. Experiential state B must obtain no earlier than t3 if 
we are to rule out backwards causality. So there will be a nonlocal causal relation holding 
between t1 and t3, which is a temporal distance of 300ms. The presentist’s solution to the 
problem of trans-temporal causal relations is to posit an extended present within which 
the causal relata are encompassed. But on this model, the present must have an extension 
of at least 300ms! Moreover, it is obscure how the presentist could account for the fact 
that sensitivity to motion varies from perceiver to perceiver. If one person’s borderline 
motion experience takes 300ms, what do we make of someone else’s which takes 310ms? 
It is difficult to see how the presentist could maintain that the present has an objective 
duration. 
Intuitive grotesqueness aside, we can labour the point by stating the obvious fact that 
things happen at sub-300ms intervals. It cannot therefore be the case that the proposed 
extended ‘present’ is mereologically simple. Hence, the Augustinian refutation will 
apply. Further, 300ms is nowhere near the proposals found in quantum physics, to which 
                                                          
17 In Chapter 3 is was suggested that what we regard as an experience of movement is in fact a 
combination of (at least) two perceptual mechanisms – one that detects positional change and one 
that detects motion per se, or ‘pure’ motion.  
115 
 
the presentist might be tempted to appeal. Even if the 300ms estimate is out by an order 
of magnitude or more, the discrepancy would still be enormous (compared with the 10-44 
to 10-24 second proposals in quantum physics). Positing an extended present just isn’t 
going to work for the presentist trying to accommodate our experience of A-change 
events. I conclude that if the A-theorist wants to reject (B3), they aren’t going to have 
much success from within the presentist camp.  
4.3.4 The other A-theories and the challenge posed by nonlocality 
If the A-theorist is going to stand any chance of rejecting (B3), it looks like they’ll have 
to also reject presentism. This is quite the blow for the A-theory, as presentism is often 
regarded as the ‘purest’ version of the A-theory. Other versions accept certain aspects of 
the B-theory’s ‘block universe’ model. These are the ‘Growing Block’ and ‘Moving 
Spotlight’ theories. Both theories accept the existence of past events, but only the Moving 
Spotlight theory says that future events exist. So, unlike the presentist, it would appear 
that these A-theorists are straightforwardly able to accommodate the trans-temporal 
causal relations with which the presentist struggled.18 There is a tension here, though.  
According to the Growing Block and Moving Spotlight theorists, the present is somehow 
unique in its existence. But these A-theorists need to spell out what this means without 
losing grip of the claim that non-present events also exist. Broad (1923) did this by 
supposing that non-present events are different from present events only insofar as they 
lack the property of ‘presentness’ (call this an A-property). If this is right, the A-theorist 
will be able to straightforwardly accommodate trans-temporal biff relations in much the 
same way as the B-theorist can.  
This rather weak conception of the present/non-present distinction is not a popular one 
among contemporary A-theorists. For one thing, it undermines one of the attractive 
features of the A-theory: its (apparent) ability to do justice to our common-sense temporal 
attitudes (Zimmerman 2011). Arthur Prior (1959) argued that if the B-theory was true it 
wouldn’t make any sense to feel relief after some painful experience had come to an end. 
According to the B-theory, past pain is no less painful that present pain; both are equally 
real. This argument applies equally to Broad’s proposal: the only difference between past 
                                                          
18 For the rest of this section, when I refer to A-theorists, I am referring to non-presentists (i.e. 
growing block or moving spotlight theorists), unless otherwise stated.   
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pain and present pain is that past pain is not happening now – but that is the only 
difference.  
Another reason for A-theorists wanting to distance themselves from Broad’s conception 
is that it leads to the sceptical conclusion that we will most likely be mistaken any time 
we judge that it is the present (Bourne 2002; Braddon-Mitchell 2004; Merricks 2006). 
Let’s say at t5 a subject judges themselves to be in the present (call this a ‘NOW-
judgement’). If, as Broad supposes, non-present events are just the same as present events 
apart from their A-theoretic properties, the NOW-judgement at t5 will seem the same to 
the subject whether or not t5 actually is present. So there would be no way for the subject 
to discern whether the NOW-judgement was true or false. Even when t5 is (briefly) 
present and the NOW-judgement is true, the NOW-judgement will recede into the past 
with the passage of time. The NOW-judgement, even if true at first, quickly becomes 
false – and stays false. The chances of it being true are therefore miniscule. That being 
so, it would be reasonable for the subject to expect their NOW-judgement to be false. 
Many contemporary A-theorists avoid these undesirable consequences by stripping non-
present events of properties other than mere ‘presentness’ (e.g. Adams 1986; Smith 1993; 
Williamson 1999). Zimmerman calls this the ‘ghostliness strategy’ (2011: 170) for 
obvious reasons. Although non-present events are still said to exist, the property-stripping 
they undergo leaves them as shadows of their former selves. Details differ between 
theorists, but the general idea is that although events exist at non-present times, they only 
occur or happen in the present. Similarly, objects involved in these non-present events 
exist, but non-spatially – i.e. without location, shape, size, mass and so on. This strategy 
enables the A-theorist to avoid the problems facing Broad’s conception. I can be thankful 
when my toothache subsides because that dreadful event, although existent, is not 
occurring. And for the same reason, when I judge that an event is present, I need not 
worry that my judgement might be a past event.  
The A-theorist needs to be wary of throwing the baby out with the bathwater, though. In 
stripping non-present events and objects of these problematic properties, it becomes 
doubtful whether they could serve as the relata of biff causality. Perception is a 
mechanistic process that involves the interactions of physical entities. Electrical signals 
propagate up the optic nerve as a result of photons with certain physical properties 
interacting with light receptor cells with certain physical properties, and so on. But on 
the current proposal, these sorts of properties only belong to the entities in question when 
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they are present. And so those entities will only be able to play a causal role when they 
are present. All non-present entities must then be discounted. This puts the Moving 
Spotlight and Growing Block theorists in the same position as the presentist. As such, by 
pursuing the ghostliness strategy, the Moving Spotlight and Growing Block theorists will 
find themselves facing the same problems as the presentist – and so be prone to the same 
criticisms.  
The A-theorist seems to be facing a dilemma here, then. One the one hand they can accept 
a full-blooded account of non-present events and objects along the lines of Broad which 
equips them with the means of accommodating trans-temporal biff relations. But then 
they face the sceptical conclusion that our NOW-judgements are most likely false, and 
that many of our common-sense temporal attitudes are unjustified. On the other hand, 
they can avoid these pitfalls by pursuing the ghostliness strategy – but then face the 
difficulty of explaining how these ghostly non-present events and objects can act as relata 
in trans-temporal biff relations. If they can’t, they will find themselves struggling against 
the same problems as the presentist. 
4.3.5 Temporal nonlocality and the mechanisms of perception 
The last criticism that can be levelled against the A-theorist trying to resist (B3) is that 
doing so will commit them to an untenable model of perception. We have seen that the 
A-theorist who rejects (B3) maintains that momentary experiential states can be non-
derivatively causally connected to extended objects of experience. And we have seen that 
this means that they are committed to temporal nonlocality. But not only must they accept 
that temporally nonlocal causal connections are possible; they must hold that nonlocal 
connections play an essential role in our everyday experiences of the world. They must 
hold that it is in virtue of nonlocal connections that we perceive A-change events.  
First off, there is absolutely no evidence that perception involves temporally nonlocal 
causal interactions of the sort that needs to be posited by the A-theorist. Any plausibility 
the A-theorist may have mustered in favour of temporal nonlocality has been off the back 
of spatial nonlocality. Quantum mechanics successfully predicts nonlocal influence in 
certain cases. We are justified in believing that nonlocal interactions occur because we 
have the weight of quantum mechanics behind us. But this theoretic framework does 
nothing to suggest something of a temporal analogue in the case of perception. Moreover, 
it does nothing to suggest a temporal analogue in the case of perception that would suit 
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the A-theorist’s present needs. So the A-theorist must, in effect, be implicitly postulating 
some alternative theoretic framework that would do precisely the job they require of it. 
Physics gives us no reason to suppose such a framework is true, let alone what it might 
look like. But physics does give us quantum mechanics; and quantum mechanics does not 
deliver what the A-theorist needs.  
But let’s just humour the A-theorist for a minute. Ignoring all the foregoing problems, 
let’s see what the A-theorist must really be claiming when they reject (B3). Let’s say we 
have a momentary experiential state S in which we perceive event E. As discussed above, 
the A-theorist who thinks we can be non-derivatively aware of E must accept the 
existence of temporally nonlocal causal connections between E and S. We can talk of 
causal connections in terms of information transmission. When we perceive an object, we 
gain information about the world – information about the object. That information is 
transferred through the causal connection(s) holding between that object and our brain 
state. If we perceive E via temporally nonlocal causal connections, this means that 
information about E is transferred to S without first going through any intermediary 
mechanisms. But this makes no sense. We know how we gain perceptual information 
about the world: through our sense organs! In the case of vision, we know that the light 
receptor cells in our retinas are responsible for converting the energy of the photons that 
hit them into electrical impulses that propagate up the optic nerve and into the brain. If 
our perception of E is non-derivative, then information about E will be transferred to S 
through temporally nonlocal connections; and so that information will bypass our sense 
organs and associated neural mechanisms. On this picture, information is ‘beamed’ 
directly from the external world into our brain. If we are to account for the role of our 
sense organs in perception, we cannot entertain the existence of nonlocal causal 
connections between our experiential states and their objects. And if our experiential 
states cannot be causally related to external events via temporally nonlocal connections, 
then any perceptual awareness of those events must be non-derivative. (B3) must 
therefore be accepted. Our perceptual awareness of extended events must be derivative if 
experiential states are momentary.  
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4.4 Justifying (B4) 
4.4.1 The problem of linguistic convention 
(B4) states that our perceptual awareness of events must be accounted for within 
momentary experiential states. To see why this must be the case, we first need to 
recognise that if the success of a theory is hostage to the vagaries of linguistic convention, 
that theory must be rejected. This shouldn’t be much of a shock. We are rightfully 
sceptical about theories that attach great significance to merely conventional matters. For 
example, astrologers would have you believe that your personality traits are determined 
by your zodiac sign. Because my zodiac sign is Taurus, I am supposed to have a 
personality similar to that of some mythological bull. It is purely conventional that we 
group a certain set of stars together and name it after a mythological bull. We could just 
as well have grouped a different set of stars together, decided it looked like a hamster, 
and assigned me a different set of personality traits to suit. But it was decided that this 
particular set of stars formed a constellation, and that it should be called ‘Taurus’. And it 
is because this decision was made – because this is the convention – that astrologers think 
they are in a position to explain why I am stubborn, reliable, and dislike sudden changes.  
I assume we are in agreement that astrology should not be taken seriously. Clearly, a 
theory should not rely on convention in this way; a theory should be made true by the 
way the world is. As I shall now argue, those theories of temporal experience that posit 
temporally extended experiences are also guilty of relying on convention. Instead of being 
made true by the way the world is they are made true by the way we describe it, and, as 
such, are guilty of ‘treating language as more important than reality’ (Parfit 1995: 32).  
Temporal experience poses the following problem. We seem to perceive events (such as 
change). So it seems (as we are currently assuming to be true) that our experience 
represents temporally extended phenomena. As we have seen, some writers have claimed 
that we are able to perceive temporal phenomena events (e.g. motion) of up to 300ms in 
duration. However, experience is restricted to the present: what we experience we 
experience now.19 As discussed earlier, though, the present is either a durationless 
boundary between the past and the future, or else it has some miniscule but indivisible 
                                                          
19 That is not to say there is no time-lag between the object of experience and our perception of 
it. It’s just that whenever an experience happens it is always temporally located – and that 
temporal location is what we call the present. 
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extension. Either way, the present would not have the extension required to accommodate 
our experience of change events. How, then, is it that we could be perceptually aware of 
events? 
There are a few different ways one might respond to this puzzle. One response is to simply 
deny that our experience represents events, and so accept that we are therefore not 
perceptually aware of them.20 This is what Dainton (2010) calls ‘phenomeno-temporal 
antirealism’. Dainton points to Reid as an early proponent of phenomeno-temporal 
antirealism. Reid claimed that ‘if we speak strictly and philosophically, no kind of 
succession can be an object of either the senses or of consciousness; because the 
operations of both are confined to the present point of time’ (1855: 235). We must 
discount this response given our assumption in this chapter that premise (A1) of the 
argument from experience is true. We are, if you recall, allowing for the sake of argument 
that the A-theorist is correct in claiming that our experience represents A-change. A-
change is a type of event, so if experience represents A-change then our experience must 
represent events. Phenomeno-temporal antirealism is not therefore on the cards as far as 
we are currently concerned.  
We must accept for the time being that experience at least represents events. The 
responses available to us once we do so can be divided into two sorts. On the one hand 
we have what we may call the ‘atomist’ models, and on the other what we might call the 
‘extensional’ models. Atomists contend that events are represented within instantaneous 
experiences. They argue that just as we should not expect an experience of blue to itself 
be blue, we should not expect an experience of an event to itself have temporal extension. 
Atomists are thus said to distinguish between the content and ‘vehicle’ of the 
representation. Extensionalists draw no such distinction. They maintain that events can 
be represented because, although events have temporal extension, so do our experiences 
of them. Our experiences have sufficient temporal extension to encapsulate the events 
being represented. The extensional theory is our target.  
Because it posits temporally extended experiences, the extensional theory is hostage to 
linguistic convention. It was established in Chapter 2 that it is an empty question whether 
                                                          
20 I take it that in order to perceive X it is necessary for one’s experience to represent X. The 
representation of X is not sufficient for a perception of X because, as discussed earlier in the 
chapter, perception requires an object of experience; but a representation of X could obtain 
without X as an object, as in the case of hallucination.  
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or not experiences have temporal extension. What we normally describe as a single 
extended experiential event could just as accurately be described as a series of distinct 
momentary experiential states, metaphysically speaking. Nether description is more 
metaphysically accurate than the other. There is certainly no denying that it is natural to 
talk about experiences as extending through time. Such expressions as ‘stream of 
consciousness’ are commonplace. But as it is an empty question whether two experiential 
states are states of the same experience, we must accept that a different linguistic 
convention could just as accurately describe a succession of experiential states as distinct 
experiences. As such, although it is true that experiences have extension, we must accept 
that it is true only because of the way we talk. If linguistic convention was different – if 
we instead described the successive experiential states as distinct experiences – then it 
would not be true that experiences have temporal extension.  
If we were to adopt this alternative convention, the extensional theory would no longer 
be able to explain how events are represented. The extensional theory says that events are 
represented within extended experiences; it says that instantaneous experiences aren’t up 
to the job of representing events. As such, if experiences weren’t extended – if we never 
had extended experiences – then the extensionalist would have to say that events cannot 
be represented. As discussed, however, experiences have extension merely by virtue of 
linguistic convention. A different linguistic convention could be adopted under which it 
was not true to say that experiences have extension. Under this alternative convention, 
the extensionalist theory would be unable to explain how events are represented.  
As the representation of X is a necessary condition for the perception of X – it is 
impossible for one to perceive something that one’s experience does not represent – then 
the extensionalist theory would be unable to account for any perceptual awareness of 
events under this alternative conceptual scheme. But it cannot be a matter of linguistic 
convention whether we perceive events. As the success of the extensionalist theory is 
hostage to the vagaries of linguistic convention, it should be rejected. Any perceptual 
awareness of events must therefore be accounted for within experiential states. This 
delivers (B4). 
I will now consider three objections to this justification for (B4). 
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4.4.2 Objection 1 
It is an empty question whether or not experiences have temporal extension. Because of 
this, we have said, experiences have temporal extension merely by virtue of linguistic 
convention. It was then concluded that, because of this, a theory of temporal experience 
cannot posit extended experiences. Surely, though, the same reasoning can be applied to 
those theories that posits momentary experiences. If it is an empty question whether or 
not experiences are extended then yes, we could adopt an alternative linguistic convention 
and eschew extended experiences. And if we adopted this linguistic convention then we 
could truthfully say that experiences are momentary. But although we could truthfully 
talk of experiences being strictly momentary, such talk would be true merely by virtue of 
the linguistic convention we had adopted. And so a theory that posits instantaneous 
experiences will be just as susceptible to the vagaries of linguistic convention as one that 
posits extended experiences. If the argument against the latter sort of theory is effective, 
it will be effective against the former sort. But this would mean that neither extended nor 
unextended experiences – i.e. no experiences – could be posited. This is an absurd 
consequence. A theory of temporal experience must be permitted to posit experiences of 
some sort. As such, the argument presented in favour of (B4) must be rejected.  
This objection would succeed if the situation regarding the extensionalist and atomist 
theories was in the appropriate sense symmetrical. But it is not. As discussed, extensional 
theories cannot account for our perception of change if experiences are strictly 
momentary. If it were true that e1 and e2 are not states of the same experience – which it 
would be were we to adopt the alternative linguistic convention – then the extensional 
theory would fail. But the converse is not true for atomist theories. Atomist theories can 
operate whichever linguistic convention is adopted. The atomist accounts for our 
perceptual awareness within instantaneous experiences. In other words, they can account 
for our perceptual awareness with e1 alone. Similarly, they can do so with e2 alone. There 
is no need to appeal to an extended experience of which e1 and e2 are both states. 
Nevertheless, just because they don’t need to appeal to that extended experience, they 
don’t need to deny that it exists. As far as the atomist is concerned, e1 and e2 could be 
states of a single extended experience. It’s just that the atomist’s theory does not require 
them to posit such an experience; it would be doing no explanatory work for them. So 
unlike the extensional theory, the atomist theory is compatible with either linguistic 




4.4.3 Objection 2 
It might be objected that even if we could truthfully talk about experiences as strictly 
momentary – if we were to adopt the alternative linguistic convention under discussion – 
we would nevertheless still be able to posit extended experiences. So long as we have the 
notion of an experiential state we can derive the notion of an experiential event, because 
an experiential event is simply a conjunction of successive experiential states. And so the 
extensional theory would work whichever linguistic convention was adopted.  
What this objection misses is that the conjunctive experiential event we would end up 
with would be a ‘fictional amalgam’ (Dainton 2006: 130). This can be clearly seen by 
reintroducing persons qua subjects of experience into our discussion.  
In Chapter 2 we saw how the Reductionist arguments of Derek Parfit establish not only 
that it can be an empty question whether diachronic identity holds between two subjects 
of experience – as Parfit argued – but that it is always an empty question. As it is 
impossible for two distinct subjects to be subjects of the same experience, it was 
concluded that it is always an empty question whether diachronic identity holds between 
two experiences.  
We then considered an objection: if Reductionism is true, and facts about personal 
identity just consist in empirical facts, then we could cease all talk of persons and talk 
only in terms of the empirical facts. We could, that is, adopt an impersonal conceptual 
scheme which lacked the concepts of ‘person’ and ‘subject’. This scheme would have the 
concept of an experience – or more accurately, an experience* - that did not demand the 
existence of a subject. Once we do away with subjects of experience, however, it becomes 
obscure how we could conclude that it is an empty question whether diachronic identity 
holds between two experiences. We wouldn’t be able to say it is an empty question 
whether two subjects are diachronically identical; and so we couldn’t then conclude that 
it is an empty question whether two experiences(*) are diachronically identical.  
To overcome this objection we took the Parfittian line of reasoning employed in the case 
of personal identity and set it to work in the case of experiential* identity. In short, if we 
can give an empirically informative account of diachronic experiential* identity – which 
we should, for the same reasons that support empirical informativism about personal 
identity – then the same conclusion follows: it is always an empty question whether 
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diachronic identity holds between experiences*. From then on, we restricted our 
discussion to experiences, and dropped the ‘*’ from the discussion.  
The objection we are currently considering claims that, even if our linguistic convention 
was such that experiences were essentially unextended, we could still make sense of an 
extended experience insofar as we could make sense of a conjunction of unextended 
experiences.  I suggest that if one finds this objection compelling, it is because one has 
lost track of what an experience* is. The concept of ‘experience*’ would replace our 
concept of ‘experience’. So what we would normally regard (i.e. from within our 
‘personal’ conceptual scheme) as a single subject having a single extended experience 
would, from within the impersonal scheme, be regarded as a single extended experience*. 
Similarly, what we would normally regard as two distinct subjects having two distinct 
experiences would be regarded as two distinct experiences*. We can translate between 
the two conceptual schemes in this way.  
We can assume either our normal or the impersonal conceptual scheme in responding to 
the objection. If we assume the normal scheme, then, as we have rehearsed just now, it is 
an empty question whether diachronic identity holds between subjects, and the same 
counts for their experiences. If it were linguistic convention that subjects – and their 
experiences – were temporally unextended, then it would be wrong to say we can make 
sense of an extended experience by simply conjoining successive experiential states. 
These would be the experiences of distinct subjects, and distinct subjects cannot be 
subjects of the same experience. As William James (1952: 147) puts it: 
Neither contemporaneity, nor proximity in space, nor similarity of quality and 
content are able to fuse thoughts together which are sundered by this barrier of 
belonging to different personal minds. The breaches between such thoughts are 
the most absolute breaches in nature.  
If we assume the impersonal conceptual scheme, the same applies. Conjoining distinct 
experiences* gets us nowhere, because such a conjunction would be just as 
gerrymandered. Of course, we cannot appeal to the breaches between experiences 
‘sundered by this barrier of belonging to different personal minds’. But we can translate 
between the two schemes. We can appeal to the breaches of experiences between 
experiences belonging to different impersonal minds. We can suppose X and Y are 
experiences or experiences*. If we suppose they are experiences and decide that they 
125 
 
cannot be the same experience, then we would have to say that X and Y cannot be the 
same experience* were we to suppose they were experiences*. 
4.4.4 Objection 3 
It was argued in favour of (B4) that experiences have temporal extension only in virtue 
of linguistic convention; that it is true that experiences are extended only because of the 
way we talk. The charge that might be brought against this claim is that of banal triviality. 
Surely all truths depend on the way we talk. Take for example the truth: 
T1:  The Earth orbits the Sun 
T1 is true, but it is only true because it is conventional to use the words ‘Earth’, ‘orbits’, 
and ‘Sun’ in such ways that make it true. If it was convention instead to use ‘Earth’ to 
refer to (what we call) the Sun, for example, T1 would not be true. But this doesn’t mean 
that we should reject T1, or that we shouldn’t let it figure in theories about celestial 
movements. Far from it: it is because of linguistic convention that we can accept T1 as 
true! Consider now T2: 
T2:  X is an extended experience.  
T2 is also true by linguistic convention. But, just as linguistic convention isn’t good 
reason to disqualify T1 from astronomy, it’s not good reason to disqualify T2 from 
figuring in our theories about temporal experience. The extensionalist theory may depend 
on the linguistic convention of T2, but that is no reason to reject it. 
This objection picks up on something right, but fails to recognise an important difference 
between astronomy and the extensionalist theory. What the objection picks up on is that 
there is a sense in which all true sentences are true by virtue of linguistic convention. The 
meaning of the words we use is a matter of convention, and so the proposition a sentence 
picks out will be a matter of convention. So all truths will depend on linguistic convention 
in this way. But once we’ve decided what the words in a sentence mean – once we’ve 
fixed the proposition that sentence picks out – the truth of the theory it figures in will (or, 
at least, should) depend on truthmakers ‘in the world’.  
Claims made in astronomy are made true by such truthmakers. And so although it is 
certainly the case that the truth of the theory in astronomy will depend on the way we use 
language, it will not be true merely by virtue of linguistic convention. Its truth depends, 
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ultimately, on the way the world is. Compare this with the extensionalist theory of 
temporal experience. The extensionalist theory claims that A-change is perceived within 
extended experiential events. Now, there is a ‘thing in the world’ – call it ‘X’ – to which 
the extensionalist refers to when they say ‘an extended experience’. As this is the way we 
talk, T2 is true; X is an ‘extended experience’ because that is what we call it. The truth of 
T2 therefore depends on convention. And yes, just as this is no reason to reject T1, this is 
no reason to reason to reject T2. But the extensionalists’ claim is more than just T2. The 
extensionalists claim that T2 is true, and that it is in virtue of having these extended 
experiences that we are able to perceive A-change. The point is that the extensionalists 
rely on the linguistic convention of T2 in order to explain how we perceive A-change. If 
the proposed alternative convention was adopted whereby X is described instead as a 
series of distinct experiences, then the extensionalist model fails. As we saw in the 
response to objection 1, the atomist theory is unaffected by whichever description is used. 
What matters for the atomist is the way the world is, not the language that it used to 
describe it. We can see that this is not the case with the extensionalist theory. With the 
extensionalist theory, the work is being done by the language used, not by the way the 
world is.  
4.5 Summary 
The A-theorist is wrong to claim that the best explanation for (A1) is that time passes in 
reality. Even if we allow that our experience represents A-change, this representation 
cannot be taken to evidence an objective phenomenon. Given the truth of Reductionism, 
it is an empty question whether experiences have temporal extension. Because of this, 
any theory that posits extended experiences in order to account for our perception of 
events – viz. the so-called ‘extensionalist’ theories – must be rejected. These 
extensionalist theories depend on the convention that we describe experiences over time 
as unified. If we didn’t describe experiences in this way, extensionalism could not be true. 
Unlike the atomist theories, these extensionalist theories can appear plausible only 
because of linguistic convention, and so should be rejected. Any perceptual awareness of 
events must therefore be accounted for within momentary experiential states.  
If our perceptual awareness of events must be accounted for within experiential states, 
then the A-theorist must accept that our awareness of events must be derivative. That is 
to say, any awareness we have of an event must be derived from our awareness of states 
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of that event. This is because the A-theorist is unable to hold that a state and an event 
could be causally connected. A causal connection of this sort would require temporally 
nonlocal interactions, which would mean that the A-theorist would need to posit causal 
connections holding between present and non-present entities. This, as we saw, puts them 
in a difficult position. Further, whether one accepts the A or B-theory, it is implausible to 
suppose that it is in virtue of these sorts of nonlocal interactions that we are able to 
perceive events. Our perception of events must be derivative.  
Given that our perception of events is derivative, A-change cannot be an object of 
experience. If our awareness of events is merely derivative we would be aware of the 
event ‘Q replacing P’ in virtue of being aware of its states. We could be aware of P, and 
of Q, and of the ordering of those states. This would amount to an awareness of change 
as accepted by the B-theorist, but this does not amount to an awareness of A-change. 
Anything that is beyond our perceptual grasp cannot be an object of experience. So A-
change could not be an object of experience if our perception of events is derivative.  
Finally, because A-change cannot be an object of experience, it is wrong to suppose that 
an experience that represents A-change can be taken as evidence of an objective 
phenomenon. Even if change had the A-theoretic metaphysical structure Q replacing P, 
we could never veridically experience it as such. So, if we allow that A-change is 
represented in experience, we must accept that it is non-veridical. The best explanation 









Chapter 5: A Cognitive Error Account of Temporal 
Experience 
 
To recall, the A-theorist’s argument from experience is: 
(A1)  We have experiences as of A-theoretic change. 
(A2)  The best explanation for (A1) is that A-theoretic change occurs in reality. 
(A3)  Therefore, A-theoretic change occurs in reality.  
This chapter will challenge (A1) using the claim that it is an empty question whether 
persons persist.  
Many will find the prospect that (A1) is false deeply unpalatable. There is a 
phenomenological dynamicity to our perception of temporal phenomena, and it is 
extremely intuitive to take this dynamicity as constituting an awareness of temporal 
passage: 
‘We perceive change and motion.’ This appears metaphysically significant, 
because it is what ‘the immediate awareness of the passage of time’ amounts to. 
We are indirectly aware of the passage of time when we reflect on our memories, 
which present the world as it was, and so a contrast with how things are now. But 
much more immediate than this is seeing the second hand move around the clock, 
or hearing a succession of notes in a piece of music, or feeling a raindrop run 
down your neck. There is nothing inferential, it seems, about the perception of 
change and motion: it is simply given in experience. (Le Poidevin 2007b: 87)1 
It might appear, then, that denying (A1) amounts to denying that we ever actually see 
objects move, or hear melodies, and so on. Barry Dainton (2010) calls those that make 
                                                          
1 Le Poidevin appears to be affirming the common sense position that we have experiences as of 
temporal passage in virtue of perceiving change and other temporal phenomena, so it is natural to 
read him as affirming (A1). However, we could also read him in a deflationist light, as saying that 
what people call ‘the immediate awareness of the passage of time’ is nothing more than the 
perception of change – which can be given a B-theoretic description. I use the quote simply to 
illustrate the common sense position.  
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this denial phenomeno-temporal antirealists. However, using the term ‘antirealism’ in 
this context might lead to confusion, so I shall call the position phenomeno-temporal 
error theory, or PT error theory for short.2 Those who trust their intuitions and so are 
committed against the PT error theory will be called PT intuitionists. PT intuitionism 
unsurprisingly has many proponents, and is often simply assumed to be true: 
…our experience of change is just as immediate as our experience of shape or 
colour. I take this to be an obvious truth (Dainton 2006: 114-115)  
[PT error theory is] incompatible with obvious phenomenological data (Lee 
2014: 150) 
…movement and change are part of the immediate content of the most basic 
kinds of experience (Ishmael 2013:481)  
…we do experience constant motion: the phenomenological data leave no room 
for doubt (Phillips 2011a:815) 
It will be useful, however, to tease apart two different claims that a PT error theorist might 
be thought to be making. As discussed in the previous chapter, when we say that time 
seems to pass what we mean is that the world seems to change A-theoretically; temporal 
phenomena such as motion seem to have the metaphysical structure Q replacing P. 
The first claim, and one that I will be defending and developing in this chapter, is the 
claim that the content of the experience I am referring to when I say, for example, ‘I am 
watching the second hand move around the clock’ doesn’t have the metaphysical structure 
it seems to – i.e. it doesn’t represent an occurrence manifesting Q replacing P. Many will 
want to object that in saying ‘I am watching the second hand move around the clock’, the 
metaphysical structure of Q replacing P has already been assumed. On this view, a 
content with the structure Q replacing P is a necessary condition for the experience (as) 
                                                          
2 According to Dummett (1973), a realist about domain D holds that the truth condition of a 
sentence about D can be verification-transcendent. That is, whether the sentence about D is true 
or not could be unknowable. For an antirealist, it is always knowable. What Dainton calls 
‘phenomeno-temporal antirealism’ does not make this latter claim. On the contrary, Dainton 
explicitly rejects the view on the grounds that it is obviously false; and in doing so he is adopting 
a kind of antirealism about experience. As will be discussed, this is the view that the content of 
one’s own experience is always knowable; there is no fact of the matter about the content of your 
experience over and above how it seems to you. And so the truth-conditions of sentences about 
experiential content are not, on their view, verification-transcendent. Those Dainton calls 
‘realists’ – including himself – are, by the standard Dummettian definition, antirealists. 
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of motion that we are all familiar with. It is precisely this assumption that I want to 
challenge. 
Some of the groundwork for this challenge has already been made by Christoph Hoerl 
(2014). He argues that the B-theorist needn’t accept that our experiences of temporal 
phenomena constitute experiences as of passage. His suggestion is that the PT intuitionist 
conflates two importantly different phenomenological distinctions. As expressed by 
Robin Le Poidevin in the passage above, there is a clear phenomenological difference 
between seeing a second hand move and seeing that an hour hand has moved. Unlike the 
experience of the hour hand, our experience of the second hand has what is often called 
a ‘dynamic’ quality. The misstep as Hoerl sees it is to identify this ‘dynamic’ 
phenomenology with the phenomenology of temporal passage. The B-theorist should 
instead contend that the dynamic phenomenology of watching a second hand move is 
simply the phenomenology of perceiving B-theoretic ‘at-at’ change; whereas the non-
dynamic phenomenology of seeing that the hour hand has moved is the phenomenology 
of being inferentially aware of B-theoretic ‘at-at’ change – i.e. by seeing its present 
position and recalling that it was in a different position previously. There is no need to 
appeal to experiences of different kinds of change to accommodate the difference in the 
phenomenology. I agree with Hoerl, and this chapter can be seen as building on this idea.  
The second claim the PT intuitionist might be thought to be making, and one that I will 
not be defending, is the claim that the experience I am referring to when I say ‘I am 
watching the second hand move around the clock’, whatever the metaphysical structure 
of its content might be, is never in fact experienced. It would be fair enough, I think, to 
reject this second claim as obviously false. I can be sure that I am experiencing this 
experience, whatever the structure of its content might be. But it is not so clear, I submit, 
that we can disregard the first claim as obviously false in this way. 
Now, some people think it is impossible to be mistaken about the content of one’s own 
experience. This seems to be the motivation behind the PT intuitionist assertions quoted 
above. The thought is that, when it comes to experiential content, appearances are always 
as they seem (see e.g. Dainton 2013a: 390). Call this principle SI (for ‘seems→is’). 
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SI: what seems to be the content of experience is the content of experience.3 
If SI is true then PT intuitionism will be true. Because change seems to have the structure 
of Q replacing P, it would be the case that the content of our change experiences really 
must have this structure; we really must have experiences as of A-change.  
The first objective in developing a PT error theory, then, will be to establish that SI cannot 
be simply assumed to be true, and that accounts that deny it shouldn’t be rejected merely 
for doing so. I will therefore take some time initially to get the reader accustomed to the 
idea that one can indeed make mistakes about the content of one’s own experience.  
Firstly, I will examine Laurie Paul’s account of temporal experience. Paul is a PT 
intuitionist who attempts to explain temporal experience away as illusory. Her account 
serves nicely as a way of introducing some of Daniel Dennett’s ideas, who has written 
extensively on the topic of subject fallibility. We see that, although Paul is a PT 
intuitionist, her account actually rejects SI in some circumstances. So the principle that 
would justify PT intuitionism isn’t at all uncontroversial – even amongst PT intuitionists. 
We have good reason to reject SI, at least as an unrestricted principle (i.e. as applying to 
all experiential content). 
PT intuitionism does not require the truth of SI as an unrestricted principle; it only 
requires it to be true with regards to the temporal content of experience. I continue to 
build the case against SI – and so undermine the justification of PT intuitionism – by 
considering how it fares once we restrict it to the temporal content of experience. To this 
end, I consider how the restricted version of SI fares in the debate between conceptualists 
and nonconceptualists. I show that the PT intuitionist will find themselves in a particularly 
weak position, coming under fire from both the conceptualists and nonconceptualists. On 
the other hand, in rejecting SI the PT error theorist has the advantage of being able to side 
with either. By exploring the options available to the PT error theorist in this way we can 
begin to outline what their account might look like. 
Attention is then turned to putting some meat on the PT error theory’s bones. The general 
gist is that when we report what temporal experience intuitively ‘seems’ like, we are prone 
to making certain descriptive errors. I want to show that our A-theoretic intuitions about 
                                                          
3 When I use the term ‘content of experience’, I merely mean what the experience is (as) of. I do 
not wish to import more theoretical baggage than that.  
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time and our Non-Reductionist intuitions about the self are fundamentally connected, 
such that (A1) has the deep intuitive appeal it does only because we are instinctively (and 
inescapably) Non-Reductionists. I will argue that we should regard the intuition behind 
(A1) as a sort of side effect of a faulty, Non-Reductionist conceptual scheme. If we could 
rid ourselves of our Non-Reductionist shackles and adopt a properly Reductionist 
conceptual scheme, we wouldn’t – indeed, couldn’t – think that time seems to pass.  
5.1 Undermining SI: Paul and Dennett 
Laurie Paul is a B-theorist and a PT intuitionist. She believes that we have experiences as 
of temporal phenomena that constitute passage, and proposes that we explain them away 
as illusory. She suggests that our experience of temporal passage can be accounted for in 
the same way as the phi phenomenon. The phi phenomenon is apparent motion between 
two dots. One dot flashes up on the left side of a screen, and after disappearing is 
immediately followed by another dot on the right side. Watching this, it seems as though 
we are being presented not with two distinct dots but with a single dot moving from left 
to right. Even when the dots are different colours, the effect is of a single moving dot that 
changes colour halfway across. The traditional explanation for the phi phenomenon says 
that the intervening motion is somehow ‘filled in’ by the brain; our experience represents 
motion that is not there. But when we look at a footnote, we see that Paul references 
Daniel Dennett, who challenges this traditional explanation: 
when we have an experience as of passage, we can interpret this as an experience 
that is the result of the brain producing a neural state that represents inputs from 
earlier and later temporal stages and simply “fills in” the representation of motion 
[fn. not literally. It just gives the impression of being filled in. There is no 
“figment”, as Dennett would say] (Paul 2010: 352) 
According to Dennett, the representation of intervening motion is not ‘filled in’, nor does 
it need to be. After the second dot appears, the brain ‘judges’ that there was intervening 
motion, and it is because of this judgement that we report seeing the intervening motion. 
This judgement is what gives us the impression that it is filled in. Accordingly, Dennett’s 
account ‘does not include – it explicitly denies the existence of – any event which might 
be called the seeming-to-be-intervening-motion, on which this judgement is “based”’ 
(Dennett 1991: 133). Whilst it seems that we just saw the intervening motion, we are 
mistaken; there was no such representation.  
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It might sound like this would mean Paul is a PT error theorist – after all, if temporal 
phenomena aren’t represented, how can she claim that we have experiences as of time 
passing? To get a better idea of how this might work, it will be instructive to look at 
Dennett’s treatment of another instance of ‘filling in’: that involved in parafoveal vision. 
The eye is only sensitive to detail within the small foveal range at its centre, and yet we 
seem to be able to see detail well beyond it. Again, the traditional explanation is that the 
brain ‘fills in’ the background of our mental image with the detail it expects to be there. 
This, Dennett argues, is wrong. He imagines being presented with a wall papered with 
the pattern of hundreds of tiny identical images of Marilyn Monroe: 
Having identified a single Marilyn, and having received no information to the 
effect that the other blobs are not Marilyns, [your brain] jumps to the conclusion 
that the rest are Marilyns […] without any further rendering of Marilyn at all.  
Of course, it does not seem that way to you. It seems to you as if you are actually 
seeing hundreds of identical Marilyns […] What is not the case, however, is that 
there are hundreds of identical Marilyns represented in your brain. [Your brain] 
just somehow represents that there are hundreds of identical Marilyns […] And 
no figment gets used up in rendering the seeming, for the seeming isn’t rendered 
at all.’ (Dennett 1991: 355) 
There is a lot going on in this passage. Some have thought that Dennett is claiming a sort 
of perceptual illusion – that the Marilyns populate our visual field as they seem to, even 
though there are no corresponding neural representations (e.g. Pessoa et al. 1998; cf. 
Byrne 1998; Van Gulick 1998). However, Dennett himself has gone on to refer to the 
phenomenon as a ‘theorist’s illusion’ (1998: 754). We believe we enjoy a mental picture 
in which the Marilyns are present, but the belief is false because ‘the seeming isn’t 
rendered’. 
The reason for this theorist’s illusion is that, according to Dennett, the brain represents 
that the Marilyns are present and detailed, without actually representing them as such. 
The mistake we naturally make is to assume that, because they seem to be present, they 
must actually be populating our mental picture. As Dennett likes to say, this is to mistake 
a representation of presence with the presence of a representation. It might be objected 
that the brain must be representing individual detailed Marilyns, because otherwise our 
visual field would be populated with ill-defined blobs – which clearly isn’t the case. But 
Dennett has an answer: we will only see blobs if the brain represents blobs, which, again, 
134 
 
it doesn’t do. So whilst we are safe to report how things seem to us, we need to be careful 
about what we go on to infer about the contents of our own conscious experience: 4 
If somebody says her visual field seems detailed all the way out to the periphery 
[…] there is no gainsaying her claim, but if she goes on to theorize about “the 
background” [of her visual field] and claims – for instance - that there are lots of 
details in this background, she becomes an entirely fallible theorist. (Dennett 
2007: 263) 
So there are facts about the content of our experience that are beyond our intuitive grasp. 
Dennett does accept that sometimes ‘filling-in-beliefs may be the normal outcome of 
processes which include genuine filling-in’ (1998: 754). But we need to be careful here. 
Talk of ‘genuine’ filling-in implies gaps that are filled; and if there are gaps we should 
ask: gaps in what? Looking back at the Marilyn passage, Dennett says the brain concludes 
that the parafoveal blobs are Marilyns ‘without any further rendering’ (emphasis added).5 
So it is natural to interpret Dennett here as saying that if the Marilyns were genuinely 
filled in, there would be ‘further’ rendering. He thus implies that the central Marilyns 
have been rendered. 
The problem with this interpretation is that Dennett explicitly rejects the existence of a 
‘medium in the brain (or dualistic mind) in which subjective colours, sounds, and aromas 
are rendered’ (Dennett 2015: 3). And with this he denies there are such things as ‘raw 
feels, sensa, phenomenal qualities, intrinsic properties of conscious experiences, the 
qualitative content of mental states, and, of course, qualia’ – although he does ‘agree 
wholeheartedly that there seem to be’ (1994:129). How, then, can he talk of ‘genuine’ 
filling-in, if there is no place where any rendering happens? Well, Dennett does allow that 
our normal ways of talking about consciousness will generally make sense so long as they 
are ‘immersed in a bath of metaphor’ (Dennett 2002: 14). So he is presumably talking 
about ‘genuine filling-in’ in strictly metaphorical terms. The difference between ‘genuine 
filling-in’ and ‘non-genuine filling-in’ is then to be cashed out in terms of brain-level 
(rather than experiential) representations. In both cases the brain will represent that there 
is ‘filling in’ – hence the subject’s ‘filling in’ beliefs. But only genuine ‘filling in’ is 
                                                          
4 Dennett is not alone in thinking so. It is commonly held that psychology experiments 
investigating change blindness and other similar phenomena demonstrate that we intuitively 
suppose visual experience to be much richer than it is (e.g. O’Regan 1992; Blackmore et al. 1995; 
Simons & Levin 1997; Rensink 2000; Ballard 2002; Noë 2007; Schwitzgebel 2008).  
5 This phrase is not a one-off; he repeats it elsewhere (e.g. 1992: 47; also 2015: 6). 
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accompanied by the representation of whatever the filling-in belief refers to.6 Importantly, 
though, in neither case is there any experience-level ‘rendering’. 
We can now see that there are actually two ways in which the subject is prone to error in 
the phi illusion on Dennett’s account. Firstly, the ostensible ‘filling in’ seems to be a case 
of ‘genuine filling-in’, but isn’t. The brain merely represents that there was intervening 
motion. Secondly, in reporting to see the dot move across the screen, it is assumed that 
experience has the sorts of phenomenal properties Dennett explicitly rejects. This second 
claim is a considerably bolder one, for it means that a subject is in error any time they 
refer to the qualitative content of their mental states. It seems to the subject their 
experience has a qualitative content, and it is precisely this content to which a subject’s 
phenomenological reports refer, but really there is no such content.7  
This latter view is by no means uncontroversial. However, the fact that there is no 
agreement whether or not it is right means that we cannot assume subject infallibility. 
Further, even critics of this stronger claim can agree with the weaker claim that 
phenomenological reports can be – are often grossly – inaccurate (e.g. Schwitzgebel 2007 
and Velmans 2007). So although Paul is a PT intuitionist, upon close inspection her 
account provides the PT error theorist with the leverage they need to get their foot in the 
door. SI as a general principle is controversial even amongst PT intuitionists, and, 
moreover, evidence in psychology (for example, that the visual field doesn’t represent as 
much detail as we intuitively suppose) shows that there are cases in which it can’t be true.  
Perhaps the best thing for the PT intuitionist would be to restrict SI to temporal 
experience. Experience, it could be argued, is essentially dynamic, such that an 
experience that did not represent time passing would be no experience at all. So perhaps 
there is a special reason to suppose that SI more plausibly holds in the case of temporal 
experience. Call this restricted version of the principle TSI (for ‘temporal seems→is’). 
                                                          
6 Because in non-genuine filling in cases there is still a representation that… , it is impossible 
for the subject to tell the difference between genuine and non-genuine cases on the basis of 
experience alone. Of course, that does not mean there is no fact of the matter; the concern is 
epistemological, not metaphysical. 
7 That is not to say Dennett rejects the existence of consciousness per se. He acknowledges that 
‘there has to be something – some property K – that distinguishes conscious events from 
nonconscious events’ (1994: 58). He just doesn’t accept that consciousness has the sorts of 
properties we naturally ascribe to it. How Dennett thinks we should talk about the ‘experience’ is 
not my concern here. 
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TSI: what seems to be the temporal content of experience is the temporal 
content of experience. 
5.2 Undermining TSI: the (non)conceptualism debate 
Restricting SI to the temporal content of experience might overcome some initial qualms. 
But when we consider what it would entail in the debate between the conceptualists and 
nonconceptualists we can see that it still puts the PT intuitionist in a difficult situation. 
As will be shown, any PT intuitionist who assumes TSI will find themselves coming 
under attack from both sides of the debate. The PT error theorist on the other hand, is free 
to side with either. We start off with some definitions.  
Conceptualists hold that all mental content is a function of the concepts possessed by the 
subject (e.g. McDowell 1994). For example, when you look at a table, your perceptual 
content is determined by your concept of ‘table’ and the concepts it encapsulates – such 
as ‘legs’, ‘surface’ and so on. It then follows that if you didn’t possess those concepts the 
phenomenology would be different. It is important to make explicit that, assuming 
perceptual content is conceptual, it will be determined not only (assuming perceptual 
content is conceptual) by the concepts a subject possesses; it must also matter which of 
those possessed concepts are ‘experientially active’. To illustrate, you may possess the 
concept of, say, ‘fulfilment’, but that plays no part in shaping your experience of the table. 
Rather, it must be the concept of ‘table’ that is doing the work. The duck-rabbit optical 
illusion demonstrates the point nicely: 
8 
                                                          




You possess the concepts of ‘duck’ and ‘rabbit’, but the phenomenology only presents 
one at a time. As such, concept possession alone cannot be what determines the content. 
When you are presented with duck-phenomenology, your concept of ‘duck’ must 
somehow be involved in a way that your concept of ‘rabbit’ is not (and vice versa). This 
is what I mean by ‘experientially active’. The duck-rabbit illusion is remarkable insofar 
as, because you are able to shift the phenomenology at will, you are to a great extent in 
control of which concept is experientially active. In most cases, however – like when you 
look at a table – this is not the case. Experiential content is then standardly defined as 
conceptual iff the subject’s undergoing the experience entails that they possess the 
concepts that canonically characterise it (Crane 1992: 382). ‘Canonical characterisation’ 
is theory-relative, meaning that a PT error theorist and a PT intuitionist will disagree over 
what concepts characterise the temporal content of experience. 
Conversely, nonconceptualists hold that at least some mental content is nonconceptual. 
Nonconceptualists typically point to the content of perceptual experience as an example 
of nonconceptual content, but can allow that other sorts of mental content, such as the 
content of propositional attitudes, are conceptual.9 Perceptual content is then standardly 
defined as nonconceptual iff the subject need not possess the concepts that canonically 
characterise it.  
5.2.1 PT intuitionism and (non)conceptual content 
Call the temporal content of experience C. PT intuitionists think that our intuitive 
characterisation of C is correct (viz. in terms of A-change concepts)10. Further, by 
assuming TSI they must think that our intuitive characterisation cannot be mistaken.11 As 
such, there can be no situation in which a subject characterising C lacks the appropriate 
concepts. So by PT intuitionism,  
                                                          
9 I will be restricting my discussion to the content of perceptual experience unless stated 
otherwise. I use ‘experience’, ‘perception’, and ‘perceptual experience’ interchangeably. 
10 By ‘A-change concepts’ I mean those that refer to temporal phenomena with an assumed 
metaphysical structure of Q replacing P.  
11 Unless otherwise stated I will be assuming from here on that TSI is used by the PT intuitionist 
to justify (A1). I also assume that the language used in the characterisations accurately reflects 




(i) Characterising C entails possession of the concepts that correctly characterise 
C.  
This gets the PT intuitionist very close to treating C as conceptual. Recall that C is 
conceptual iff: 
(ii) Being subject to C entails possession of the concepts that correctly 
characterise C. 
By (ii), a subject of C is guaranteed to possess the appropriate concepts irrespective of 
any characterisations they happen to make. So a fortiori when the subject turns their 
attention to characterising C they will have the correct concepts at their disposal with 
which to do so. It therefore suits the PT intuitionist nicely to accept (ii) and treat C as 
conceptual. But can they treat C as nonconceptual?  Well, if they were to reject (ii), theirs 
would be the view that a subject undergoing C is guaranteed to possess the correct 
concepts in virtue of characterising C. This is a bizarre view (what could it be about the 
act of characterising that brings this guarantee?) and not what the PT intuitionist wants 
to say. For the PT intuitionist, a subject is able to correctly characterise C simply in virtue 
of undergoing it. Being able to correctly characterise entails possession of the correct 
concepts, so a subject undergoing C would be guaranteed to possess the correct concepts 
in virtue of experiencing C. In other words, if you are subject to C you will possess the 
correct concepts. The PT intuitionist therefore holds (ii), and so is committed treating C 
as conceptual.  
This does not mean the PT intuitionist is committed to conceptualism, though. Firstly, 
conceptualists think that all content is conceptual, but the PT intuitionist needn’t go so 
far. As long as they think some other content isn’t conceptual, they will be a 
nonconceptualist. Secondly, the conceptualist’s reasons for treating C as conceptual are 
in stark contrast to the PT intuitionist’s. The PT intuitionist argues that (ii) is true on the 
grounds that: 
(iii) A subject possesses the concepts that characterise the content by virtue of 
experiencing it 
whereas, as we have seen, the conceptualist holds that (ii) is true on the grounds that:  
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(iv) A subject experiences a particular content in virtue of their experientially 
active concepts. 
So the PT intuitionist gives explanatory priority to the content, whereas the conceptualist 
gives explanatory priority to the concepts. Accepting (iv) and giving priority to the 
concepts is not an option for the PT intuitionist. (iv) entails that subjects with relevantly 
different experientially active concepts will experience time differently. However, it is 
implicit in the PT intuitionist’s position that there is only one sort of phenomenology to 
be characterised; there is something it is like to experience time, and that something is 
characterised by A-change concepts. If we allow the assumption that we all experience 
time in more-or-less the same way then, by (iv), the PT intuitionist must assume we all 
possess relevantly similar experientially active concepts.12 This seems reasonable enough. 
But what if the PT error theorist had their way? The error theorist contends that we need 
to abandon A-theoretic concepts and find a better way of making sense of C. But because 
the PT intuitionist thinks that our A-theoretic concepts are experientially active, they will 
also see a danger in abandoning those concepts: the risk of experiential deactivation of 
those concepts, and a resulting phenomenological shift. The PT intuitionist cannot allow 
this to happen, because then our A-change concepts would no longer correctly 
characterise the experience. 
Imagine looking at the duck-rabbit image and only ever seeing the duck, completely 
unaware that it can ever look like a rabbit. You insist that the visual content is 
characterised by ‘duck’ – much as the PT intuitionist insists that C is characterised by A-
change concepts. But imagine that one day someone comes along and says to you “we 
can do better than ‘duck’ – it makes more sense to think of it as a rabbit”. So you look at 
the image with the concept of ‘rabbit’ in mind, your experientially active concept changes 
to ‘rabbit’, and lo and behold you start seeing the rabbit instead of the duck. And, 
importantly, what used to be the correct characterisation (‘duck’) is no longer correct. 
Clearly, the PT intuitionist cannot afford for this to happen; if it did they wouldn’t be able 
to maintain that A-change concepts characterise the phenomenology. As such, they would 
need to insist that alternative concepts would not be able to characterise the 
                                                          
12 It is not out of the question that there could be individuals who are neurologically different in some way 
that means they do not experience time in the same way as the rest of us. The discussion is therefore 
restricted to ‘normal’ neurological functioning. 
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phenomenology in the way that ‘duck’ and ‘rabbit’ both can in the duck-rabbit example. 
Unlike in the duck-rabbit case there is only one way of correctly characterising the 
phenomenology – and this is how we currently characterise it. But then their position 
begins to look rather desperate. Even if we cannot currently imagine what it might be 
like, with our conceptual scheme, who knows what we would be inclined to say about C 
were we to assimilate a different conceptual scheme? There is the possibility – an 
empirical matter – that with a different conceptual scheme we might not characterise C 
as we do now. This might happen naturally over time, or, more fantastically, as the result 
of some sort of Big Brother-esque censorship program. This is not important. What is 
important is that the possibility would force the PT intuitionist to admit that C might be 
better characterised without A-change concepts. 
The PT intuitionist therefore needs to block the error theorist’s move to abandon A-
change concepts, which they can only do – as they have been doing – by insisting on our 
current characterisation as the correct one. But as we have just seen, if our current 
characterisation is correct, this might just be because a different way of conceptualising 
the experience hasn’t yet been successfully assimilated. As such, it doesn’t look like the 
PT intuitionist who holds (iv) can dismiss PT error theory without begging the question. 
The PT intuitionist shouldn’t therefore accept (iv). And if they reject (iv), they set 
themselves against the conceptualist.13 
To summarise so far, then. The PT intuitionist holds (ii) and so treats C as conceptual. 
But this presents them with something of a dilemma. On the one hand, they could reject 
                                                          
13 One notable conceptualist is McDowell. McDowell claims that, because perceptual content is 
able to feature in our judgements, it must be conceptual. It doesn’t matter whether we have the 
language to characterise it; what matters is that it could be referred to – in thought at least. Giving 
it a name is simply to ‘give linguistic expression to a concept’ that we already possess (2008: 
753). All perceptual content can be referred to in thought, so all such content is conceptual. 
Whether or not McDowell is right about this, it doesn’t seem to be of any help to the PT 
intuitionist. McDowell is still telling a story where concepts explain content, and as we saw the 
PT intuitionist must reject this idea. Besides, it is not entirely clear that McDowell is presenting 
a position that opposes nonconceptualism as defined above rather than simply defining conceptual 
content differently. If any content that can be referred to is conceptual content, then any content 
that can be characterised is conceptual content. But nonconceptual content was defined earlier as 
content that could be experienced by a subject without that subject possessing the concepts that 
characterise it. This allows that the content could be characterised, were that subject to possess 
the appropriate concepts. But if it could be characterised, then according to McDowell it is 
conceptual. It looks like the disagreement might be merely over the definition of ‘nonconceptual’. 
Indeed, it has been argued that McDowell’s conceptualism and the sort of nonconceptualism that 
populates much of the literature are in fact compatible (Mazijk 2015). 
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nonconceptualism by claiming that all mental content is conceptual. But if they do so 
they will set themselves against the conceptualists by disagreeing over whether the 
concepts or content has explanatory priority. As we saw, conceptualists affirm (iv) – that 
a subject experiences a particular content in virtue of their experientially active concepts 
– whereas the PT intuitionist seems forced to deny (iv). On the other hand, the PT 
intuitionist could reject conceptualism by allowing that some mental content is 
nonconceptual. The problem with this move is that the majority of the arguments 
advanced by nonconceptualists – indeed, the literature in general – claim that perceptual 
content is nonconceptual (e.g. Peacock 1992; Davies 1997; Dretske 2008; Evans 1982; 
Crane 1988(a) & (b), 1992; Bermúdez 1994, 2009); it is the content of propositional 
attitudes that tends to be regarded as conceptual. So if they reject nonconceptualism, the 
PT intuitionist will also set themselves against the nonconceptualist. The PT intuitionist 
is therefore in a very weak position. By relying on TSI to justify their position they will, 
whichever way they turn, find themselves alone and under attack from both sides.  
Enough has now been said to discredit the PT intuitionist’s reliance on TSI to justify their 
position. It is wrong to dismiss PT error theory as obviously false; we must take seriously 
the possibility that we are mistaken about what our temporal experiences represent. 
Perhaps they don’t represent occurrences with the metaphysical structure of Q replacing 
P. 
5.2.2 PT error theory and (non)conceptual content 
We can begin to get an idea of what a PT error theory might look like by considering the 
PT error theorist’s options in the (non)conceptualism debate. The PT error theorist thinks 
we don’t have experiences as of A-change. Theirs is the position that our intuitive 
characterisation of temporal experience is somehow faulty. The position is essentially a 
negative one; it states how we shouldn’t think about experience, but doesn’t specify how 
we should. Whether or not we possess the concepts to correctly characterise temporal 
experience is left open. Perhaps we can adequately characterise temporal experience 
using concepts we already have at our disposal, or perhaps we can’t; perhaps it can’t be 
characterised.  
If the PT error theorist thinks C cannot be characterised, then they will be a 
nonconceptualist. If they think it can be characterised but we lack the appropriate 
concepts, then a fortiori being the subject of C does not entail possession of the concepts 
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that correctly characterise C, and the content is nonconceptual. So the PT error theorist 
can straightforwardly be a nonconceptualist. 
If we are equipped with the correct concepts, C could be regarded as either conceptual or 
nonconceptual. If the PT error theorist thinks our possession of those concepts is entailed 
by having the experience, they will regard C as conceptual. This is the route a PT error 
theorist must take if they are to be a conceptualist. If on the other hand they think we just 
happen to possess the concepts, they will regard C as nonconceptual. Either way, it will 
be the PT error theorist’s view that despite our possession of the correct concepts, we 
nevertheless identify the wrong ones when characterising C. We have already seen that 
the PT error theorist can unproblematically be a nonconceptualist. So what are the 
prospects for them if they are to take the conceptualist route? 
You would be forgiven for thinking the prospects don’t look good. How could the PT 
error theorist claim that experiencing C entails possession of the correct concepts – and 
stronger still, that those concepts are experientially active when we experience C – whilst 
also claiming that we wrongly identify those concepts as A-change concepts? As it turns 
out, this is quite a natural claim for the PT error theorist to make as a B-theorist. 
The B-theorist contends that change is nothing more than temporal variation, whereas the 
A-theorist insists on the Q replacing P structure. If P is replaced by Q, then Q obtains 
after P. Temporal variation is necessary for A-change, in the sense that A-change could 
not occur without temporal variation obtaining. And so without the concept of temporal 
variation we can’t have the concept of A-change. The concept of temporal variation is, if 
you like, ‘built into’ the concept of A-change. 
Because the PT intuitionist thinks that C represents A-change, they must also think that 
C represents temporal variation. And if the PT intuitionist thinks that A-change concepts 
correctly characterise C, they must also think that the concept of temporal variation is 
necessary for the correct characterisation of C. Further, if the concept of A-change is 
experientially active, then, as the concept of temporal variation is built into the concept 
of A-change, so the concept of temporal variation must be experientially active.  
The PT error theorist – if they are to take the conceptualist route – can accept this story 
in part. They can agree that the concept of temporal variation is experientially active, and 
that it is necessary for the correct characterisation of C. But they can contend that this 
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concept is sufficient, and that the intuitionist’s error is in supposing that the A-theoretic 
component is also necessary. So the PT error theorist can, as a B-theorist, 
unproblematically regard C as conceptual. And so, provided they think all other mental 
content is conceptual, can be a conceptualist.  
I do not want to argue that a PT error theorist should be a conceptualist or that they should 
be a nonconceptualist. But we at least now have an idea what they can claim, whichever 
way that debate might be resolved. Unlike those who assume SI, the PT error theorist has 
the flexibility to side with either. 
5.3 The error 
So far I have been trying to lend plausibility to the idea that our intuitive characterisation 
of temporal experience is wrong. But it will no doubt still be obscure how we could make 
a mistake about the content of our experience. That is what I want to focus on next. It will 
help to begin with an example of the sort of error I will be proposing for our PT error 
theorist account.  
5.3.1 A cognitive error 
Consider what it’s like when you push a finger down onto a hard object like a table. 
Nowadays we know that the vast majority of the mass of an object is concentrated in the 
nuclei of the atoms that comprise it. And we know that these nuclei are separated by 
empty space – so much of it that the composition of objects is 99.9% empty space. If we 
were to ask someone in the eighteenth century if the table felt like it was mostly empty 
space, they would say ‘no’. They would say the table feels ‘solid’ – by which they would 
mean the table feels ‘saturated’ or ‘full’ of mass. Call the property of being ‘full of mass’ 
solidity*. Even though today we know that tables are not solid*, we might even be 
tempted to agree that they nevertheless feel solid*, devoid of the empty space we know 
they largely consist of. But it would wrong to conclude that our, or anyone’s experience 
for that matter, represents solidity*; it would be a mistake to characterise our experience 
as being as of solidity* - even as an illusion. 
We understand and characterise the content of a non-veridical experience on the basis of 
what the experience would be of, were it veridical. We know what it is like to have a 
veridical experience of a red ball, so we know what an experience as of a red ball is like 
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– whether it be veridical or non-veridical. An experience of X is in this sense logically 
prior to an experience as of X. We could say that non-veridical experiences are parasitic 
on veridical experiences in this way.14 So to find out what an experience as of solidity* 
would be like, we need to ask what a veridical experience of solidity* would be like. What 
would a veridical experience of solidity* be like, then? Well, if a volume the size of a 
table was saturated with mass – if the atoms were compressed such that there was no 
empty space between the nuclei and electrons – then there would be all manner of forces 
in play, and touching it would be nothing like touching a table. It can’t therefore be right 
to say that we ever have experiences as of solidity*, even illusory ones. Instead, our 
deeply-held pre-scientific intuitions about mass and what it should feel like lead us astray 
when we characterise our experiences.  
This example shows us something important about the relationships between 
phenomenology, belief, and the content of experience. ‘Phenomenology’ is traditionally 
put in terms of ‘seemings’: the phenomenology of X is how X seems to the subject. But 
as the solidity* example shows, a subject’s phenomenological reports – what they would 
say an experience seems like – is infected by their beliefs and intuitions about the way the 
world is. Someone from the eighteenth century believes that tables are solid*, and they 
have no reason to believe their experience isn’t representing the world accurately, so they 
would say the table seems solid*. But this shows that what a subject’s experience is 
actually representing does not always align with how it seems to them. A subject’s beliefs 
and intuitions about the way the world is can lead them astray in characterising the content 
of their experience. The error is not perceptual; it is, if you like, cognitive. This is the 
basis of the PT error theory I will be proposing. Just as faulty intuitions lead us astray in 
characterising the content of experience when we touch hard objects, so our faulty 
intuitions lead us astray when we characterise temporal experience. More specifically I 
propose that what leads us astray when we think about our experience of time is the way 
we think about ourselves as subjects of experience. The way we intuitively think about 
                                                          
14 One potential objection with this principle – that veridical experiences are logically prior to 
non-veridical experiences – might make use of the waterfall illusion. In the waterfall illusion we 
have an experience as of a scene which appears to be both moving and not moving. So the content 
of the experience is contradictory. But it is surely impossible to have a veridical experience with 
a contradictory content, so it cannot be the case that non-veridical experiences are parasitic on 
veridical ones. We can respond to this objection by utilising the distinction that was drawn in 
chapter 3 between the perception of ‘pure motion’ and the perception of positional change. The 
waterfall illusion does not have a contradictory content so long as we distinguish between these 
two representations. The waterfall illusion represents ‘pure motion’ without representing 
positional change (see Mellor 1988 for a similar argument).  
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ourselves is essentially Non-Reductionist. If we could free ourselves from our Non-
Reductionist shackles, it would make no sense to suppose that time seems to pass. If we 
could assimilate Reductionism into our belief system, we wouldn’t mischaracterise 
temporal experience.  
The outline of the account is as follows. The belief that we have experiences as of A-
change necessarily presupposes the concept of personal identity. Without the concept of 
personal identity – that the same subject can exist at two different times – it would make 
no sense to suppose that a subject could experience P at t1 and Q at t2.15 That is, it would 
make no sense to suppose that one could experience Q replacing P. And if it would make 
no sense to suppose that one could experience Q replacing P, it would make no sense to 
suppose that one could have an experience as of Q replacing P; if it is impossible to 
conceptualise an experience of X, it is impossible to conceptualise an experience as of X. 
Because Parfittian Reductionism is true, a conceptual scheme which lacked the concept 
of personal identity would be just as metaphysically accurate as ours. This Reductionist 
scheme should be preferred, as were we equipped with it we would not fall into the Non-
Reductionist trap of thinking that our persistence is metaphysically significant. And, 
further, we would not fall into another Non-Reductionist trap of thinking that time seems 
to pass.  
Parallels can be drawn between my proposal and Simon Prosser’s (2016). Prosser also 
denies that we experience time as passing, since he considers the notion of temporal 
passage to be unintelligible. If experience were to represent time passing, it would 
therefore have a ‘necessarily false’ content. But, Prosser urges, experience cannot have a 
necessarily false content; so it cannot represent time passing. Prosser is, as such, a PT 
error theorist.  
However, Prosser is not always read as a PT error theorist. Hoerl (2014) for example 
appears to have him down as a PT intuitionist (i.e. someone who thinks temporal passage 
is represented in experience). The reason for this misclassification might, I suggest, be 
due in part to Prosser’s account of why time seems to pass. He thinks that the putative 
‘dynamic’ phenomenology of temporal experience can be explained by our experience 
representing objects as enduring. He invokes the Kantian idea (1787 [1996]: 257) that 
                                                          
15 I use ‘person’, ‘self’, and ‘subject’ interchangeably.  
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change requires identity: ‘only the permanent (i.e. substance) undergoes change […] this 
permanent makes possible the presentation of the transition from one state to another’. It 
is natural to read ‘the transition from one state to another’ as describing A-theoretic 
change. Now, Prosser thinks ‘permanence’ is represented – insofar as we have 
experiences as of enduring objects. So, since he holds that permanence is represented in 
experience, and he invokes the claim that this ‘permanence’ is required for the 
presentation of (A-theoretic) change, we might reasonably expect him to also hold that 
A-change is (re)presented. The fact that he doesn’t think so might be thought to create 
something of a tension in his account; and one that is perhaps evidenced by Hoerl’s 
misclassification of his position.  
What I propose shares the general idea that change requires identity, but differs in several 
respects. Prosser proposes, in short, that time seems to pass because: 
Experience (mis)represents objects (and ourselves qua subjects of experience) as 
enduring. 
Whereas I propose that time seems to pass because: 
 We conceive of ourselves qua subjects of experience as persisting. 
There are a few key differences. Firstly, my account locates the error at (and restricts it 
to) the level of conceptualisation, rather than experience. Because of this, the account sits 
squarely within the providence of the PT error theorist, and avoids any tension that might 
be thought to be present in Prosser’s account. It says that the error is cognitive, rather than 
perceptual. 
One immediate objection here would be that the distinction between conceptualisation 
and experience might not be so cut-and-dried: how we conceptualise the world bleeds 
into the way we experience it. This is the basic idea behind conceptualism (but a 
nonconceptualist would presumably be willing to accept this claim up to a point). To 
respond to this objection, we may reconsider the solidity* example. The solidity* 
example shows that we can distinguish between perceptual and cognitive errors. As was 
argued, we cannot regard the experience we have when we touch solid objects as a 
perceptual illusion. Our experience cannot be representing solidity*; the mistake can only 
be one of characterisation. Further, it is not even clear that this commits us against the 
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claim that the way we experience the world depends on our concepts. All we need to 
claim is that we are able to distinguish between perceptual and cognitive errors. And we 
don’t even need to claim that there is always a neat distinction between perceptual and 
cognitive errors; it will suffice to show that in some cases there is. And this is precisely 
what the solidity* example establishes.  
Secondly, my account focuses exclusively on the identity of subjects, and ignores objects. 
This is because, for it to make sense that one could experience A-change, it is necessary 
and sufficient that subject identity is preserved through the change; but it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient that object identity is. To explain: If you experience P (and not 
Q) and I experience Q (and not P), clearly neither of us has an experience of Q replacing 
P – even if the set of objects in P and Q are the same. So subject identity is necessary, but 
object identity is not sufficient, for the experience of A-change. On the other hand, P and 
Q could be states of affairs with distinct objects. When we awake suddenly from a vivid 
dream, for example, the objects that were represented are replaced by an entirely new set. 
So we can make sense of experiencing A-change without object identity, provided the 
same subject experiences both sets of objects. Hence, subject identity is sufficient, but 
object identity is not necessary.  
Thirdly, Prosser’s account focuses on a particular kind of persistence (viz. endurance), 
whereas mine is concerned with persistence per se. Prosser’s account relies on the falsity 
of endurance theory to explain temporal phenomenology. The problem with this approach 
is that endurance theory is naturally aligned with the A-theory, so Prosser’s account won’t 
do anything to convince many A-theorists that temporal passage is not represented in 
experience. Further, it’s not clear that B-theorists are forced to reject endurance theory, 
so his solution won’t necessarily appeal to all B-theorists either. The account I propose, 
on the other hand, engages both sides of the debate. Everyone should recognise that the 
way we naturally conceive of ourselves as subjects of experience is flawed. Whether you 
think that persons persist by perduring, enduring, or exduring, you must, if you accept 
Reductionism (which you should), accept that we could equally well describe persons as 
non-persisting.  
5.3.2 Empty questions and alternative conceptual schemes 
As was argued in chapter 2, it is an empty question whether a person persists through 
empirical change. On the assumption that over any interval (no matter how brief) there 
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will be some empirical change (no matter how trivial), it follows that it is an empty 
question whether persons persist per se. As such, what we ordinary describe as a single 
persisting person could just as accurately be described as a series of distinct persons. 
Indeed, it could be described as a series of (infinitely many, if time is dense) momentary 
persons. My disagreement with someone who denies that I am the same person who began 
writing this sentence – or even that I am the same person from one moment to the next – 
would be merely verbal. It would not be like the substantive disagreement we would have 
with someone who thinks the Sun orbits the Earth. It would be like disagreeing with 
someone about whether Jurassic Park is an ‘old’ film. Or, more accurately, it would be 
like disagreeing with someone who contends that no films are ‘old’. Any failure on our 
part to accept this is due to our inability to shake off the Non-Reductionist shackles. 
If a single persisting person could just as accurately be described as a series of distinct, 
momentary persons, then a conceptual scheme which lacked the concept of diachronic 
personal identity would be just as metaphysically accurate as ours. Whereas we use ‘I’ to 
refer to our past and future selves, an alternative scheme could use ‘they’, and ‘we’.  
Under this ‘we’ scheme, you would regard your past and future selves as temporal 
ancestors and descendants rather than as you. If someone were to ask me ‘what are you 
up to at the moment?’, I would reply something like ‘we’re just working on the thesis’. 
Thinking in this way is of course difficult to imagine. And perhaps for some it is not 
pleasant to imagine. Brueckner puts it nicely: 
Maybe one [scheme] is more comforting than another, or maybe one has some 
other desirable consequence. But if the question really is empty, then no [scheme] 
is better than another in respect of truth, or of conformity to the facts. (Brueckner 
1993, p. 15, emphasis in original) 16 
We can speculate about the practical benefits of an ‘I’ scheme over a ‘we’ scheme. Prosser 
(2016: 183) suggests that a perceptual system that represents objects as enduring would 
be more computationally economic than one that represents them as perduring. The same 
kind of consideration holds for a cognitive system that conceptualises the self as a 
persisting entity rather than (infinitely many) momentary ones. Further, thinking of my 
                                                          
16 To be accurate, Brueckner’s quote is not one in which he is comparing the two conceptual 
schemes as I am. Rather, he is comparing the two ways of describing an outcome when it is an 
empty question. We could describe a situation as involving one person, or we cod describe it as 
involving two distinct persons. But neither description is better than the other in terms of 
‘conformity to the facts’. What Brueckner says for descriptions goes equally well for the two 
schemes I am comparing.   
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temporal descendants as me means that I have a unique sort of future-directed concern 
that has clear evolutionary benefits. I am avoid painful situations because I don’t want to 
feel pain; I sacrifice immediate gratification so that I may reap the long-term rewards. 
That is not to say I don’t care whether others feel pain, or that I never act in ways that 
benefit others over myself. But the drive to do so is different when I think of the future 
person as me.  
A ‘we’ scheme would have its advantages, though. In thinking of our temporal relatives 
as ‘others’ we would be liberated from Non-Reductionism. We wouldn’t fall into the trap 
of thinking that our persistence is metaphysically significant. And, as the concept of 
personal identity is necessary for the belief that A-change is experienced, we wouldn’t 
fall into the trap of thinking that time seems to pass either. Without the concept of personal 
identity it would be impossible to believe that I could be the subject of two states of affairs 
obtaining at two different times. It would make no sense to suppose that I am experiencing 
Q replacing P.  
This is the general thrust of the account. There is still more to be explained, but it might 
be helpful to do so in response to some objections one might have.  
5.3.3 Objections 
The first objection is that my account will do nothing to convince PT intuitionists that 
they are wrong. My claim is that time would not seem to pass under a ‘we’ scheme; that 
it would make no sense to suppose that we have experiences as of A-change. Even if this 
claim is true, it does not show that (A1) – that we have experiences as of temporal passage 
– is false. The question of whether or not we have experiences as of A-change is left open. 
The PT intuitionist thinks we do have experiences as of A-change, and so they would 
regard my account merely as showing that, were we to adopt a ‘we’ scheme, we would 
be prevented from recognising the fact that we do indeed have that kind of experience.  
Further, because of this, they would be unwilling to accept my claim that a ‘we’ scheme 
would be just as metaphysically accurate as our ‘I’ scheme. Our ‘I’ scheme makes it 
possible for us to recognise the existence of a certain kind of experience – viz. those that 
represent A-change. If these sorts of experience would be absent from a ‘we’ scheme, 
then the ‘I’ and ‘we’ accounts are not equally legitimate ways of conceptualising and 
describing the world. The ‘I’ scheme should therefore be preferred. And so the proposed 
PT error theory could never even get off the ground. 
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What this objection brings to the fore is the need to distinguish between two parallel ‘I’ 
schemes: a Reductionist one and Non-Reductionist one. As argued, Reductionists should 
accept that persons persist through empirical change merely as a matter of linguistic 
convention. It is convention to say that persons persist, but this persistence is not 
‘metaphysically significant’. This runs counter to our deeply held intuitions about 
personal persistence. I cannot help but feel that my persistence is metaphysically 
significant. Try as I may, I cannot shake the instinct that my diachronic identity is more 
than a matter of linguistic convention. When I take action to avoid pain, it is not because 
I can call that future person who would otherwise have suffered ‘me’; it’s because they 
are me - or so my intuitions tell me. As a Reductionist, I believe these intuitions to be 
faulty, but they are so ingrained in the way I think that it is seemingly impossible to 
override them. I am intellectually Reductionist, but instinctively Non-Reductionist. The 
first-person concepts I cannot help but employ invoke the metaphysical significance that 
I, as a Reductionist, regard as irrational.  
We can, however, recognise the possibility of a different conceptual scheme that 
contained first person concepts, but in which those concepts did not invoke the 
metaphysical significance that ours do. Under such a scheme, ‘I’ would be directly 
equivalent to ‘we’ in the ‘we’ scheme. As it stands, our concept ‘I’ is not equivalent to 
the ‘we’ scheme’s ‘we’ – precisely because of the metaphysical significance first person 
concepts invoke. So although the two schemes would use the same first person words – 
‘I’, ‘me’ etc. – the concepts they contained would be importantly different. The concepts 
in our ‘I’ scheme are Non-Reductionist in that they invoke, or assume, the metaphysical 
significance entailed by Non-Reductionism, but we can recognise the possibility of a 
Reductionist ‘I’ scheme in which they don’t. 
Now that we have distinguished between Reductionist and Non-Reductionist ‘I’ schemes, 
we can see that my earlier claim that an ‘I’ scheme and a ‘we’ scheme would be equally 
legitimate – as equally accurate metaphysically speaking – is in need of clarification. A 
‘we’ scheme would be as metaphysically accurate as a Reductionist ‘I’ scheme. But, 
because our Non-Reductionist ‘I’ scheme attaches unwarranted metaphysical significance 
to first person concepts, a ‘we’ scheme would actually be more metaphysically accurate 
than our ‘I’ scheme. 
This answers the objection above. Yes, our ‘I’ scheme enables the belief that we have 
experiences as of A-change. But our ‘I’ scheme is Non-Reductionist, and as such it is 
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defective. A Reductionist ‘I’ scheme would correct this defect. To get an understanding 
of the implications adopting a Reductionist ‘I’ we can look to those of a ‘we’ scheme, 
since a ‘we’ scheme would be as metaphysically accurate as a Reductionist ‘I’ scheme. 
Under a ‘we’ scheme it would make no sense to suppose that we have experiences as of 
A-change; and so under a Reductionist ‘I’ scheme it would make no sense either. It is 
therefore only because we possess a faulty Non-Reductionist ‘I’ scheme that (A1) seems 
plausible. Could we correct our conceptual scheme, and fully realise the superior way of 
conceptualising reality that a Reductionist scheme would enable, we would not say that 
time seems to pass.  
The second objection one might have concerns the proposed account’s focus on subjects 
of experience, rather than the experiences themselves. And in doing so, the objection 
would run, I have made the assumption that experiences are individuated by subjects. 
Only if it is impossible for a single experience to be experienced by distinct subjects 
would it make no sense that two distinct subjects could have an experience of Q replacing 
P. And so the ‘we’ scheme would preclude the thought ‘I am experiencing A-change’ 
only if the concept of ‘experience’ is such that experiences are individuated by subjects. 
Even if experiences are individuated by subjects according to our conceptual scheme, that 
doesn’t mean the same would be true of a ‘we’ scheme. Perhaps under the ‘we’ scheme 
it would be natural to suppose that a series of distinct subjects could share the same 
experience. And if that were the case it would still make sense to suppose that A-change 
could be experienced. So it cannot be claimed that a ‘we’ scheme wouldn’t yield the 
intuition that we have experiences as of A-change.  
What this objection highlights is that the operative concept is not personal identity per 
se, but rather experiential identity. Personal identity is relevant only insofar as our 
conceptual scheme individuates experiences by subjects. But, if we are Reductionists, we 
do not need the concept of ‘subject’ in our conceptual scheme. If personal identity just 
consists in empirical facts, all we need in our scheme are the concepts that refer to those 
lower-level facts. We could do away with the concept of ‘subject’ altogether (Parfit 1999). 
We could adopt an impersonal conceptual scheme, and this scheme would be just as 
accurate as the ‘I’ or ‘we’ scheme.  
Our concept of ‘experience’ comes attached to the concept of ‘subject’. An experience 
can’t be an experience unless it is experienced by a subject. This is a matter of definition. 
An impersonal conception scheme however would have the concept of ‘experience*’, 
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which does not demand the existence of a subject.17 ‘I am experiencing A-change’ would 
then translate to something like ‘this is an experience of A-change’. In order for this to 
make sense, we would need the concept of experiential identity; that the same experience 
could be an experience of P at t1 and of Q at t2. And from here we can see that the same 
line of argument relating to personal identity will apply to experiential identity. The same 
epistemological arguments that are effective against Non-Reductionism about personal 
identity are also effective against Non-Reductionism about experiential identity. 
Consciousness is not a non-physical substance; if we are to say something informative 
about what experiential identity consists in, we must say something empirically 
informative. That being the case, questions of experiential identity will be empty. As such, 
an alternative conceptual scheme which lacked the concept of experiential identity would 
be just as accurate as one that didn’t. And, under such a scheme, it would make no sense 
to suppose that an experience could be both an experience of P at t1 and Q at t2. The 
experience of P at t1 could not be the same experience as that of Q at t2.  It would therefore 
make no sense to suppose that an experience could be an experience of A-change; and so 
the thought that an experience could be an experience as of A-change would be 
unthinkable.  
5.4 Summary 
PT error theory is highly unintuitive – so unintuitive, it is often assumed to be false. But 
the principle that would justify such an assumption – that what seems to be the content of 
experience is the content of experience – needs to be treated with suspicion. As we have 
seen, this principle is controversial even within the PT intuitionist camp. Further, 
evidence from psychology – for example, regarding the amount of detail represented in 
visual experience – shows that in some cases it is possible to be mistaken about the 
content of one’s experience.  
Maybe the PT intuitionist would concede that the principle is not true for all cases, but 
maintain that, at least in the case of temporal experience, it is. The problem with this 
manoeuvre is that someone can only make it at the expense of facing a dilemma in which 
they fit in with neither the conceptualists nor the nonconceptualists. The PT error theorist 
                                                          




on the other hand has the freedom to be a conceptualist or a nonconceptualist. PT 
intuitionism cannot be assumed true; PT error theory deserves a seat at the table.  
The B-theorist may therefore reject the A-theorist’s motivating intuition that experience 
represents time passing. Provided, that is, they can explain how it is we come to make 
such a mistake. It has been proposed that this mistake results from our Non-Reductionist 
conception of the self. We naturally suppose that our persistence is metaphysically 
significant, that questions of identity are not empty. This conception of the self is built 
into our conceptual scheme in the form of first person pronouns. Because Reductionism 
is true, however, questions of identity are empty. As such, a ‘we’ scheme would be just 
as accurate as an ‘I’ scheme. Further, once we distinguish between Reductionist and Non-
Reductionist ‘I’ schemes, we can see that our current scheme is a Non-Reductionist ‘I’ 
scheme; and that a (Reductionist) ‘we’ scheme would therefore be metaphysically 
superior. The intuition that I experience A-change – Q replacing P – necessarily 
presupposes that I am the same subject that experiences both states of affairs. Without the 
concept of personal identity (and experiential identity), it would make no sense to suppose 
that I could experience A-change. Such an experience would be impossible to 
conceptualise. And so it would be impossible to conceptualise an experience as of A-
change. We would be faced with a certain phenomenology, but we could not characterise 









The A-theorist’s argument from experience is simple and intuitive, and captures the main 
motivating intuition behind the common sense belief that time passes: 
(A1) We have experiences as of A-theoretic change, 
(A2) the best explanation for (A1) is that A-theoretic change occurs in reality;  
(A3) so, A-theoretic change occurs in reality.  
I have argued that neither of its premises should be accepted by anyone who holds a 
Reductionist view of personal identity.  
The first job was to define Reductionism, and show why Non-Reductionism should be 
rejected. This was the focus of Chapter 1. Parfit’s own definitions weren’t particularly 
helpful, even in his attempt at clarification in his later work. We saw that his definitions 
would end up counting some Cartesian Views as Reductionist, despite the fact he 
explicitly classifies them (and argues against them) as varieties of Non-Reductionism. 
The diagnosis of the problem was that Parfit defined Reductionism in terms of the 
grounding relation only, but without any mention of the entities between which the 
relations hold. Having taxonomised the various possible positions, it was clear that a 
satisfactory definition needed to account for both.  
Since Parfit’s own attempts at defining Reductionism weren’t particularly helpful, it was 
necessary to ‘reverse engineer’ a definition. This was done by examining the arguments 
against Non-Reductionism, the idea being that those views not targeted would have a 
good claim to qualify as Reductionist. The epistemological arguments against the 
Cartesian Views were straightforward. In short, since we have no evidence of separately 
existing entities we shouldn’t believe they exist. Arguments against the other view Parfit 
explicitly classifies as Non-Reductionist – the Further Fact View – were not so 
straightforward. Since the proponent of the Further Fact View is a primitivist about 
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personal identity, they were able to resist the arguments of Shoemaker and Parfit. Other 
arguments against the primitivist were supplied by the Criterialists. These arguments 
focused on the disastrous epistemological consequences of denying the existence of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for persistence. Although there is logical room for a 
primitivist who accepts necessary and sufficient conditions for persistence, it was 
concluded that such a view was implausible for a number of reasons. Finally, I argued 
that the considerations that count against the primitivist’s Further Fact View also count 
against the ‘brute persistence views’: the views which say that personal identity consists 
in the brute persistence of an empirical entity. The only view left untouched by the 
criticisms was the view that personal identity consists in empirical relations holding 
between empirical entities. This gave us our definition of Reductionism.  
In Chapter 2 we examined Parfit’s Combined Spectrum thought experiment. Parfit’s 
target was the intuition that there is always a deep difference between identity and non-
identity. The argument he provided purported to show that there can be no sharp 
borderline or cutoff anywhere on the spectrum (where on one side we had a clear case of 
identity, and on the other a clear case of non-identity). He took this to show that identity 
can be indeterminate; and he claimed that when a question of identity has an 
indeterminate answer, that question is empty. By supplementing Parfit’s discussion with 
that of Ted Sider’s notion of nonsubstantivity, it was shown that Parfit’s claims were in 
need of clarification.  
Firstly, his claim that there could be no sharp borderline on the spectrum makes sense 
only if we read Parfit as saying that there can be no substantive sharp borderline. That is 
to say, there can be no borderline on the spectrum where on one side it is substantively 
true that the person persists, and on the other side it is substantively true that they don’t. 
That would require there to be a metaphysically privileged entity that the term ‘same 
person’ picked out, and that could make such claims true. Only the Non-Reductionist can 
claim there to be such an entity. There can, however, be many nonsubstantive borderlines 
on the spectrum (where we would be merely describing a case as involving identity or 
non-identity).  
Secondly is the claim that identity can be indeterminate. It was shown that it cannot be 
substantively true that identity is indeterminate, since that would require a metaphysically 
privileged vague entity – which, again, only the Non-Reductionist can posit. But identity 
will be indeterminate in the sense that it will be neither substantively true nor 
156 
 
substantively false that identity holds. Questions of identity can also have indeterminate 
answers in the sense that, since it is an empty question whether identity holds, we can 
legitimately describe identity as neither holding nor not holding. Both these sorts of 
indeterminacy result from the fact that questions of identity are, given Reductionism, 
empty, or nonsubstantive.  
I then argued for a stronger conclusion that Parfit’s: given the truth of Reductionism, it is 
always an empty question whether a person persists through empirical change. Parfit’s 
restriction is unjustified. This claim was then extended to experiences: on the assumption 
that it is impossible for two persons to be subjects of the same experience, this means that 
it is always an empty question whether experiential identity holds. Experiences have 
temporal extension, but only because of the way we talk. It would be no less 
metaphysically accurate to describe experiences as strictly momentary states.  
In Chapter 3 this ‘Neo-Parfittian’ claim about experiential identity was defended against 
the arguments of Ian Phillips and Matthew Soteriou. Both argued that there are cases 
where we can only make sense of momentary experiences as part of extended experiential 
wholes. If true, the question of whether an experience has temporal extension would not 
be empty, since experiences would be fundamentally extended. Coincidentally, Soteriou 
and Phillips both argued that their preferred ‘holistic’ conception of experience was 
uniquely placed to make sense of certain aspects of motion perception.  
I began with Soteriou’s argument. Soteriou argued that a puzzle was brought about by the 
conjunction of the following two assumptions: firstly, that a subject’s awareness of an 
observed event has the same temporal extension as the observed event, and secondly, that 
when a subject is in a given state over an interval, this is determined by the fact that they 
are in that state at each moment during the interval. These two assumptions were puzzling 
because a subject who is aware of an object’s movement from location L1 at t1 to L10 at 
t10 can be said to be in a state of awareness that obtains from t1 to t10; but if they are in 
a state of awareness then we must be able to attribute them that same state – being aware 
of the object’s motion from L1 to L10 – at each moment during that interval. But at t1, 
the object has yet to reach L10; so we can’t attribute them such a state of awareness! 




I countered by arguing that the puzzle can only be generated by presupposing the 
‘atomistic’ conception – the conception of experience that Soteriou is arguing against – 
to be false. If the atomist accepts that the proffered mental state obtains they will have to 
deny the second of Soteriou’s assumptions; and if they accept the second assumption they 
will have to deny that the subject is in the proffered state. Either way, there is no puzzle. 
Soteriou therefore failed to show why the atomistic conception of experience should be 
rejected. Further, the solution he offered required us to reject a representationalist theory 
of perception and commit ourselves to a relationalist theory instead. The atomist solution 
made no such demands, and so is the preferable option.  
Next we looked at Phillips’s argument, which made use of a puzzle raised by Delia Fara. 
The puzzle resulted from the two obvious facts that, firstly, we experience constant 
motion, and secondly, some positional changes are too small to be perceived. Phillips’s 
solution had two commitments at its heart: that experience has a ‘temporal field’, and that 
the content of this field is purely determinable over short enough sub-intervals. Phillips 
claimed that these commitments can only be accepted by the holist.  
My response to Phillips was to point out that his notion of a temporal field as a sort of 
window through which we can directly perceive extended events had unacceptable 
neurological consequences, and ran together two importantly distinct neural mechanisms: 
one that computes positional change, and one that computes ‘pure’ motion. By separating 
these mechanisms out, a much simpler, atomistic solution became available. All we need 
to make sense of the two troublesome facts that Delia Fara raised is the claim that a subject 
enjoys non-illusory motion phenomenology when and only when an observed object is in 
a sufficiently different position from a sufficiently recent position it was observed in. 
Neither Soteriou nor Phillips succeeded in undermining the atomistic conception of 
experience. Far from it; the puzzled they presented can be dealt with far more effectively 
by the atomist than the holist.  
Having defended the Neo-Parfittian claims about personal and experiential identity, they 
were put to work against the A-theorist’s argument from experience in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Chapter 4 focused on (A2) of the argument from experience: the claim that the best 
explanation for our experiences as of passage is that time really passes. I argued that, even 
if we allow that our experience represents A-change, this representation would not 
provide evidence of an objective phenomenon.  
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If it is an empty question whether experiences have temporal extension, any theory that 
posits extended experiences in order to explain how we perceive events will depend for 
its success on linguistic convention. Hence, these theories should be rejected. Theories 
that posit momentary experiences, I argued, do not suffer from this problem. Hence, our 
perceptual awareness of events must be accounted for within momentary experiential 
states.  
Given that only those theories that posit momentary experiential states are tenable, our 
awareness of events must be ‘derivative’; when we are aware of an event, this awareness 
must be derived from our awareness of instantaneous states during that event. Several 
reasons were given for this. For one thing, if our awareness of events was non-derivative, 
information about the world would have to be ‘beamed’ straight into our brains, bypassing 
our sense organs and the associated causal mechanisms. Further, we would have to accept 
temporal nonlocal interactions. Although controversial, this might not be such a problem 
for a B-theorist; but it was shown to pose deep problems for the A-theorist. Our awareness 
of events cannot be non-derivative.  
It was then argued that, since our perception of events must be derivative, A-theoretic 
change cannot be an object of experience. A-change, I claimed, is an event with the 
metaphysical structure of ‘state Q replacing state P’. If our awareness of events is 
derivative, then our awareness of A-change would be derived from our awareness of state 
P, and of state Q, and of the ordering of those states. But we would not be aware of the 
replacement. The obtaining of states P and Q in an order is something the B-theorist 
accepts, so at most this awareness would be an awareness of B-theoretic change. Anything 
that is beyond our perceptual grasp cannot be an object of experience, and, as such, A-
change could not be an object of experience. If A-change cannot be an object of 
experience, then we could never have a veridical experience of A-change. But if we could 
never veridically experience A-change, then, if we are to assume that A-change is at least 
represented in experience, we must accept it as a misrepresentation. As such, this 
representation cannot be taken to evidence an objective phenomenon. (A2) was thereby 
refuted.  
The final chapter of the thesis addressed (A1) of the argument from experience: that we 
have experiences as of A-change. In response to this premise I proposed a cognitive error 
account of temporal experience. 
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To many, it will seem just obvious that we have experiences as of A-change. And so the 
prospects for an error theory did not look good. Efforts were made to soften these 
intuitions. We began by considering a general principle that would justify the common 
sense view that such an error theory would be obviously wrong: that what seems to be the 
content of experience is the content of experience. If this principle were true, we could 
never be mistaken about the content of our experience. I firstly discredited this principle 
by showing that it is controversial even amongst those who think we do have experiences 
as of A-change. Further, evidence in psychology shows that we do make mistakes about 
what is represented in experience – such as when we uncritically suppose our visual field 
is far more detailed than it actually is – and that these mistakes can be ubiquitous. Further, 
if an account like Dennett’s is true, then we are radically mistaken about the content of 
our experience.  
It would be a mistake to suppose that we are infallible judges of our own experiential 
content. The prospects for a restricted version of the principle – that we are at least 
infallible judges of the temporal content of our experience – were considered. By situating 
this principle within the debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists, its 
proponent was shown to face a dilemma. Conceptualists think that, if we are subject to a 
particular experience, we will possess the concepts to correctly characterise that 
experience. Since the proponent of the restricted infallibility principle thinks that it is 
impossible to be wrong about the temporal content of experience, they must hold that we 
possess the correct concepts to characterise it. Hence, they think the temporal content of 
experience is conceptual. This is where they face the dilemma: they could either be a 
nonconceptualist (if they think that at least some mental content is nonconceptual), or a 
conceptualist (if they think all mental content is conceptual). If the former, they will find 
themselves alienated from the rest of the nonconceptualists, since nonconceptualists 
argue that experiential content isn’t conceptual; but if the latter, they will alienate 
themselves from the rest of the conceptualists by disagreeing over whether the concepts 
of content has explanatory priority. Whichever way, they will find themselves facing stiff 
opposition from both sides of the debate. But, by rejecting the infallibility principle, we 
are free to side with either.  
This opened the way for a cognitive error theory. I suggested that the mistake we make 
when we characterise temporal experience can be thought of as the same kind of mistake 
we make when we characterise hard objects as feeling as though they are ‘saturated with 
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mass’. When we say that objects do not seem to be mostly empty space, we should not 
say our experience is illusory; rather, we simply have a false belief bout what the 
representation is (as) of. The question then of why we have the false belief in the case of 
temporal identity was addressed.  
It was proposed that, since it is an empty question whether a person persists, an alternative 
conceptual scheme which didn’t contain the concept of diachronic personal identity – a 
‘we’ scheme – would be just as metaphysically accurate as an ‘I’ scheme that did. 
Moreover, we can distinguish between two sorts of ‘I’ scheme: our Non-Reductionist one 
(in which persistence come attached with the notion of metaphysical significance) and a 
Reductionist one (in which it doesn’t). I argued that a ‘we’ scheme would be preferable 
to our ‘I’ scheme. Under such a scheme I would use ‘we’ to refer to a part of my 
temporally extended self that included my present state; and ‘they’ when referring to a 
past or future self. I would consider my past and future selves as distinct subjects of 
experience. I would still be able to recognise and value the special kinds of relations that 
would hold between me and these temporal counterparts – in much the same way that I 
do with those I love, share ancestry with, and have memories in common with. But, in 
much the same way, I would regard them as ‘others’.  
The consequences of fully assimilating such a conceptual scheme would be far reaching, 
and throw into question the justifications for many of our common practices. For example, 
the notion of responsibility would be upended: how can I be praised or blamed for 
someone else’s act? Similarly, acts of future-directed self-interest might be reasonably 
viewed as a sort of nepotism.1 Parfit argued that identity was not what matters in survival, 
and used this claim to construct an ethical framework around. The position I have been 
arguing for would no doubt require an extension of his ideas, but much work would need 
to be done in order to determine exactly what this would amount to. For now, however, 
the consequence we are interested in is the impact this way of thinking would have on 
our beliefs about time and our experience of it.  
The A-theoretic notion of temporal passage, we have been supposing, is of a type of 
temporally extended event with the metaphysical structure of ‘state Q at t2 replacing state 
P at t1 as the presently obtaining state’. In order for it to make sense that a I could 
experience A-change, therefore, I must suppose that I experience both states. But since 
                                                          
1 That is not to say these acts would be unjustifiable; but if we were to continue practicing them, 
we would presumably need to alter the ways in which we justified them. 
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the states obtain at different times, this would require the concept of diachronic personal 
identity. Without the concept of personal identity, we would not intuit that both states 
were experienced by the same subject. I could not intuit that I – a single momentary 
subject – experience A-change. Since the content of a non-veridical experience of X is 
parasitic on the content of a veridical experience of X, I could not therefore intuit that I 
have experiences as of A-change. The intuition expressed in (A1) of the argument from 
experience should therefore be considered as a sort of side-effect, or by-product, of a 
faulty conceptual scheme. 
The Neo-Parfittian account presented does, however, leave some questions unanswered - 
most notably, if the intuition that time seems to pass is a side-effect of a faulty Non-
Reductionist conceptual scheme, how then should we characterise temporal experience? 
What would we say were we to adopt a properly Reductionist conceptual scheme? This 
will be an important question for future research.  
A fruitful place to start might, I suspect, be Le Poidevin’s (2007b: 95) suggestion that we 
project A-theoretic properties onto a B-theoretic world, in much the same way that 
projectivists think we project secondary qualities onto the world.2 The projectivists’ basic 
idea is that secondary qualities – such as colour – do not belong to the objects that we 
ascribe them to. Rather, the primary (e.g. light reflective) qualities of the object cause us 
to have an experience of colour, which we then project back onto the object.  
Now, we couldn’t give this exact account in the case of A-change if the phenomeno-
temporal error theory is true. A projectivist account would say that certain primary 
qualities in the world cause us to have experiences as of A-change, which we then project 
back onto the world. But the central claim of the account I have proposed is that we don’t 
have experiences as of A-change in the first place. There might nevertheless be something 
worth pursuing in the idea that temporal passage is a secondary quality.  
One way of distinguishing between primary and secondary qualities in the Lockean 
tradition is brought out in the following passage: 
[T]o grasp the concept of red [a secondary quality] it is necessary to know what 
it is for something to look red, since the latter constitutes the satisfaction 
condition for an object’s being red. In contrast, to grasp what it is for something 
                                                          
2 See e.g. Boghossian & Velleman 1989 for a projectivist account of colour. Le Poidevin (2007b: 
96) defends projectivism about A-theoretic properties against an argument by Gale (1968). 
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to be square [a primary quality] it is not constitutively necessary to know how 
square things look or feel. (McGinn 1983: 8) 
Since we don’t need to experience primary qualities in order to know what they are, we 
might say that concepts for primary qualities can be grasped ‘purely intellectually’. We 
can understand the concept of ‘square’ so long as we have the concept of ‘line’, ‘angle’, 
‘point’ (and so on), and understand how they relate to one another. We might say that 
‘square’ is conceptually structured in this sense. On the other hand, we can’t grasp the 
concept ‘red’ without experiencing redness. We might say that secondary qualities are 
essentially sensible properties.   
Intuitively, hard objects feel solid* - they seem to feel ‘saturated with mass’. This concept 
can be grasped purely intellectually. We don’t need to know what a solid* object would 
look or feel like to be able to understand what ‘solid*’ means. Our grasp of ‘solidity*’ 
comes from our grasp of ‘mass’, ‘saturation’, etc., and how these concepts are related in 
instances of ‘solidity*’; we understand what solidity* is because we have a grasp of its 
conceptual structure. Hence, solidity* is a primary quality. However, I have argued that 
the experience does not represent solidity*. One suggestion would be that the experience 
doesn’t represent a primary quality at all. Instead, we mistake the representation of a 
secondary quality for a representation of a primary quality. We are subject to a 
representation of an essentially sensible property, but we misattribute this representation 
with a conceptual structure.  
Such an account would take a great deal of developing. But if it could be made to work 
in the case of solidity*, there is no obvious reason it couldn’t work in the case of temporal 
experience. The idea would be that the phenomenology we associate with temporal 
passage – what is often called a ‘dynamic’ phenomenology – would be that of a 
representation of a secondary quality. We then misattribute this essentially sensory 
representation with the conceptual structure of A-theoretic change. What is responsible 
for this misattribution is, I have argued, our Non-Reductionist conceptual scheme.  
I hope to have provided a compelling case against the A-theorist’s argument from 
experience. Neither premise should be accepted by anyone who isn’t prepared to face the 
disastrous epistemological consequences of Non-Reductionism. Intuitively, our 
persistence is metaphysically significant. And, intuitively, the belief that time passes is 
justified by our experience of it. These intuitions are connected. Since our experience is 
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not metaphysically significant, we cannot trust the intuition that time passes, or even that 
we have experiences that represent it as such. It might be impossible to fully embrace 
Reductionism. Nevertheless, so long as we recognise its truth, we must try to resist our 
A-theoretic tendencies. We don’t have experiences as of temporal passage, nor if we did 
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